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SC[Il'O•!lly ove:r

not a ft'tllliliar•

t'~rm

Sinoa tllat t1me,
:umeU.ght by
V!ilt<!l

~>t'l

th<~

of'

term

was

Aille:r1oan people.

e;ov~~·tl!l>ent

the

bO'J1es and. pr1w

t1n1t<~d ~il,;iil,t'>S

smd

~bl"OlMi.

t&l':tl wh1Cih evO~(!)S d1r~parate :r<~<lot1ot1f:l whenevor•

is uttered.

te~~<oh~~:~rlil

it

tn the United. 3tsti;l!l 1 1t. is a tc,<rm which

it

\.UIU!llly lli&Htif<llSI>lil dilltlpJ:)I"OOi'l.tiOll Whli'nGViH'

by

oartc~l

it b&H! been tn•oj!;oted into thll}

C1g(<l-l.;iom> o:f'

1nd1vidu!ills, both

It is a

l·~;~;:l.oot'l

1n the

ho~Hllver•,

in'\u~~<

thE~

@;>"'nerti tion ago 1

and laymfo.n,

by bUJ'i!1Mslilmen ll!.t'ld

th•~

In

Gerl:t~l\\ny,

ustw.lly •mlOEhl'ld

it h

·man oo the street as an orderly form

of aGonom1c Ol"gani)J:;Il>t1on; in the
<ar<dor•sii~<ll<nlt

!£nglll:nd sueh ooopllllt•'!:l

ill dilfiO\olli!:!Hi'ld

llll!I.JOrity of th'l people d.ew

rem~tinder

of

Enrop<~

is ls.okltli£ 1 though the

0€-'l:'tt'lls

in

&,

f.la'IIOt'<lbla light,

Tbiw tliverglflnoe of opinion holds trt!l!;l 1n
Of,l,t't&,ll'l and their aotions tmd®l" the l<m.
Ft:l•~·op{;li!n n1~.tioo<S,

the llll!!tjor•ity of

ll!lgal eut1t1eo; !lnd

of their fane t:l.on:;;.

ar•:~

Oi\rtf>ls

not amenahl<i to

In

11nd in

r•0!;p!!H:lt

In O·!n'Hl!!lny rcnd.
:u···~

r·::>ooe:;;n1zed

P'~r,u.H:JUt1on

aont••,;;di~·ttn<Jt:l.on

to

e~:~

beoe.use

to thie view, the.

lliJ.Wlil Of ths 111'l1t>~d 3t<ilt<H! l'i!lij;.f';t•d Oell'l.<!!le 1~,!> Oll',!!;:;cn:l.a:atiO'Il.l~

1n the

\

restrj~:l.nt

ot' tlNl.d,s, ttnd thus ar® aubJlliot to indict•

Jll~<~nts

under tbi:l antit:ru.st law;;i.

th~llill'!l

laws

art~

'l'he only uception to

osrtN:!.n gov€lrtllllllltll> approved Biii$OOi.\llt:l.ons for

ttler~e a;r::mp~> b&i!l<i\ sJUIIf•Pt

the oerry:tng on of O.ltport &rnde•
\?~ob-PO!Il'0re.~e

und.er th.e

t>h<lt<~V<&r th+~
eXi!\lt.eno~S

ot 1918.

Aot

roex·i t; ox· dem•wlt oi' ea:vtels thit!ll:'

and. functions e.re of con!1lsquen.oa to every l"'"'tlon,

and lllt'eot;J.y or indJ.. ~''"ctly to fl.lmost ev<n•y :tndiV:hlunl in

the world 1 sinoe thilir
distribution

1~1:Hl

eervl.c®<h
~l.nd

at hollle

~nd

opel~:,tlon. ~;.f'f!>Otll

thc1 produot1on,

or th<l world' .s goods t!lnd

c~oxtst.unpt1on

eoonf.>mio t:;<nd pol1tlod

ab:ro.,,d s1re of such

,,ff,~cts

import!Ulc~ l'c<l\1

oi'

~:mrtols

to justify

a careful study of the aubj,;ct.

i<t the prese11t time•

laymen aee 1n th® o,;•rtlill syt-;tem
pollc 1cr~l

demo<:~t•acy

oorrel~ltlng

1!1,

tl'lre;c.~t

pote11tl<al

!il.l:ld a lllJ.ol;;;us for

tot<tllt~ri<ln sy~tt~1m.

aee in

sohol;:;,r,;, atnttlsmen

rn~any

t!'u~

~:md

to

bUr£i;aon1ng: of a

':l:ha rt'llllilt1o:nshlp wb.1oh tbellie

obat~rve:·s

C<ilrt,el s with totsll.t"<X'llln:ism hMI b''ile:n

!'Ollltex•a(l by Gernlany 's aft'lnity for. th.l.s form of e.oono:.llio

orggnl!l!&:it1on for over three
nt~t1on•s

!'.;en'.!lrntlon~>,

mil:tta.ristu in or.;e l);uni!l1:'lil't1on.

at1on of th:J

o~.~rtel

$'\!Pl

well as tbli!.t

!t h

this E;ssoo1-

ant't thill political 11lph&tc!!e of inte'i'·.,llt

1n Ge:rwf,\llY with 1'1h1ch this

1nv,~at1ga<tion

will b<>

oono~i':O!ld.

iJI;J)rrMny, the cl2.Ew1oal l<tnd of <HJ.l:'tfllo, bl!l!il

d.av~;~loped

thill t!ystem to its most ad'n'lnCEHl clegr'~'"'' lilnd fo:r· th.l.lll :r&.ason

an

E~Xam1n<J.tioll

to be
ca.rtr~l

edif.'yin~l:

of

r;,~l'many

1s

eart~l

orH:W:i.<.tlons should pt<ove

in giving an ins1£,;ht into tile 1nt,:>,rnr,,tiotwl

oper:>tioos in £fb.neral.

In addition to t'h'ilse. other

3
questions relating to G<l!rmany 's cartels will be closely
explored,

;.Jhat were the effects of th'" cartel system as
develop!:itd. 1n

Germ~my

stc<te?

wer<~>

What;

upon the poli'Cical 11rtr·uoture of thst

the effects of theit n.\l.tiotl 1 S int,,n•national

cart<ll agreements upon thC:> volurlles of pr•oouction, ceohno-

logical progress, and na tiol:l<""l defense prep:n·ation'l of
oountri,es abroad?

It will be the purpos(l) of this paper t;o

attiilmpt to answ<H' these questions, which for too long a
time have been gi1nm only a, modicum of attention.

An eco-

nomic and his tor :I. cal analysis of' the; c.artel ays tam in

Germany OVIllr the past

ti~Emty-fiV<ll

years should se1•ve t;he

l''u•pose of f'ocu:'liug: new light on cnrtel

iiH1Uiill':1

wh1ah for too long a time in the past "nd

and problems,

p~·esent

have been

submerged in world indifference.

!n tbis study of
agreem<:mts there

~'ill

G·~H'momy 1 s

1nternat1onal cartel

be some shortcomings in the textual

ma,t;er:l.als during oerta.in periods of time covered in this
report.

'I'his is due both to public apath.y in respect to

cartels, and th0 reluotauce of firms to publici;;::e their

cartel
of this

ar•rangeu1en·~s.
r<.~port

In addition to this the ooin <nnphasis

will streFJs t;h<J :r'!'Wlifioations of Gel'ruany 's

cartel upon the United. States in the decade

preoe,~ding
- -----------

~Jorld

liar II.

'l'hia does not detract from the equally

in:tportant effects G,n•many 's cartel oper2t:l.ons had upon

4
other nations, but is indic.stive of the dearth of material
av·ilable to this writer on cartel ag1•eememta abroad.

Though this shortcoming is unfortunatre in respect to other
nations, it is appropriate thr.t emphas:ts be focused upon
the United St;e.tes bace.uae o!' its position of' leadership,
induiJtri;,~lly

speaking, dtlring the era c;)vered in this

report.
....

This report will first exa.mi.ne

th~~

word cartel in

order to give the reader an insight as to the definition
of this te:t'lll.

'l'his is necessru•y sinoe there is some dis-

during the period und.er consideration,

or

Though the intent

this report is tb,;; exploration of Gerlll<"•llY 1 s intePnational

cartel effects, the inclusion of that m1t1on 1a domestic
cartels is warranted by their relationship and similarities.

From this point the rt;port will proceed to give a
bri<!f hlstol'ical sketch of' ttHl devdopment of' cartels to

the present day, with special attention bein, giv-?n to the
growth of German cartels,

Inol1:1ded in this analysis \vlll

be t;ho philosophical and legal basis for their g:rowth.

'I'he role played. by OH.rtels in the r.:l.se of Hitler to

power and thCJir

r<~lationship

be scrutinized a.'1d .av11<lUt1. tad.

1v1th Nat;l.onal Soc.ialism w111
At LenUon will then be giv<n'l

5
to specific case histories of international cartel relationships between German and foreign firms.
The selection of these specific oases was dictated
by the importance of the products involved in the agreements.

Emphasis was given to materials which are considered

strategic by nations and which vitally effect both a nations
peacetime well-being, and its ability to defend itself in
time of hostilities,

Px•oducts such as pharmaceuticals,

aluminum, rubber • magnesium are lnclud.ed .Vlmong other vi tal
commodities,

'rhe leading GerllFlm and foreign firms in these

shown, as well as the nature of the agreements.
Follo~Jillg

these specific oases, a oo!llp$ndium of the

effects of Germ;:m oartels upon

abroad will be preswnted.,

th<~

war ef.rorts of nlll.t:l.ons

lrlhether ·these ag:reem&nts were

motivated by economic or political considerations will be
discussed s.nd elaborated. upon on the ba.ilis of research
material,
The

functioning

or

Clermt~n

cartels du.ring the war

period and cartel legislation in occupied Germany in the
postwar period. will serve ar, a subject for another chapter,
This will serve to bri\~"; cartels, and their position in the

German economy, up to the present 1n respect to descriptive
analyais.

It is 1n this pa.rtioulm:· period beginning with

World War II to the present day, tha L there 1s tlle greatest

6
paucity of materials germane l;;o the study of Germany •s
international cartel op<H'at1ons.

This is an inher·ent

shortcoming i.n any endeavor which attem''iil to trace a
period of twenty-five years of histol'i¢lal evonts, but

i,-

particularly true in respect to cartels wit.h their
sub rosa agreements.

Fortunately some basis for analysis

1a possible from the material on the subject available to
the NlSearcher.

Before proeeedlng with this report it

should be pointed out to the reader that the subJect of
cartels is one in which objectiveness 1:;; di.ff'icult to
a.eb1ev.e.

This iii! due to the hot that the majority of

writers and students of the subject are resolute in their
Opinions of cartles, as to their bemefioi'.'ll or pernicious
effects upon society.

'l?heve is seldom a tniddla ground in

respect to ones opinion of cartels, one is
or opposed to them,

Ftt1.d

<~it;her•

for them

moderation if:! usually lacking in a

disousfl.!ion of the sul>ject.

All! a vesuly of these

pr<Sjud~.ces

much of the material available on the subjeot 11as somewhat

great majority of the research mat;eriaJ.
was the

wo:rl~

w;s available

of American autllors who were oloslllo to unanimous

in their dislike of' ca:rtles,
closed later;

~hat

f'Ol'

veasons wbioh will be dis ...

impartial1 ty by the writer will be difficult.
------

It is the intention of the wr1Ce1•, however, to adhere to
the tenets o:r objective researoh, as far as is possible,

7
human f'rVc1lty not withstanding,

If this approach to

ob3"eoi,1vlty 1!l achieved, the study involved :l.n th1t3 report

will he amply reN\1trded.

'1'he

justif'1ct~t1on

for such a

<ttudy having; already been <oSC8.bl1shed by the events of

the past generation.

--------

CHAP'l'ER II

-TYPES AND HISTORY

The 1~ord 'cartel ~lli!li! f:l.ret wri·tten upon public records
on i'lay .5, 1879

~~hen

Eugene !Uehtar, a member of

tl:l~

German

lie1ohstag used :l.t in a meet1ng of that legislative body, to
denote private market control meehanJ.sms of' entreprenuera,l
'l'he word itself was oantur1es old,
enterprisers t<1as

!lin

~o'lnd

cooperation among

equally old established function, but

this was the first instance that; it appearerl upon a public

record.

Since its initial utt<n•anoe the

~~ord

has be<iln

submerged in a mir<9 of <iil!lput;e a.s to a defin:l.tive meaning.
The detln1tio.na
,,1r1te:r•s and

giv~n

ot~H>r'

to the word by oeonom1sts 1 teachers,

parti•J:lS intereete<J. :l.n ;ooonomic semantics

have been protean, and 1nv.ar1ably contain 11Uances of the
def'1ners own thought on

cQrt<:~~ls •

In the United Stertes, ttm

word usually is def1.ned in terms which .r;ive the connotation
of

g•~neral

1llegali ty.

usually define(~ wl.th

--------

11<

ln European cottntrles, the

tc~rra

cot1notation of acceptability.

1 E:rvin Hexner, i.;lterxt.,.tiontl Cartels, p. J,

is

9
Wha:tever one 1 s own defini t1on of e cart;lll, an analysis of
the various definitions given to the tenn seems Justtfisd
from the standpoint of economic analysis, if not from one
of lucidity.

'rhe term cartel is defined by &loooe writers on the

intent of minimizing or elim1:nat1ng competition among
·ckulmselvr~s.Z

some-what at

I,.o:rd

A definition given to th'"' ~~ord by en

v.~r.iance

l~c0owan 1

w1tb the first definition.

head of I:lr ::. tian 1 s ImpaJ.•l.al Chemical Industries

def1nes a cartel as a method of' orderly marR<Jting which
assures a planned. expansion Of international trade and leads

to the elimination of cutthroat praoticea.:.l

lf one makes use of the standard American college
d1ct1.onary he will find a cartel desl.n•ibed as an international synd.lcate, combine or trust generally formed to

regulf!.te prices and output in some field of

business~

4

·

Possibly tha most concise definition ElPP'""'rs in a

2
George W• :Stock.1ng and Myron
C§:lrtels 1n t\ctiou. p. ;.

~~. via tld.ns,

3Edward s. Maaon, u<rha. I?utu:re of Int!;'lrnational
Cartels," Forie:\.gn Affairs. Vol. XXII (Jllly 1944) p. 605.
4ctarenoe L. Barnhart, Ed. The A1nc1rloan Colle,l:re
Qictionary, P• 18.5.

-------
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dictionary of economics which defines cartels as, "contrgctual IM;sociBtions of indepema.ent business org<Inizations, located in one or more countries, formed for the
purpose of' :regulHti:ng: tho purchasing, procuct:l.on, or

mark<liling of goods by the members. 5
.Before proceeding furthtn• as to th® meaning of the
term, i t sl1ould be pointed out that the word. may have a

'
6 Because of
l egal as well as an economic definition.
tl!lis d:l.ohc)tmnous definition, the meaning of the term has
been

somewhat of le.te 1 due to its inoreEsed usag<o.

chan~J,'ed

Once 1t. stood simply

fox~

a contr.~'totual relationship,

usually enforceable at law, betwee11 a number of enter•
prisers who had bnnd.ed together for
in order to

b'3~t<Jr

~~

fixed period of time

regulate pr•ice 1 or produc-tion or ma.rket-

ing terms, or divide ax•e:!\ 1 or some other fi!H3.t1.tre of business
relating to a single o1• a closely l''01Tt;ecl c;:;•oup of commodi ties produced by its membet·s.

describe a C€tl'tel as

me~;ning

Now thc::_t the term has

any sort of compact - whether

:recognlz·ld and enforoeabl'21 by la.w or not - bGlt><een two or
more concerns wU;h the purpose of

.2(

manipul~l~lng

5Harold S, Sloan and Arnold .J. Zurcher,
p. l>8.

Econgt~,

one or more

A Dictionary

6 unole of Cartels in Nodern Economy," Foreig·n Policy
lieugrts, Vol, XX (October• 15, 19tfl.f} p, 182.

ll

of the

elem,~rrcs

of coruluoting business to tl'vs advanta;2,e

of' the participating parti,~s. 7

The legal recognition acool'ded to cartels has
occurred o.nly in N?spect to the o.omestic f'orm of' ce.rtelixation, and i t is hi2,hly Slfnif.l..c?nt th;s:.t to

th1~

present

time • the caP tel ht,s no le.gal statu": in international law, 5

Due to this lack of recognition in intar'n"tlonm.l

la~;,

a

legal definit·ion for the t•:>rm is applicable only to the
domestic variety of cartels.

h

comparison of domestic and

inte:rne..tional cartels, and the r•elationships and similarities
existing betvJe<:m them ia the next subj•illot; of inquiry.

- A COM!?'' '!SON

·the 11&me given to th0 t1•1o terms implies.

One type of'

organization functions within the bouncl:olriefl of a particular
country, the othGJr

C1.tts

acrosfl national bouudar·ies to reach

agreements with foreign oonc"'rns.

In es!1enoe, thf:l inter-

national type of cartel is the prototype of the.; d.i)mestic
cartel.

"ff{ober·t A. Brady, .Bus in'i.HlS .!!!!. .!:!. §¥8 tem .Qf. Povwx·,

-----

P• 239.

8

"Hole of Cs.r•tels in Nodern Economy," B'or'!!lq:~,
P9Ucll Reports, Vol, XX (Oot, 15, 194e.'!) P• 182

.

In some nations, cartels take the form of trusts
and pooling agreements and ar<l not illegal under domestic

raents on output and prices t•eaohed
trust mechanism.

>~i t~out

An objective s.ppraisal of oaJtels :requir(>S

discriminat.lng between cart0;ls Hnd. trusts,

. t:· ough there" tias no legal
between· th'ilm,

while a trust
units.?

the use of the

Ol'

In the United

economic dif'fcn•entiation

It must be rememb,3red that a cartel is an

rc~presents

oentra;L1zeq oont.Pol of dependen.!(

In organization and function trusts and cartels

differ; some trusts joined cartels, as chemical and
steel in gngland and in Germany, or used them as 1nstru-

the1l• structural organization,

The discussion that

Cj

~~111

f'ollO'i'l 111 a. lslte.r chapter

7Freder1ok Haussmann and Dan1el J, Ahern Jr.,
11 1U.sconcept1ons ahou.t Cartels,"
'l'he American Ht!>J:'Cur;y,
Vol. LX (l1<;.r•oh 1945) p, 299.

lJ
close r.:>lationship to domestic as well as the international

'ro give the reader a better understa.nding of

cartels.

cartel ·types in general, the following outlinl!! of cartels
ilil

pr'JJsentGd.

It includes both the domestic and inter-

national cPrt,el types ''<hioh existih.l. ill
European nations prior to \'l'orld 11Jar

:n.

use tu> a b.asis the particular phase

or

duction

<e~hioh

G'~rmany

>!!nd in other

'Che <.mtl:l.:ne will
m2wketi:ng or pr·o-

eaoh cartel alms to regl.lle:t;e the means

cbosen for its spec:l.f'ic purpose.

It is truo that; some

wrlt,<crs on cartels distinguish only three major types of

ror a mor<3 complete study, I b'i.llleve the follotdng
clasH1fioat1ons seem mox·a satisfactory:

I,

Cartels regulating phases of sale
A,

Hogu.la·tion of .sale terms
1.

3,

'I'erm cartels

Hsgula.tion of smles prices
1,

Calculat;1on C''H''tels

2,

Price cartels
a.

Ninirnum-pr1.oe cart,sls

b.

th1l:t'o:rm~price

eart<::>lll
--------

c.

Hlilf{;ttl~~ttion

1.
D.

II.

of !iH<br> p:rot'lt;s

Pl'Ofl t !'lh1w1ng oa:rteth

fh~gul~tt1on

of s.w.e.z

1.

'l~et'z•1tory ...p:r,~!let•vat1on oa:rt>r!l.:;

2.

Guilit0lller-pr!1!Silt:rwH;1.on

Cartels

r<~gulating

o>u·t~la

proo.ue.tion o:r ttri.!rketi.Ug

w.i thout oemtral selling

A.

outl~t

agq$~lOY

Production :ra{;ulation w:!.tnou;; output

r<l'lst:r1o Uon

13.

l.

P~tant

:z.

Sp~to1elha.t1on

l?roduot:l.on

cartels

ctu·tels

r<~e;ule.t1on

througl'l. <u<:u•keting

t'C;tStJ:•:I.ctiOl:IS

l.

2.

IUddin!\\"'t'<~~ulation

a.

Ot'd.lllcr allooiii.·tton oartl>ls

b.

Et1ibm1u1on oartels

ill!i'ldtet1ng•reatr1otion Ol'l.li't'>ll':l w1 t.h
all001irt1oo of

0.

st.L.<:~l:'G&.

lll<>r•kr.~ting

a.

F'bed

b.

l•!,n•k·::t•equaliii:atton n;:u•twls

o.

'1'tll:'t'l.over·-sQ.t•l'tllzst1.on

.Oir~ot

l.

c;;;rtale

shsr<i' eartliil'lliil

e~u·tels

p.rod.uo t:t.on-regulation eart<JlS

'IJithOUt fdloo;;~t10ll Of' IS)H'll'"'S
--------

a.

Plant r'ii!strleUon

<:~a:rt<)lS

1.5
2.

III.

tVl. th allooa t.1on of'

sh~'ilres

a.

!l'ixed production-share cartels

b.

Production-eqmJ.lieation oar•tels

Cartels x·eguln.t1ng production and marketing
'

through ce.ntral selling agencies (syndicate}

A.

II.

Agency sy:ndiomtes

lnternat10n<11 sht,'l.res with

mui~ual

:preservaeion

of domestic market

III.

Int0lrnational sh.r.ras allld specific subshares
for each market
Within the frwnework of the above functions,
cartels may adopt a:ny of ~he regu~
latory I'H:tlvltie;s of domestic cartels, 1 '
int~rnational

L_

---
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Having outlined ·the org,mization r>f both dom!l)stio
t'lnd intc,rn•.'l.tional o<>rtels 1 the next phase of this report
will define <:uta elaborate upon the various types of oa:rtels
cited in the outline.
:J;:e:rm C!i!rtel,

tih·~

'1'h1s is

s.troplest form of oartel

ag:reeruent ancl its :!"unction is to reg,u.late the terms of
sale which ths members may grant to th<:Jir customers,

Qalcula t:l.op, Cartels.

'J!h1s form of oa:rt!lll deter-

mines the oost-acoount:l.ng method. to be employed by the
ro.emben•s in det:11rruin:l.ng the price of tooir output.

Price Cetrtel.

In this form of cartel" an agree-

ment is concluded on whRtt un:l.fnrm price shr±ll be charged
to

t~

consumer tor a

p~~rtlcuh<r•

commodity.

'.!:here is usually

a minimum !Jrice which o&Hl be charged and a uniform selling
price.

':J:r&d!-l!liaf.\t:

Cartr~ls.

'l'he prov11lions of this form

of cartel agreemant stl!lte that th'(l assoo1<;;ted prod.uoers
of

trade-m<~rk

wholesal~>rs

goods agr:0e not to sell th,el!.' products to

or retl'lilers who

nwl.rk,~t

any of th•.il protected

trade-roark products below t;h£1ir fixed price.
Profi)!-sharin;& Cartelm. 'l'his type of cartel takeli!

diverse fo:rm 1 some h.-ave provisions requiring that a fi'Y..ed
p~reentage

of'

th~

total receipts of

~11 !ll('>Ulber•s

shall

p~~riod

:l.eally be paid :l.n&o a oom•non fund, whi11h is then distributed

17
witb allocation depa.ruii:ng upon rel.at;ive sh,,:.res of members.

Other typr"'s provide for a distribution of.' the diffel•e.moes

between a basic price and a s:elli:ng price,
'J,'§rJ: i Lory-presel'VA '>1.® Cftlt:tel.

'I'hllt put•pose of this

oa:r.tel i8 the mutu.al prol.:eotion by the affiliated enterprises· ot

~l1e\r

respecuve natural rna:c·keti:ng areas.

CI,!.St.omer~P;reseryat1on

is

~asually

'fh1s type of oartel

.Garte.j.s,

adopted by l.n.dustr:l.es t\lhosa t'ela.'tion

~<Jith

their

o·ustomers are of a more rlurable nature, iimd irrvolve a
considal'abl.® extentl.on of' ore<Ut by tlliii producer to the
purcha.se~r

of his pro<'\uot.

li'tgqucti.gp Cartel.

'.f.'he objeot1ves of' this cartel

are the regulation of the relative srvtr•llll or each member
1\'lnterprise l.n the !11>0lrket demand; thiil dim1nhtvss ·til<'>
p<:>!!lsibili ty of over- c:-!' ~:.:ue,.:zrproduction.
li)lten~

Cf!rjle},.

The purpose behind this cartel agree-

ment is the desir'e to expHnd the
by a

parllioul.~tl'

mar·k·~ t

for goods produced

ind.u.tltry by the mutuR1 use of pat,mts

certain members of the industry; this
;and ·the oondi tion<> of thl() excbang'ii!

~~re

lint~:>.bfil,H£;6

~tmong

of patents

agreed upon by the

respec·tive oODlp>.mies concerned.
§peclal~z!J13;1on

Cartels.

This type of cartel agree•

ment 1s in most ins ~~mce s found

in l.nd u:' trl. (iS which

manu•

faoture a large variety of products with great similarity
in the quality of each type,

By the terms or this

---------
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agreement each of th•;; affilia tail. n.ru1s i:i'
several products .tach

a

~~ssig:w~d

one or

l.s to manufac tur<.> exolus 1 vely ~

t)iddir<g-regulatjl,on Cartal;a.

':Chis .type is found

mainly :ln oompeti t i ve biddi.:ng entsrpri S(~S • and the inlmnt
of its

m·.~mlnrs

ilil to prevent underbidding amo:n.,q; competlng

members 1n a particular industry,

Ordel·-allooation cartels

and submission c•;u-•tels arc ex;?tm,,les .ot bi.dding-l•egul<:it1on

cartels.
11al•k!llt,..restrigtjl,on Qartels with. Allocation !ill:.

This type of oa;•tel does not impose any d il'clO c

l,Ulara§.

restrictions upon ths volume of prOduction of its memberliil.

In it;;; place 1 t allocates quotas to each
t~uanticy

memb01~

which it is pli'H'll!ittsd to market.

Included in this

type of cartel .are fixed-marketing cartels,
equall;;;a~ion

C<l..t'tels and

marke't;~

tu.rnov<~l·-equalization

The flrst type provides for ;a, fixed

sh~\N

J.>s to

cartels.

of' an't;icipated

sales, the second provides for oompel1Bat:1on to equalize
shares, and the last

involvr~s

a fixed she.r•e of the market

as expressed in moue hm•y terms •.

jf'lant-restriotion, .Qartels.

This type of cartel

usut?,lly follows one of three metnoos in its functioni:ng 1
the f 1rst b;;1:ng en ovet•all reduc t.ion by all associ<< ting
enterprises of the numbel' of shifts during; which mttchines

-------

may be employed., th.e second methocl being the px•ohibition

of the installation of new; rnachinery and lastly,
down of' a certain p0rcentage of machines .•

th~;;:

;,hut-

.
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a oertain qus,ntity, by limitins tht1 a:nount ®1>\0h firm can

put on the mat'lt;;;t..

'I'he quota

syt~ t<ol!!l

is UI'H.ld in t'lllOOAting

the market.
Qartel,-Stndicate,

In this

typr~

of cartel, thlll

ayr;d1oate, m<>de up of members of a particulB.r industry, acts
as the selling agency for all t1lembers and 1s

vest~d

H1th

authority to regulate the output of thi3 affiliated. f irrns

I

Internati.ona! Shar*s wi.th l'lutual Presarvation
Rornest1o Mm'ket,

In this form of cartel. acoot'd, El!!'Ch-- \

national cs.rtel receivc;s 1ts qu'lta. in th=__ <mtlre
national

ot\
'

llli!H'.'k<C~t 1 bl:~t

.

'

itl'l::i!~~

it ir> not permitted to sell its pro-

ducts in. th"l do:nastic m'r1tet cf >'U1Y of the ,<J,ffiliated

!nterU&t~on.;;.l :ShtU"<3S

!t!:!d

Subsh~.~res,

for

~Q.ll ~jarke!i_,

Under this arrangement eaoh affili®.ted na r.ional mC:trket

are then divided, inco ep.;oirio quotas for emoh me.rket.
Inb,il:rmlt:t~

M.ar~&et,

sell1ng

ShHres Without

fn~s•ll"V@.tlon

.2t Domestic

In this type o:f' oartel qg:reement, an internaUonal
syndicril.t>~

is orgem1:ged which

alloo,\Jt~es

all lnooming
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requisitions to the various national cartels in the ratio
to their shrilrel!l; 11

aotiv ities of the formal'.

Natur>'!.lly, the lnter·na t:l.onal

cartel is likely to be more dif.f1cult to f)rgB.nize and
oper·ate, but its essential ns,ture is similar to that of
the domestic cartel.
III. EAHLY. !USTORY

().!)'

OAfl'I'ELS - I.''ROrtl )000 B,C. 'J!O 1933 A.D.

Having deflned aJ,'IO. el<tsslfied cartels attention is
now directed to the history of t'lese inatltutions.
as it may seem, cartftls are not

net~

in

~h<lJ

Strange

field of economic

e.o't:l.vity, they started over four thowsand y<llars ago.
The history of c.a:r.tela began as early as JOCO

B.c.
l ..,,

in Egypt •·hich had at that time a munber of prioe cartels. '·
l?ollowing that data there is a dea1•th of information as to

-----
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marketil:'l<S cartel which had lts 1ncepUon in

l~ngland

in 1'?71.

WSIS bold but Unt-luocet;;>ful wRS attempted by Sit• George Cole-

brook to control the production 'md m!lrkethlg of alum, 13
':!'he Y.;ltgl1sh cold syndicates of 1771 alld 1835 were

early prototypes of modern c;u•tels, ·~s
fayenoe cartel, (1811) alld

1835. 11~

·~he

N6I'0

the FrGnoh

b1•aw<H'Y O<'>rtllll of Ghent in

The N<tJokar Salt Unio;t, :·>hlch t1Ht1 organized. ln 1828

Hesse, entered into

agreeme~nta

'llith the !>;astern Prench Salt

Works syndicate in 166? became a fo:rerunn'i;x' of mooern CB.r-

.

tels.

15
The chem:toal l:nO.us try provided ex<J.mplas of inter-

nat1onm.l syndicates in the latter half of the nineteenth
century.
Ac~tlc

'l'he Bismuth Syndicate; ths l3m·ax Syndica.tc, the

Acid Syndicate. the Carbide Synd1cate, and the

Ct1r-

_/

tels in the explosive 1ndt1.stry can all be cHed as being
prominent cart<llli> of the,t
international

C£~rtel1~

I!U'lh

In addition to these,

were formed by prod.ucere of poroebd.n•

table glass, e1atch glt:u;;a• !lnd enamelled. ware.16

-------------
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ment >vhich evolved with the mo;lern nation
cartel was a nntural growth of this
ism,17

';tv.tc~.

m·~r<},'f..nl;ile

·I'he

protect1on-

This syst•3!ll of economic prot·actionlem devalOJ.:vad

to a great degree ln the majority of !i:uropean countries,
a.nd as a resu.lt at the begint1ing of ;•Jorld !tlsr I,
was reported t;o be

<~t

ther~

lem1t 114· 1nt·3rn:1tional cartels 1n

existence , 1 .8

l?"lio P'i'>!i!Oe with !, 0,

(Septemb•or 1942) p, 105.
18Haussmann and Ahern,

1&.2.·

clt.

since they were the most numerous and fully dr9V<llloped in
this classic land. of Ocsrtels,

'Though thsy existed in other

lands prior to their appear:•ance in Gen:nany, 1t took the
.OI!llrman business mind with Hs p•3rWh<mt !'or orderly, regi-

1870 1 s, and are
slump which

rz~:c·<ll:·ded

follm~ed

as having developed out of the

the impstuou:.> and erl'atl.c industrial

immense war inctsmnity obtained from France follrMing the

provided the basis for an industrietl anti fins.ncial boom,
Thi!! boom

W9<'1l

·:]:uickly followed by the crisis of ll:l7J, which

was oonaidered by some economic histor•inml tts th,,: first
comprehensive crisis it'l tile modern economic v.u.n<ld. 1 B·scause

lJJouis Domeretzky, "Cartelil and th:' FJusill•'ilSS Cr-isis,"
f'o:r;eign AffeirrJ 1 Vol. X (October 1931) p. 3'7.

--------

,-----
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they were nurtured during this period of depression,

cartels fAre often designated as •otfsprillg;s of poverty. n2
'l'hese cartels achieved grectted s.:l.,i)';nificanoe after
1879 when the German economic system rnr,\de use of protective

tarl.ffa.

This same year ae,w the birth of one of Germany's

earliest cartels, the Lux6mburgh-Lothrit1ger Erzverband.J
In addition to being offsprings of poverty, cartels became

offsprings of protectionism.
1>11th the imposition of duties on the importation of

commodities •

Get'~M~n

producers of various c::.mmodi ties

instead of engf.tg1.ng in. co.mpet.itive practices among themselves

sa~>l

in the tat>iff' an opportunity to f'lx prices and

thus eliminate
selves.

~'!lY

"pernicious" competition among th•om-

'.Hth the tariff, a great stimulus was given to

the erection of industrial comblnextions which
to spread over the

,,~hole

•~ere

soon

of' the German \'i!Conomy.

Germa.ny continued being the srn'\w.n1ng gx•ound of
cartels into thfJl twentieth c<mtury and there wns a steady

itlcrease in their numbers.

In 1905 the H13:\.ch Ministry of

Interior counted 385 1 in 1908 the est,J.m<l,ted number of
2wnHam F. Bruck, Shlia.l and l!!qonomi~< History
11 .!i.Q H tl•ar, p. 9:3.

Oerm§lny £rom Willie

3I•'rank Hunk• 'J:he Legacy

!J.f.

Nazism, p. 16.5.

:2!.

C1H't<~1 S was placed at (lQO, L:.

These t'igur<~S did. not. X'f~veal

for tho prod 1g1ous growt;h of cartels in Gerrnany.

l~hy

•,;as

with this study.

method of protection for all proo.ucers, both larg'" and
small, though smb\ll px•oducers who needed prot,;,ction against
tl1,;;1r larger competitors '"nd trusts would benefit most by

produ.ction and distrl'bution policies the

intor<~sts

of the

-------
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consideration, a b;u·rler, more or• leHss

~emporary,

is built

cite the di:> tinction between indus ·tri91 concentration and
indus tr:lal coop"n'at ion; the for•mex· is .fl. trust and under a
centr,,_lized control, the lattBr

repre~o<'l.nts

full partici-

pation in the cont.x•ol of Uw or•gani:i%ttion by ind.ependent

the dominant. cause for t:h<::l gre 't growth of cc\l'tels in
/

Gernmny. 0

Unregulated CO!!Jpetltion to the majority of

Gel'lll:CU1 busirH:ssmen could offer' littlrj except economic chaos,

'l'hey <mvlsioned a continual struggle in th<" market v;ith
thil denouement predicted by the PrHnell economist Proudhon,

that "competition kills competition."

'l'he German attitude

tended, thEJr·efor'"• to look upon the principle of combination

in a fc;wora:ble light and. tis a means to assure

8\0fll<~

.1n•ofit

to each ot' the priv<->te business enterprises. 7
Economic stability was the idea employed. by G<Jrman

this t'orm of oX'g<ilt1ization could destructiv·0 competition
be elimiJ:l''•'ted, and only through this method could ord·arly
5Domeratzky, ~· cit,, p, )8

6Bru.uo Burn, Codeg, Qart<>ls. and ;-ls.tioney,J, Planning,

p,

1'1·5._

lA., J. Hor; ens te in 1 "liCM C 'rtel s Brolte the German
Q;anadil!&n 1\'or!:\m, Vol. xxrn (N"'r·ch l9h4) p. 279.

Hepubl1c,"
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markets be main:taimld,

Coopora.tion bred stal;Hi·ty; and

•Jtab:tlity bz•ed economic security, 8.nd. the domir.w:nt urge

eecuri t;y through organization,

by the national urge to d.rive

'This drive for meouri ty

·~vcwything

to a "logical"

conclusion, to anticipate and malce allowmces for every-

III,

'l'Hl' l,EGieL

\vhat is the legal status of cartels in. Gr;rmany?
Ho;'> do the courts view oou:iolnations·l
th0se are the ncsxt subject of inquiry.

'.luesclons such as
"£he findingo: mll.y

B

of economic r<Jlat iont>hl.ps. A deci ion of
,
ruling on a o~<ae involving a

Supreme Court

-

8G:Ubert B1-'uck, liThe Chlrman B~\slness Nind,"
Fprtune, Vol, XLIX (May 1954) p. 112.
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selling agency agreement among producers of wood-pulp in
1908, epitomized th& attitude of the German leg,Rl system

rt}gardJ.ng c;;u•tels.

lt stated in part:

"If in any branc.!'l of' industry the ;n·ices of pro Juc:t;s
s1nk too low and i f ttl~ thr1v1ng operation of the
industry is t;;·,ereby made '-mpossible or emd<mgered,
then the crisis whloh occurs is destz·uct;1ve not only
for i:nd.lvidllals, Jnt ~o;lso f'or the s'>cinl economy in
general, and 1 t .J.s t;harafore in the interes·i;s of the
eo=unity that unduly low prices 1n a branch of l.nd.ustry shall not permanently exist.n9
Opinions such as this pr•ovided a heal thy milieu

tor• the gr011th of cartelism in Germany.

l'hrn•.lghout their

history in that nation, thlil courts lla.ve been entreated
to

adjudica~e

numex•ous disputes which have arisen among

cartel m;;mbers.

In msmy instances, t;he g<)verruMmt used the

courts 1n the appl1cat1on ot' legal measures in o:•der to
J?l.'olong cartels which it c-::msider•ed necessary to

the interests of tbe a·tate.

p1~otect

As a.n example, ·the interven-

tion of the statlll through the law was responsible for the
continuation of the !lhen1sh-1.4estphal1an Coal Cartel as we;J.l

as the Potash Synd1c'3lte in 1910.10
The nex·t and most general legislation dealing with

9quoted in l:i:> A, Robi<'lSon 1 Honopol:t; p. 226.
10aobinson 1 ~·~. p, 233.

- -- -------- --
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regat>rHng cartel qontrs.c ts, aecondl;y 1t g$tve certain po:qers
to ths lil..Jlieh Ni:nis t•&r of !T;conomio
cr~~'D\ted

a cartel court and

,~:<ff'ctir"J,

eF.Jtl~bl:tsiled

t:md las t;ly 1 t

certli\in rules to

d.eH.veries to ou.tsid.ers, and gave it to the presid.ent of

the cartel court,ll

saitl it was successful in givi.tl£1; means to priv;:ate <'mterprise
to preclude 1.md.ue .:;,oerciOll 11\l:l!.'l control. 1 "'
:rhe genfn•;,,l effect of ·the deorfJe ln the matter of

regulP;t:ion of trust;s and cal'tels proved to lle inef'fectual.

p. 198.
----------- -- ----

JO
In the ye!ilr following its issuance it

~HIS

found want1ng i:n

many resp®cts, thOU!Sh it remained in foroe until a new
decr"'e was issued by the Nazi govel->nment in 1933.
no\'1 deCl''l1:e, however, 1dll be fully discussed in
chapter dea11n.g with

o~nftels

th'~

Th1.s
mntt

a:na. !UCler' s rise to power.

-------

CHAPTER :tV

AND 'l'HinH lh1LA1'IONSRIP '1'0 NJ!.'J'!ONAL .SOCiitt,ISM

eai·tels with which Ger·many had been promitl<mtly a!iH!OO:I.t•,ted

had been thrown 111to confusion and disorg&mization due to
defeat and occupation.
•:•as

vie1~ed

1·1ith

Any nec-1 at·tempt to rev:I.VIi!l oa1•t•$ls

<U.s>E~pproval

by the victorious !!!llied powers.

In th® middle of the 1920 1 s, in a mere prop :I. tious poli ti.cal
atmosphe1•e, · Gel:'man

clilrt•·~ls

began their contabacit and

~tare

once agt'lin to assume their position or importance in the
struot1,1,re of the Germ<m state.
It is said that ca.rtela beoame th<> real government

or

Oermen:~,y

in thls post-11a:r period, and •anonymously ruled

the life of the nation d01m to the last detmils of burial
while the Weimar Republic withe red powerlessly" .1

While

tb1s statement is hyperbolioal, there is still considerable

truth in 1ts oontention, as ev1denoed by the role wh1oh
cartels played in the rise o:f the Hitler regime.
-o-"07---~-~-

1 1L J. BoaHmstein, "Ho,,; Cartt9ls broke the German
lie public, u Ca!J.~ld i!W !? orum Vol. XXIII (!'larch 19!:.1!) p. 279.

An investigation of available sources of information
dealing with the ,:,er1od under· consideration gives e:redenee
to the belief

th~1t

Hitler's rise to power was financed to

a considerable degree by OH:t'tel interests.
randum d<•.ted March 22 1 1932 1

-

In a memo-

a yel!l.r before Hitler took

control, the head of the Foreign !l.ela Lions depau•tment of

Du :Pont de Nemours & Company wrote his. superiors from
Germs.ny:

is a matter of common g':>ilii1.S> in GermallY that
is financing Hitler. Other German f.l.t'Wil t~ho
are supposed to be doing so are Krupp a;t1d Thiessen.
How much tr•uth tbere is in this gosai,~ w& lilre unable
to stt,te, bttt there seems to b<a no doubt whatever
that Dr. Schmit:<: (director a;~tlaral of I. o.) is at
least: personally a large contributor to the Nazi
party ."2
·
~It

I.

o.

Later evidence collfi:rmed this observation.

In its issue

of September, 1942, fortune rnmga:<:ine stated 1 "It .l.s now

historical t'aot that t.he steel and chemical oartels
t'inanoed Hitler's early polit.ioal adv•Jntures.nJ

lt should

be pointed out that the firms mentioned, I. G, Farben,
K1•upp and Thiessen

'>'~ere

all prominent members of d0111estio

and internat:1 ')nal cartels,

---- -----------

2quoted in Joseph .8ork1n and Chr:u~les A, Welsh,
G•?,Jt'mapy 's !•la[!t'"r ~. p. 58

3Bork:l.n £U'J.d 1Melsh, op, cit!. • p. 306
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Hitler had the support of the Junlcer<J, 11ho had beoome
eartel lee.ders following t·iorld vrar I.
represented the cartel

m~1gnates,

This class, which

saw in Hitler the psyoho-

log:l.oal magnet with which to align the

ftletl"!il•

unreasoning

resent,ments and the :need of the German P"Wf>le for a common
purpose.

t~h11e

Hitler "Focused the ncttion will,

same time he protected the oa:rtel inter!:llsts. " 4

at the

~'he cartel

system extant in Germany e<t the time of :Hitler's accession
to

prn~er

was favorable to the mutual growth of both.

alliance which was achieved was

inevit~ble

The

and sprang from

"The undemocratic oha.racter of both the cartel System 2o11d
li'asa ism." 5

an hUthority on the subject of cartels had the following
to say concerning cartels and the rise to

pOWl~r

of Hitler:

"Hitler built up his system on the inst.ltution he
One of the most impor•
tant instit>;rt:ionf! he found ;-;as the cartel £md patent
system as developed since lo79 • • • , Ceri;:ll:u~ E~.re tools
used to accomplish certain ends. :I'hey have :~10 life
of their own; i t is the peopl'" behind them that give
them life • • • • 'l'he psychology of these people, their
efficiencies or luz.1ness, their d.efen.sive or offensi~e
spir1 t, together m~tke up the spirit of the cartels."

found when he came into power.

4Borkin find Welsh, gp. cu., p. 306.
5rrarley Kilgore, "'l'!le Menaol'!l of the Block International, •
National Ed.uoa,:!?ion ASS<)ciation _igurnal, XXXIII (April 19l,f.4) p. 90.
6quoted in A. J. Rosenstein, "How Cartels Broke the
German Republic, • Canadi~n Fol'UJ!!• XXIII (!1arch 1944) p. 279.

!liUar and th"l system of National Socialism gave
c;;.rtels a nm; vigor, and along witt! vigot",
off.;;nsi.ve spirit.

gre<~ter

The aims of .the c:;u•tels were now to

be fused. "'ith the S;r;:bttions of the sted\e.

Prior to Hitler,

the produc tton 1 prices or mc:'>rks ~ ing of comrrtod i ties were
s<<bjected to only a minimum of state ccmtrol,

'.!'hey Here

Gubeequent legislation had little eff$at on their act:l.ons.

l!
!

'l'hls Gituation was to be radically oh"ll1[;ed after Hitler 1 s
aocecH>lon to power.•,

the

car•tel

deore~s

!I.

~Che

Iii

The 1n1 tial steps in th1s change l'lere

of l9JJ,

CArtTU:LS AND NA'.r!ONAL SOOIALISr1

Naz1 state regarded cartels as necessary and

chang:• from 1nd1ff.~H'€mt tolerance to positive approval.

/l.coord 1ng to one formula:
"lrnti-oa:rtGl poll..cl<~s "' Lltwralism, J?ro-ca~"t;C;~l
policies on the basll~ of thz~ Compulsory Cartel Law "'
National Soc,l.al:i.sm." t
.
---- ---------------

7ao·bort A. Brady, :r.h.! SJ21r:l.t and ::>tr1•oture SJf.
Gerllllin Fascism, P•

Jl•o.

-.-

-~--.
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'rne e.bove formula

h~Cts

as one of i te basts; the

Comp1llsoPy Cm•tel L<ws of 1933.

l

':t'hese lmrs, Nhich were

solid bruse for thB enh?.tlcem<'!l1t of economic control by the

I
lnd1v1!:i.ual producers to _join the cartel o'f' theil• trade.
·rhe sta·te was given the full ri;:;ht of ccmtrol over• these
organizati0.11s. 8
In addition to thts 1 the Dep,',:i:"t;nont of gconomics

~ras

assured C<U'tels that no new firms ;you.ld. be permittec1 to
form

~•i thout

the expressed autborization of the

cart·'~l

productive C1%paclty without simllcn' eomHmt from th.1l

oona
lHn,;wrood e.ltcl En1<'•st ll·?6.it;"''• "O.'H'ru:a.n Cartels In"
vails 3;u:rope," J-i'or~ei;<rl Policy Hepofts, XVIII (Aug. 1942) p, 111-8
9Fr•ank t•lunk 1 :l')le L<~gac;y; .!2f_ Qiazism, p, 170.

I.Cl!~L Vi:~E3ION

·~lh~:n

the compulsory

c~R:rtel

statut;es wel'<' promulgated

they vJOl'<~ IH:JC<)mp,rxlied l:ly an oft'ioial st"l.tement as to ·the

aims of the deorces, Nhich attempted,

one writor put it,
•to mislead public opinion" on thi;; :tss\l.e. 10 'l'his of'fioia.l
~~s

explanation said in part:
"The
economy

s·~v·~:re

ilf'H3

depr:sssion hB.!l[,;ing over the German

struclt most sevt::rely at 'those branches of

lndustl'Y thnt have a prod.uctive cmpaaity far in ·~xcess
of presen.t market possibilities, Int:~msifi:>O. compe\;1timl
and th1~ low pr•ioe level resultant tber•$fx·om • • ,have
brought nearer the point at which the r•uin of enterprises V(i:llUBtbl·{J to our ns.t.i.onal ec<-'>nomy t.s thr~.at~ned~ ttll
'!.'houch the official aims of the d.ecreG stress the necessity
of state control as the-

£llSil.llS

to sueco1• the thNJatened

t:.ct,:o:"dl .r,eonomy, tha actw;tl intent of the daer·e(M was to

i:nsur(il state control oven'

l V,

ev,~ry

rn:; UL'l'S

segm1mt of Oerm&n ind.ug tr•y.

Qli' 'l'lL~

LA \·IS

Under these new laws, the number of <Hcrtels, ·che

10 otto Nathan, ~ ~ Economic Syqt{,!ro, p. 72,
11

quol>sd in !'ram: Neumann, Behemoth, p. 266.

~--·--
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poe it ion of the cartels Ni th oth:c;r enterprises &md lf1th

tho covel'lllnent were greatly improved,

'l'hoy >HH'r;; no

re.ood 1'11th the tacllt of fight;in(>; outsid•"rs;

long~n·

Sup•JX'ficie.lly

1 t ;crppee.red t;he.t the CctrtBl 'sy1> ts!lm g;•1 tn/:6 new streugth

from the lavm; in ao tuc;l i ty, hot•reve:r,

G:\l'iM.n

o•srtels f:rom

d oo 11"' ins tn1.l!H?ntG for the execut 1.on of Naz 1 impet•ial.o.

zaU.ons to regulritte prices wr:us seriously hampered i)y sub,iootine rJ.ll ;:;uch functions to

~ho

approval of tiH> stHtt3

'viii;h

issuance or this edict, the cartels lost every

the

\

'

of :1.1td.$pendent author :I. ty in the price-making field.
The tightening of foreign exch1:1nge control worked
cottsidera.ble hardship on oartels.

The dlf':f.'iculties

confront~

inH cartels because of' the foreign exchan;f,e situation became
acute in 19) 1' ,

•~ith

the in1tial;io:n of a new plan which gave

The ?,ct1vlt1es of tbe <lUl'JElrviaory agencies soon developed

int:o a complElte control of foreign and domest.ic raw materit:tls
nnd other commodities.

'.!:hat this action lncreasad

tl~e

power

of' the state r,mc1 greatly ourta:nect the aot1v1t1es of cartels,
which hac'!. theretofor<l attempted to :regul,,,te the pt'oduotion ,
or' their members ls !'('laCiily understs.nd~1ble.lJ

The J?O'Her of the goverrunent over Cf1J•tels grew with
inci•ea.sing regulation or' the enUre eoonqmy,

In

l9JI~,

the

gover:muent began a program to construct an "Organization
ot Industry".

The Groups and Cha1nbers which madeJ up this

Organi?.ation of Industry
of

th'~

govert'lm<.mt,

'l'he functions
~t~conomy,

~~ere

under the oom lete domination

All entreprenuet•s were compelled. to

pe~·forme~d

by the Groups and Carte1s 1n the

in respect to marketing regulations, etc., over

l3N athan,
,
.m!•

~.,

P• 76.•
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cb.are.ctur of tho c.a:rtol

or·gc>~nization,

wh:l.l<} tho Groups gave

a certain political emphasis to cartels. · Due to duplication
of f'unction

and on

conflict of views, tho gov0rnment a·cepped in

l'ltld

Novemb,~r 12,

19)6, the cartels were intlJJgr&l.ted into

the adlninistraM:ve economic h:i.el'e•.rchy and were put :in a
position

belO~l

the Groups,

Since the!;e groups

~Jer'e

und.el"

th"il complete control of th:3 Dep'-u·tm<t;>nt of !i:COl'lOlnics, the
tr>J.mlfll:l" of respm'lsibility to the Group solidified the
pONEt:r the

of' ,Jt,ly,

[OVermn~nt

assumed over ce,rtels hy the ,s.tatutes

19:n. 14

Having reached th:l.s stage in this stu.cty of G!llrmaey's
ct;rtel system. attsntion shall now be

re,mif:\.c;:ltions abroad.

foc;UEH!Hi

u.pon 'their

Their effect will be appraised by

CHAPTEH V

I, GSRNiiNY AND

!'Hi:~

ALUMI:NlJN ALLIANCE

"'£vel'Y pile of aluminum pol~s and pans Nhioh
Americans bu.Ud 1n public squares is an unwitting
tribute to the eff1c-.1ency of Germ~m o&u•t·"J>l warfal'<h nl

This

sent,~uce

laconically

expr<~sees

the eff17ats of G<;r•rnany 1s

oartGl arrMlgemente in the field of alutn.1num production.

dev•.")loped as a result· of calculated. planning by

th~~

German

aluminum,
Germany entered the first major

int.ern,~tionio!.l

alum:l.-

num c.art••jl in 1926 Htlow.:; with several oth•n• nationi!:L.

Pr1o:r.

total ou'l;put, 1t merely regulated quotas for· domestic and
o_)

export s···.les• including aluminum sold in th<" torm of alloys.'
--

1,..,,,,,,.
~l"'o
v 1'.1-,;t,
t--:.>
k

Plan, p. '?2.

,..,

---------

n~:nl

car•t:$1 v;w:; fortned tn ::>w.itz,ilrlnnd t:n 1931, a.n<l G':'\llcMia 's

!ll>tin pt'Oduc,~:r ot: lf\lUJ:n:!.nUlll, '.;h''" ,uuminu.m Ll:r•it,;;d U.lted),

was lrJoludGd.

Al tl'lo1.t11J;h the AlumlnUlll f:ooopany of Aoorica

(Alcoi!.<) thil soll:l pror:t,uoer in t.h") United

3G;i>orge

w. s took ina;

1n Action• p. 265.

fl.nd

Myron

'l·

Stat;;;~c1

at this

Hatk1ns, t;:z\rt!l!ls
--------------
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of shares was bmsed. on the production rates of cartel

the lrargest sl·w.re 213.58%, the quotas of tha other members

1•ere 21.36% to the French, 19.64% to the Germans,
4
to the Swiss, ·and 15 percent to the British,

15.42;~

In 1934 1 the German nF;t.ional groups of the cartel,
the Verellligte Alun1inum Wel'lte (V. t\, \v, ), 1•1hioh was a
govert'lme:nt sponsored cartel, and ths Aluminum \4et•ka asked

p1•oduct1on.

l'l.ilitary

1'·c>1ltriot::ad domeatio

repre;<enk.ttlves

m~eds

(!ictated tl:ti;s request fox• un•.

production, H:nt'i. thOuiJ:h the other cartel

a~pproached.

the oartel members and offered

the followi:r.tg alternatives,

First, 1f the members v;oul.d.

1agrse to freeing Oet'!ll%ny from th•:J

quottc~.

restric1;ions,

Germany would agrea to stay out of the world market com"
pletely • buyiJ:lll;

/il,

p.;mnd of C2ll'tel aluminum for•· avet'y pound

that was e::q;orted from Germany,
the first sugt_;;estion

t'ill\S

H8E

It

Wif!S m.G~de

cleEr that if

agreed to, the GerinP,ns would

--------

4)

all the allWlinum trwy

w~mted

ar1d would sell it anywhere.

This was a serious three.t to the oa:rtiill alliance, since if

cartel agreed to 1•aleaaa

Ch~x·m&:ny

from the establish<>d quota

smd as a result, the pl•oduct:l.on of aluminUlll in that country

.c;ent from 37,000 met••ic tons to 70, oon met:r1o tons within

small margin, 6

From 19)8 through 191;1, the primacy of

was r•?.lit,\bly &stt:IliJ\ted that in 1941, Germany produced

!!lore aluminum than the combined. !Jl:41 ted .Nations. '1
IIi. Europe as in Am&rioa• altuninum production in-

5a:&a1t l-jgody, Boom or Bust. p. 23'?.
6stock1ng and. vJatlq.ns, op. o1t., p. 27l.
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bounds,

In B':r£uJ.ce, aluminum pt•oduc tion wns gr:;Jtatly·

retarded by th<J cartel agreeme11t.

Alumtnum production ·

advanced at such a low ratt< that it t'ell short of doubling
its output in the s;;1:ne period when

(h!!'i:tHi\ll

prOduction

:l.noe,.>ased f:l. ve-fold. 3

I'hrough the adroit uHe of' th!il instrumentality
offered by the cartel agt'eeme:nt, thcs le&\de:rs of the German

State built up tlle air arm of th,eir war machi11e,

And

thOu{!;h this superiority was short-lived, i t provided the
Luftl~"f'f<~

<<~iivRntage,

with "'great in:l.tiP.l

'.l'his agr•eJ:!ll!l(J):Ut reached on November 5, 1928 1 gcwe

rise t.o the patent

oart~;l ~lhioh

provided for the. exchange

of techl1ological information in add.ition to the pooling of
pe.tents.

Under the terms of this agreemant, Gelleral Electric

through ita snxbsidiary, Ce.¥·bc1loy lne., !'l.gt•e•''"i not to l1eenae
othC!lt'l'l to produoe the cemented cstrbiae in thrll United Stetes

without

th·~

specific permission of Krupc>•

'I'h:l.s ag:reel!wnt was r;oachetl despite &h® fa.ct that
KrU::'IP • s pat,;nts on the

· were tenuous 1

~md

procer~e

·of mak1ng tungsten carbide

probably would have bii'!i5lll held to be in-

valid if' hNlught before a court.

'!'his ma.s th<l opinion of'

of all expel:'ts on the m&.t tte1.', and for this l'eason the
---------------
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pat;ents were never tested, since such a. decision ·•,,ould

have made it impossible for any producer to hav;;; a rwnopoly
ovel" the new product.

of

tht~

J.'his cm•tii!l agreeflH>nt was reached

German firm in order to gain

~;olri'J

tungsten cr·u·bide indufJ try in the United

cont1•01 of the
Q

Stat:·~s,"

from engaging in th0 export of carbide ruaLerials,

sbut the metal out of Great Bri ta1n s'nd h<:Jld

In

GtH''lll1'l.ny 1 s

grip

on the;; South American trs.de, 1 0
Ilt t:l'li'o United States, the few firms which did function

ta1n pr1CH'lS at a par 1d.th General Eleotx•.l.c.

'I'he price follow-

ing the conclusion of the agreement rose abruptly in the
United States from

.~:45

per pound to ii4.53 per pound, thus

these industrial diamonds became "more expensive tha:n gold. ull

9ouentr~r H<i!1Utnnn, Pat"'nts t:o•• 1;\ltler·, p. 229.

lOi'loody • Ql2.• oH .• • p. 214-1

-·

llib1d

--------------- -----
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In (!·JJrma:ny vJhere a. much l::;rger· amount of

tun,,~sten

c<1rbide

was nmi:mfaotur·ed, the prices through /l'. ten year period
were g0!per!illy only tt•enty-five percent of the

u. s.

price,12

Though the price in the Unitc~d E~tt~tes dropped in

yeF!I.r,

T'he price in the United States· r,ema1ned

g<meral high

lev~~l

·t;ill 191H;,

shal-ply, follON:I.ng ths

<J,t

this ,

But; 1n 191>0 it dropped .

invalic'L:~.tion

of slx important p<ltents

by a Un1t0d StP1tes Federal Cour·t. 1 3

thel 1930 1 s h:lndered its uae by the g!'eat rn!i!.jority of

manuf.ac tur·e of mi'Wh:l.ne tools.

the demands of n,.'\\,t1o:nal

det"~mse,

Amerl.ot'in industry could not

fully utilize tr11s product bec<mse it; wae not ·<;eohnolog,ioally

adGquacy

~then

ha said.:

"'I'he control of tungsten carbide patents by the
G<:;neral i:Elecr'-ric CO!llpm'J;Y and th€.l Krupp Company has

l2Bone Committee, Patent HeaPings, Pavt 1, pp, 8.'5-87,
quoted in Hexner 1 OlJ.• oi t., p, )69.
lJBorkin M<l Welsh, l.Qs. g1t,, p. 267

------------------

nr.:.;;~·:r<J.l~0d

NO<'i

in i\::~.::}_L.illl~ t.lL0 p:t,ice at axo:cbi'Laut- l·._.;rvels.
when th® time haf.l C(Jme, in:lus l;r•y h?,S not learned

hov; to

us,~

tu:t:l,:;;·st.·).U ogc"iJld:~ E-i.n& hr~s :tl<JL -;...h~<;; mach.lnes,

th·s skU led m<m, or the technique ~~hi all 1 t would have
hB.d lf ~;t'12 ma-·C-,3r ic.1.l i'u3.d- b.aan a vallt~bl::: at. ·Ghe s-~~me
low pr1<1cW a~ which it t..ras EFrailab'Lo to Clzrm;m
inUus t.x•i:;;;t.:;.11 l·+

of

xllili tary

-------------------

CHAPTEH VI

I, ZB:ISS OPTICAL COMPANY OF JSNA - A HlS 1I'OlU:CAL !rSSUl1E

One of

G~~:rmany 1 s

1

lnterna tional cartel agreements

that had a profound effect upon tile m1li tsrry

pr<~paredness

of' several nations was in the field of' optical

instruments~

Through th<e use of' patent and price <Ja:rtels • . the German firm,

trol

ov.~r

trol

~;h1ch

tbe mltrnufaotul•e of military

op'l;iC61l

goods; a c.:::.-·

proved costly to Germany 1 s •enemiea ·in two t"lorld

wars.
Zeiss, by the use of oe.rtel

agrc~ements,

w:>s not

only able to rogtr1ct tho production of v.it,al optical glass
needed in

thf)

pr¢cis1on instrt.lments of foreign inrlust<•iee,

but also obtained valuabl•z information on the relative
military preparedness of nations.

It was able to do so

because of its position of leadership in the field of
optic,'l.l instruments.

be•.sn

~whleved

German leadership' in thiB field had

in the. 19th Century

~~~Hm

that :ua t1on devel-

oped optical glass mt'lnufacturillg to its most, advanced st.ate,

The Zeiss Compo,ny was the domirl@.t:l.ng group of the German
optical lnduetries.

The other main German companies in
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Ne tt;.al A. G.,

~nd li~'nl~ill!1lnn

A. G. wer·i.l f't.uaad d ir~'c tl.y l.Wder

tbfil oontrolliug 1ntli':t'liHH. which Ze.lalll had .in e~ch.1

upo.n elUJl:nlning th•l

OP!rl;.<~l a~p:'<'lii:llllent;

l>h1oh

•:;:tdate<~

between

that firlll• iMld t;he !:'li'>U.Sch and Lomb Conrpl>lUY of !'!ooh•><'~ter• l'l.t.

!n 1906 t,h•:n'•;)

w.\il.lll

in th{)l Un1t;sd Statcul."

no

i>1111llUI'!!Io tur<w o:i'

glliM!H;l Uclo~d

fo:r poor viilil1on,

!l.a a .r:i.ff'·eH!'I.'Illt type of optlcal .gl~~t!!IS,

oip!l\l mtmutact;\lrers of optiot<l
h~1.d.

g;las~:'

By optit)li'<l glO.Ill!$ llili m~nt thi) a,lalilie

not to bo confu.£H>d w1 th op th<>lmio
~1hich

optical

oeillfn

¢;ood~a

mf).flu.f'actu.rin~ m1Ut1>~ry

in tbe tl'!lit.ad, Stli'tes,

optl.aal

i~oode

from glass
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~~h1oh

the American firm had become the exclusive agent

of Zeiss in· the United S·i;e,tea.

In exohtmg;e :for this

position of pr1mii!.oy 1n the Unil;ed States, 8gusch: & Lomb
£~old. one~-fit'th

of ·their capital stock to Zeiss ar1d

per~

mitted the ropresentation of Zeiss intet•ests on its
board of directors.

From 1907 to 191'4• no optical glass

was made in the U.nited States, Bausch & .t.omb had to depend

upon l.mports

ft'OI.ll

Zeiss for their e11tire supply. 3

Zelss reta111ed silnilat' control ov;n; the optical
gl2osa indus tries 1n France a.nit
p0l'iod.

In Bngla.nd.,

~~here

li.'l:~.e;le.nd

dtU'ing; this same

Ch!"..noe Broth•Jra were the main

producers of optical glass, Zeiss 1;ras a mt>.jor factor in

dependent tlpon Ze:l.ss for teol'molo,,;ic.al informt> tion, as
ae maldng them pay rQy!!llties to ~~"'iss foro th•3ir use. 4

t<~ell

:t:n 191111 the Allied countries sours.ht to place
ordel't> with Bausch & Lomb, as 2:eiss could no longer be a
sour•cH9 of supply due to the war.

Zeiss objected to this,

and refused to continue to supply Bausch & Lomb with glass•

Jwendell .Berge. carte~lh p. 11+5.
14-Borkin and ~lelsh, .22.• cit., p. 279.
-~--~-----

---=-o
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under

thr~ir

that Bausch

contract of 1907•
&

It

OV(n' this dispute

wa\~

Lomb purchased Zeiss 1 one-fif'th inte1•est

in that company•

thB Allied nations made these non-Oe:rman firms wholly
dependent upon Zeiss for th•:J:I.r supply of glauss; and
resulted in a ssvere shorti:!.g•ll of mil :I. t1.n•y opt; leal apparatus
;,ih:l.ch co11tinued thl"Oughou.t the p<srio::t of hostilities,

In

the United Ste.tti'!!s 1 the Alie.n Property CustocU.an confisc::tt''d
the Zeiss patents, but this ha..:l little effect on

duotion since
vJOl'k up.

u.

S.~,,,.,.f:l.n:ns

had to

st~<rt

u, s.

pro~

from the bottom and

''b;-'

A la<ll£ of trained t<ilehn:l.eio.J\S ln

field furth'llr harop<>r"od

Alli<~d

t!M~

optical

production ot' th<;se goods.

l!Iitk< the end of the war, Zeiss onoe aga,:l.n sought
to t[la1nta1n the supl'•>ml!ley it had enjoyed for so lo~g in

past years,

In order to circumvent restrictions put t.lpon

Vmnlo 1n the NethcJX'liitnds, and it

~~as

throucll t!ltH t'il:"m that

they renewed their oa.rtel negotia"ti.Qns. with Bausch & Lowb,5

l:'Hi.UolCh & Lomb >1ho bad

t'~rm1n11i ted

th<lir f h'st e.gree-

ment 1dth z;e1ss in 1915 ent<llred into a new cartel agreement
ort April 28• 1921• follon1ng at trip to Gurope by ex·scutiv{;;s

knCH~ledge

Of (;eiSS

We;S

to b•J placed at

i;he~

disposal of

Bausch & Lomo.6

'I'he oontl'act follovred was .a familiar pattet'll of an

intern.f.!.tional cartel agreement sponsored by

Clet'!lllilll

oonoerltS.

;:,mong the provisions of the agreement was the req.uirement
that all new patents in the military line ii!hould be acqulr·sd.

in th•£< name of Bawsch & Lomb and beld
or

:l~eiss.

fOl' the

exclusive use

In consideration of th1s Z<llsa reoeiv<11d a

on all m:U:l.tary app!!n·a·t;us sold by B<:lusch

&

Lomb,

royal·~y

<HWB

field

gh'\sses, regardless of its inclusion 1lt t;he ;oeiss patents. 7
The agrl\lement also divided the wor•ld madtet for
optic<~l

a;ood.s between the tv.ro f1rms 1 the provhio:n relating

0L'lerge • l2,Q.. oit.

7Arnold 1 op.

£11.,

- --------------------

p. 70.
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B.. & L. obligate thamselvea not to sell d1l:•ectly
or .indirt~ctly, m1lit~u·y instrumetlts to countries out•
side tl::t$ United States of America <1\ltd. vice V•3I''Sltl.
Carl ZC~ilH1 obllr.atc) themHJc~l'\H;;s not to B•9ll such
1nst:r•uments directly or i:tlli1reotly to the
United St1ates unl0ss the partie>J have come to an
<:\grr3ement reg\'a~d.l.ng tlH oond i ti on of scr.lg cmd the
prosp~Jctiv<~ ·r;e:·ritories o.f di!'!·tribution,

It was u:ndex•stood. that if eithrg• of the p<:irties
received bids from a source outside their exclus~hre aNel.
:;,_~j§

o.f sale, it was incumbent upon

"'rne

t;l:lf• pllU'I#i;:c;s

to inform their

contr~;.ctin£;
agx•eem~ntt in

parties agree to l«!ep th!J foreiiltt•tct confideno"' as l:'egardil a
t.hird party and to t:;uard sil•a11ce co:nJ)lH'ning this
•J~greeroent also wl th the·ir OWll (,:;mploy<Oco;B as f~lr M1
this may be prli'.ct1c.~"bl•'! under th'" circumtitn.r1oes ... 10
going

chance of incurring the wrath of' public opl.nlon,
Another provision of this cartel agr<Weill\i.mt, srno ontJ

establishment of a "fUlit.:,,:ry Dep!itrtment".

Paragraph four

of the contraet reads:
"In l'urthiilranoe of the aims o:f this agreement, .
Bausch ,lt Lomb in Hodleste:r will c<·r~e.tr~ a ne•~ Depart•
merJt solely :responsible t;o t.h£0 Boar.d of' Directors;
t•lhioh is cl':\arged. W"ith the independent developme.11t of
all scientif'i.c <mel technical tasl{S within ths mHHary
scope ond 1;h<~ maintenance of oonnecti.ons V(it;h Jena.
The parti:3lH VJ1ll come ·co C!.l'l agrC:t7riH$t1't a.s- rt;gr..t:rds r~a

beads to be placed. Ln ch•:\rg;e of this cermrtment. •
In the military field there was an agr<.!enl<'mt between

the~

out of th·;; obll.gations to the nations was anticipated,, and

~rh~~ mutual obligation ragal'cti:ng th>:!' eKohange of
mHitary aesigns shall bG void t1h:imever tlw highest
hO!Il<'o e;overnment of on~: p1:11.rty \Bxpre>ssly demands that
th.::~y be kept in C<)n.i"lden.oe in th(il .interests of the
nE1t1on."l2

continue the exchl!lnge of milit<P.ry c\ata in the event of war,

optics t:Ul the st>art of vlorld ''ial' U.

11 Htld.
12p.•i!

...~·

I

!h

l!l6.
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V. A NO!JIF:tCA'I'ION IN PROVISION - IN NArliJ; ONLY

out, Bausch

&

Lomb was a/l1T1Bed. th1.'lt its ag:reemen.t with

Zfd.ss was 1n viol£l.tion of the antitru.r>t laws of the
United Stt>tes.

Upon the 1ni1lis i;ence of Bausch & !,omb.

'iilttorneys vihO saN thr3 marl!::et-dividlltr.& c1lause as a violation

sections, but the performance m:' the p:!lr'ti\'l£5 r•;>mained
t'\ubstantlally thta same.

1~vid<moe

that; this -r•evis1rm of

th·a 1921 agreement was subt•?.rfug;e 1s sholim by the follow1ng memor·m1dum of 8dward

Be~usch,

the head of Bausch & Lomb,

and. dated Jauue.r·y 27, 1927 1 which stated:
"It 1s my understand 1I:tg 1x1 s.coo:rd.ance ~~i th th®
opinion of Carl Lomb, that we Ar'e not 'to bid on 'i"tlY
n;ilite:try ins t1•uments for use J!Uzywhere outside tb•a
Unit;ed Stmtes. The agreement is that 1f such
inquiries oorn<o to us we are to r·~ l'c~r th,~m to Zeiss." 13

l'he 1921 agreement as well as lat<)l:' agreements be•
t"Je<:m the

t1."0 firms provided for an exch<mge of information.

-- --- -----------

Under• the oontra,ot any new developments in the military

optical field were to be exohanged between th"" pEtrties to
~hlll

agreement.

It was this provieion that

OctW:~<:!d

the most

furor when ot'ou.ght to lig;ht in S•>nete hearings dealing with

w~re

requtred to list for Zeiss any rtetl scientific and:

.:;~ptionl

instruments manufaoturecl

'rivs same> oondi tionH

~•ere

fo~'

th·'

u. :)• Armed Forces.

11>
. ...

imposed upon Zeiss 111

respect to new disooveri.c\S in the military optical field,
but z,!l:l.ss, e'SP•'lloially a:f'Mr Hitbr 1 a r:l.se to power•, did

Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, of Franltfurt, GEu·many, con-

earning mil:l.tat•y transactions for April, i'lay end June of

"Heretofore the Governm<mt bas m~H·ely been insistent
ths;t none of ttw detalls as regards th1D des:l.e;ns of
these instruments be made public, but :l.t !iHilems as 1f
the qi:vo.ntlties,. Pl'icens, etc •• <.md the amo,,nt of the
equipment purchas,ed u.re <~.lso considered. secret.
Obviously, our agrEH;~m<mt with l'!e1asrs, Cs:u•l Ze:\.s!l cannot v1ork sat;i:Jfactor1ly unless, at least, the latt.sr
information beoomes common knocoledge to !:loth p'll.rties,

...

>Ut iilOIDe

er•rt~ngm!Hllllte

aet'lurii.ld tb:\a
confl<l<!!nC~~n

'l:lH:I report

must b@ rl!lll.de lliher<c;by we a:re

H~form~:>t1on

;•1ill be kept in

st:r1ot,~st

J.;;>

aocom:J;~<'>n,u'1ng

the lett.>el?

~<.fill)

atat.:.~ment

th.<:

of

.Bausch & Lomb·~~ m111t(ll"1f dep>ortm•ll:nt, and d<lal t with "1'1\U{';a
fl:ndl!lrc-1, P'lill"iaoo~~;.ul~ tl\ll,o>aoopae, 111nd bomb-si~t;ht<{~
Ul<~

conclusion of tho :report, l:'ti!!lat;ing t()

Bqu1p;ll,mt Will!! th~

N<l!elr

th~~ rJpt~1olill

parae:r&ph;

• It will be noted from tha

fot•e~:oillg atri\ t'!iltflents

j;hat not, rntwh l'ttrtt.,,r 1nf'orllli.>.t1on

c~~n Jo,~

obta1ntiid

l''i.IIJ;lt.X'iting (>()ltlj)'iltitiV\11 fJl'':l.Oii.lh
\~h:!.le t.ht"l'l~ bi<llS t-II'•il
5!1AppOsii!d to be~ pt~b11e, 1t h0l$ lnt,~l~· b'J~~O!!lll!i thr,'J plf',',ot.l(Hl

to withhold thl(') 1nt'o~m1a,t1o:n frow thlil publ1•"•

latt,~r

I·~VIll!'f
·tn~> i:fOV(j)t'\OJQO!lt 1s mtH·l~!;;d
~mel Ill<~ ll!l:'lil h!:lll'ii l'!.OCOUUltcitll·lll tl'Hlt the

and env,.lope f't·om

"Conf1d<mt1tol"
1n.form~it1on 1'111ll not b.memno .PUb:UG, i!ll'l\t tl:;.gt it will

be trent.ed 111 etrtotest oonf'.ldeno!fr." l"

The mH1tary 1lllpl1e'1<t1onr> :l.nhlllvent :l.n the

ot inform'• t ton

ol~~us<!l

h

<)XCih.~e

l'ut•ti'lw 1~ dillmon!il tr•~ t•$d by a lilltter

n;tour ltHiil.i mrmtc>ly l:'lll;po~·t h<<~!l H1v,,m

Ci'lUM><!

to th1ill

oonlilld<r~:rauon i:.thlt w®

w!Juld b€1 b~;~tt<t~:r ttl a :podtion
to alils1s c you 1f you l~ould repol:'t t,o w11 'lit;.~ t kind iii
of inlil tX"UllhZ<Utll sr0 und~r tr 1al oU1d Ui!ll) by your 1:0U 1 tary
lil';>ll''i/lt>;J~,
'£b'llt"" llltiiH, biil Ia gl'>:l!l!it lll!lXlY (j\.1>;1\i) tiO!li> :t'!llg$,1"dltlg

1ni5t:rumen1H> fen• a1l'pl.\onf11s 1 taanks,t sud skl:!.ps, whioh

dem&l'ld lilP<lOii!i.l irlllli>>'Uitl<iltltl;<. n 17
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'fhe royalty payments

~shich

Bausch '" Lomb made to

Zeiss similarly inl)luded infornEttion on the m111ta.:ry
potenti!itl of various n'!ltions doing business
Lomb.

~Ji th

Bauscll &

'fhrough the .medium of accounting on these payments,

by the .American firm, both l'lithin and without the

United

In 1935t with German rearmament no longer a secret,
F:lausch & r..omb refu8ed contracts with Great Bri tian a.nd
I~rance

for

i~l,500,000

worth of m11:\.taz•y imrtruments.

In

Scma te investigating oommi ttees, thero were dozens of letters

in which inquiries from foreign buyers or m1l:\.tary optical

•I:)Jr.ample, on J.l'!Hi,rch

;;o,

M:l.litar;v At·tache 1 in

1938, Bawaoh & Lomb 1>1rote
W~lshiU!~ton,

th~ flt•1t1sh

th<i< following letter:

21!,, 1938, we ~Iish
to infol'!ll you that the instruments :'hat vHll mm1ufactured.
for th'" u, s. War Depc-cr-tment are 4 wc"ter St"reo Height
Findel'l!l•
"Unfortun.'itely we have ·co inform you that
are not;
in a, poal:tion i;o t;alce !3r1tif;h ~covcn·mlHnt orders at the
preeent time. ull::!

•rn reply to your letter of l11s.l•ch

''ill

lEho~w-o
~
~t •-t "P• 1·'·7
0 ·,.,.
JJ'WJ.{f)""J
~·
"-'
l1 •
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The fulfillment of any order from abraM required the permlssio,l of Zeiss. and conrslder1ng the source of the ord.ers,

'~xplanation

on•" can offer for th•a uuul!ual dil,int,'lrest in.

profitabl•;; business on the part of oau.sch & Lomb. 1 9

economy to !Wiet ·the 111\hsds of its. war effor•t, Bausch & Lomb

found that ac t,ua.l iUsclo!n.lres of :l.nforn:n t.ion 11rere no longer
forthc:oming from Zeiss.

In 19)9,

'~Hh

Cl•;)rmany at war, the

were being governed by a pollt1cal cont.ing·Jncy clause in
their contract;,
On r~arch 27, 1940• an indictment >.-as retu:r.n11d against

Bausch

&

Lomb, three. of its officers, C:<u:>l Z·<,iss of Jena,

and Carl

Z~iss

of New York, the Ame:r.io"'n ;c::eiss

trade, under the

S~1erman

l'Si)r'(1t5E!nta-

Act, in respect to the

dit~t:r.ibution

of' mili.ta:ry optical eqii!ipment resulting in arbitrary, unr.:;H;.sonable, a.nd noncrnnpeti't:\.ve prices;
pl 'aded nolg

B''"'.:~m:oh &

aogJ;,enQ,~~~

Lomb

and f1nes of $1;1, 000 were Hssessed 1
on i'Jay 27, l91H) um !'lt<l"Ch 5, 191>1; respect1vely, 20

1 9Bo:rkin and otJelsh, tiEl.• Q.ll. , p, 28 5 •

.

~o

"' Bel"ge, Qll• Sl,ll., p.

2.55.
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'rhere was no indictment returned against Bausch &
Lomb for unwiti;;il%,?;1Y giving away secrets which affe.oted

,,

the national secur:l:ty of the United. States, but 1f t'irma
engP,ging in eartel agreem<mts, sucb as this, were amenable
to prosecution for these aots, a second. itl.dictment would
probably lm.ve be!!!n made,

ment hindered.

tht3l

United Stat;es

ons considers 'that the

shortag'~

x·ated as the fourth motllt

world war II.

'!'he fact that this cartel arrange•

s~r1ous

~ffllLr

effort is appar•:mt when

of optical instrumemt;s was
bottleneck in the United

In its final report• the '!'emporary National

Economic Committee, which investigated foreign pe.tent controls over AnHwican industry, stated.;
"The production of vitally important materlc<ls l\\S
optical glass and chf.lm1cals has been restrl\ined through
internat1orual pat•::>nt controls and croa:•·.J,icen~?ing, l'lhich
have' divided th'1 wo~·ld m!il.rk<llt into closed areos. All a
result the capacity of Amet•lcan industry to produce tht;~se
matJ;~rl.m.ls is noc ~!'iaqu&:te to !!l<Jat the nel!)ds of the
defense program. 2
.

------------

21.;auoted in Geora;s !!:. Falk, Pljtentcl ang IndU,str:!.al
l':t'g£:rl!IGS, p,

6J,

CHAPTER VI!
I • G. FARagJ'HHDUS'l'B!E A. G.

1

THII: NONO.L!TH

01~

Gll.TtH!HlY. 1 $ INT!l:BJ'!A.l'IONhL Cl\RTll:L ST!:WCTURE

The point has been reaohetl. :l.n th:l.s sttldy where
attention needm to be focused. on the protagonist of

Germany's cartel system, I. G., Farbenlndustr!e, the unquestioned leader of world c.\Cirtelism, ;,Jhose
ations affect almo:at every oivil1<tlli!d

na~:J.on

C(>~rtel

ope:r,-

in th!l> 1r10rld .•

The study of cartelism is the s l:udy of' I. G. F'arben since
1 t was this .f1l'lll which exploited and eonaumiuated the develop-

ment of the oa:rtel device.

Because of its uniqueness in

the oartel field., a oareful study of !, G, Farben 1 s back•
ground and operations shol!,ld prove invaluable.

Germany • s had ins cartal in both th®
1nt.:~rnat1onal

domet~ t1a

nnd

sphere wao the firm of Int,,reSiHm Gemelnshaf't

Farben1m:lu!iltr1e Al:ttiengeslllllschaft, more commonly :referred
to as l. G. Farben.

I .• G. !<'arben

~:rcos

the largest industrial

corporation in Europe in 1941 1 and aoco:rding to the U,

s.

:Oepartmsnt of Justice at that date 1t was the la.rgest
--------- ---

chemical company i:n the world.l

'!'he influence of this

chemical oombl.ne permeated the chemical industries of every
o1v1l1zed. nation of the

•~orld •.

The hiscory of this group

under the Nazi regime "reads like a detective story" 1t1as
··the. way the late President Roosevelt described 1 ts operations)!

Germany 1 s economic power was bu1l t up by olHlmical and metal•
lurgical industriE:H> t and the dominant tMw\bera of this giant
structure wer'il six chemical companies which ev<:!l.ntually evolv111d
into one concern known as I. G. Farben.
Germany Is posi t1on of primacy in the fl.•1lld of industrial
chemistry '<lias achleved mainly beoause of three factors.

First,

Gel'lllany made an early start ill the adaptation of an ed.ucationr<-1
system which

~;as

geared to meet the needs of a modern

1ndustr:l.al nat:!. on.

Secondly, because of Oer•many 's dearth

of natural resources, parttculary in iron, copper £md oil,
mttention was paid to the developement of synthetic mater:tals
to offset the det'iote:ncy in resources.

A third f;;;.ctor was

psyohological and can be ascribed to the chln'e.oter of the

Oermt<n people, this factor involved the great drive of the

l,u... S... ltS. AJ1ied Cbem}oaJ .& .l:l,jr.a Cnrporat.3rm e.t. al.
Diatriot Court for the D1.str1ot of 1'1. J, {Criminal
action No •. 75JC) retu.rned May 1';, 1942 par. JO• quoted in
Geort~;e Stock.1ngs & Myron watkins, CaPh 1 11 J.:R, AG:1·1o:a, p. 414.

in

u. s.

2colaton E. ~/arne, "IrJteruation Cartelst A t-!:enaee to
World Peaoe," Gm:rent ld3 stotQt 1 VIII (Feb. l91+5J 113.

---- - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Garman oh:-n:-aoter for sy.st·,;mat.Jzatic>n and an intense
nationalistic ambition.)
The Big Six chemical companl.as whloh formed the
great bulk of Germany • s in<'Justrim.l

po~;er ~1ere

in 192.5, and thie corporate g1•oup came to
I. G. Farben,
1.

b,~

incorporated

Known as

'l'hese Big '0.\ix of the chemlcal field

1veNll

Bodisohe Anilim & Soda Fl?,brik, ·;f Lud.'tligstlafen;

2. l~arbenfabr1ken vorw.
of L(:rvarl<usen;

J, Farbwerke vorm.
of Hoechst <'lilt Hain;

i"ieistex• .Lucius •n1d 1Jrtl.al11l:'lg,

4.. Akti®V..,f:;·sSellsc·h(ift ftlr
Berklhl;

5.

Leopold

6.

Kalle

Friedrich Bayer ·!: Co,,

c~~ssela &

Co,,

1tn11anfghrlk~lten,

lH~t

ll.

o.r

H~~;

& Go,, l>. G •' of Blebr:l.cl<.

Of

F'ranl<furt;

4

Even before this formal .merger, ther•a had been
numerous instanoes of ooop·c::ratiml bet•Aellln these firms,

The

first steps t;,;ward merging and. cooperation came in 1904,
following a trip to the Un1 ted States of Dr, Carl Duisbere;,

the founder of I, G,, and later the Chalrman of its :Soard
of Director's,

Dur1ng his trip to the United States in

1903, he became so deeply impr;H;sed by the Amarioan trust

3stooking; and \1atkins, .fm• c:tt., p. :372.
4Joseph Borkin and Chi:J.rles A, '1/,~lsh, Oermem:v 1 s
j1astex• Plan, p, 22.

6.4
movernent, which sutoaeeded in uniting competing enterprises,

that upon his return to Germany the following year he indetailed €Uld extensive memo-

formed his competitors in

'·l·

randum of his

in Am(])rice..

exp<~riences

The three largest firms,

ThuB the basis was

HodisOb<~,

Bayer, Bnd

Berlin, r•el'Johed an agreement almol.'lt 1mroedi<tt<ely 1 and
entered into an Interessengemenschaft 1 or I. 0.,

mat ion and patent

pooling of

lie:H£~wlles,

profit<~.

m::1d Cas~Sela

Shortly

i'~

reciprooi ty 1:n res pee t to

aft<~r

in 1908. 1 Hoechst• Kalle

formed a separate OIJu•tel.

TI'HJ> prov h1ions

of

the agreement 11et•aeen these U;ree smaller firms were similar to those concluded b;y tbe first three.
m£e:rgers, the

t~;o

W1tl'< these

German firms bad attained an almost

•ab;:lolate monopoly in the organic <lyeatu.ffa, pharmaceutical,
explosive, and synthetic chemical 1ndu1Jtries of the world. ,6

I.

o. 's

internal integration was oomple·ted in 1916, through

the a.1l<1lg;amation of the two groups as a wartime measure. 7

.'5carl Duisb.;n•g 1 illeine Lebenss,~rln.ner\mfien, quoted in
Ervin Hexner • ~f',tion<~>.;L QF.!rtliils, p. 4.
"''Community of Interests of Dye Indus t:r .teru, !nco.rpot•w

6Bork1n and Welsh, QL?.• ~. p. 26,
7!i':rank !11.mk 1 '.!!tle j:.;em;t<tcy of

N§!<~iSllh

P• 116.

---------------
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I, G, 1 S Il.OLE IN 'l'Hli: S'l'AGE OF CONJ:i'LICT - CIBCA 1914.

II.

B9fore returning to 1925 and. I. G. 1 s formal incorporation, mention should be made of th'> role which this
oombi~"l

war.

played in Germany 1 s war effot•t in the first world

Its op<H'Sttions had. at that time. and again sca.rc.ely a

ge:neration later, greatly though unsucccessfully aided the

imperialistic dreams of the Reich,
The role of I. G, F'at•ben in

~>or•ld

Har I was not

m<9rely a minor one given to a corporation during tlle time

of war, but one which conceivably could MV<'l> altered the
course of that first world conf'lict.
nitrotoluene used in (.Ierman
'''-8

sh•~lls

wa.s the poison gam used to

SO!ll<~

wB.s

'!he new type of tri ..
p<~rfeoted

by I, G,,

extent in that oonf'liot.

Germany lost the war, but it wtts not due to the want of

materials

~rhioh I.~G •.

could produce for the fatherland.

l>laJor Lefebure ln "'1'he Riddle of tho Hhin,z," succinctly

stated the value of I. G. to the German

l15'.:r

effort during

the first Horld illar when hw aRid:
"On broad 11nes 1 the pre•wa.r anrl w~u· activities of
o., prod.uoed the same result as an attempt to
str!irigle the economic life of possible opponents 1
enfeeJbl1ng their rlllsistance to the subsequent delivery
of a hamtnel' blow designed to take maximmn advantage of
the situation thus created. 'l'wenty years or more und<Oir
the regime of a forceful economic pol1cy, not without
1 ts sinister aspects prepared the ground by ~~eakem1ng
us in the concentrated chemical warfare which emsu,-sd.
I.
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"The success of this policy maneuven?·sd

U}'J

into such

esc&~ped def~.:H'd; under the
dhemlcal aggrt~sslo:n. '!'his in

a position th(ilt 11e barely

halllllle:i' blows of (h>r!Jl.an
fact applll<U''l to hav~l b•!l;m the Get'mlln COlfC~ption of
modern Wl~r in 1 ts l:'!lla:tion to lndustr•y.

I. G. w.a.s l:lltPong.sr at the oonclusio.t:l of the war
than at lts start, and this is attributable to the?. proo.lgiotHl
hostil1tii~S.

growth of prod.uct1on which O(lourred rJuri:ng the

concerns

suff.er.~c1

&;ree.tly from tho loss of ,,1artime contt•acts,

LiUt I. G. l<arben 1 s industrial power remained reht t1 vely

of the Du l?ollt corumented on this slttntion in 1920, saying

"(Hsarmament is a t'iiu•oe t;JhH& Gt'lrmsmy

r·~tains

organic

chemical monopo11ea,n9

He:11lng explor•3d the background let~d lug up to the
merger of the Big S1.x .tn the chemical f.ield 1 attention :l.s
now directed to :l.ts growth s:l.noe its formal .l.'!:J.Oorporation
ln 192.5.

I, G, 1 s oper,'tti<ms and control of Gcn•many's oham:l.-

oal industries expanded rapidly from this date,

By 1930,

Sv. Lefebure, The H~ddle $!., th<a lihixw, quoted ill Borkin.

and welsh, 2.!2.• cit., p, 29.

9H};lar1ng!' 1 S);)eoial Conun1ttee Investj.uating th•e .li1u:g1t1ons
u. s, Senatiill,. ?3rd Congr~ss., fl<?.por·l; .(i9Lfl}, ql!Ot;i~d.
1n 8o1•kin and Wdsh, ibid,, p, 32.

J;ruil.usj:;J;'ii'Hi!;
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piil:'t l.@lly

o~·

oompli! t•.illy

m.nd if the$fM3 ''1ere

011:1 doutll·ed. 11

u;~ned

inolud·e~d,

tmd

th:llse

ormt.r~lll·~d sub·~· id ix:lt>.i.es,

!'i~~u·f'e:o \!10Ul·:l.

no aoulJt

Ey 1931, I. G. had Y'llc>.OboJ <1 pb•:mot~h:Jt'lal

ai:U\\ Wlth 1'77 ml:liUvidion~"' oover:l.lJ!~ r1, v;;u•i,~ty ::Jf f'1olds.l2

It

to or th+i!

wa~ el;l:i,J.nnt:.\~d

actu.•~l

t..hut 'by

lH'OmOt<i1r> or·

l9J9, .:r. G,

s~veral

rmM;

a p;u•ty

hundr!lld lnL•n'net.iowl
.

-----

....

--
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founded in Germany and its operations represented the

"aome of Pan-<lernlanism in the economic sphe~·e." lJ
The products which Nere itWOlved 1n I.

1nternat1oool

eartj~l c~greemmnts

vi.tal commod.1t1<3S,

a.

F1;l.I'bal1'S

r@ad like a \liho'<J l>lho of

Items fluch as phavmaceuticgl drugs,

magnesium. synthetic vubb•'lt'; am.l pot2H3h, were all included
in the family of r. G, 's

c~;rtel.hl,~d.

pPoducts,

'.Che operation

of' these cartels, !J\Ud their latent effects upon for¢18,11.
countries should prove 1nterent1ng :reading to those who
view eart,11S all solc::!ly economic ent1 ties •

!,

o.

l?arben took the lead in setting up int,o;rnational

cartels dealing in

phar·!'~aceutical

:produo ts, an'i. as a conse-

q,uenee its powillr r•eached millions of people in the far corners

of the world.

On;;; of the vital pl'otiuot;s which I. G. con-

trolled was atabr:l.ne, a cool-tar derivative used in the
treatment ot malarta.
quinl.ne,

thr~

Before I. G.

deve~loped

this synthetic

natural quinine :tn the world v;as ulkiii·nly in th<:l!

hands of Dutch interl'iHtJts, because the Dutch huid political
cc:mt.rol over Java wh•n•e tJ;w c:l.<lhona barkr from which quinine

was extracted 1 was found.

Al;abrlne was claimed superior

to natural quinine

beea,~tse

of' its greatel" potency,

I.

o.

Farben obtained. a patent on tj'l:l.s synthetic quinirull, and
through the use of lic,:>nses limited the ,,mount that was

product, vitally ne<J<ded by the Armed For(}es in the malar-ia•
inf,Jsted regions of the South :Pacific.

In the U.nit<'Jd States, only one company had a
license t;o lnanuf'acturil Fl.tabr:l.ne Wldet• ·t;n\'l I, G. Farben

sl.dim•y of St;erling Produc:ts, with

daalingr;.

~>~hom

I. G. had other

Comm<U!t:l.:ng on the effect of' I,

o, 1 s

control

over this vital <.lrug, Assists.nt Attorm>y Oeneral

'rhurmtm !u:•nold, who 1nve ,; t;lg;l.t,~d the cartel

!'i!J;re.,lll\ln'~•

as head of th'<> Antitrust Div1s1ol1 of the Depa:rt;r:">l1t' of
Justice stE:ted:
"A single pa't~<emt controlled by I. G. !'lgr11en, dictated.
the terms by which thls e~:sr;ential t'l.:rug could be manufact~.tred in the United i:lto,tes. , ••
'l'Olil.ay the situ:c.tlon
is safeg.<larded. by the seizure of tlv:; G:ll"m~;m rights by
the Al1<m Property Cuatodi:m. But the sp•ectnc1e of' tho
jH•oduction Of this <HHient:lo.l drug:; l•:Jft SO long; to the
S•c;Cr(~t manipul~·,tion of a Ckn·uwn-Amoricnn combination
durl.ng a period l·ih<lln Cl<~.rmany t~I"!S prepsu·ing fot• war.
against us;, is t,oo shocking to !lli\Bd elaborra.t:lon .... 1 4

l4'l'hur•man Arnold t Atl,cmtio r<Jonthly 1 Oo toher 191~2 •
quoted. from 1b1(,,, P• 17;5.
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:r,

G•.><lso took thiiii lead in Becuring patents on

othor phar·mrul,3Utioal products niileded to cm·e the ills ·of ·

the worlds 1 afflicted.
"Bayer ;,:05'' • "' modicinal

On€! stwh patent was secure<,'). on
formul~~

v;hi<)J:l

w;~s

a cure for

sleeping slokn<::HH;;, so common in Africa in the 19th <cmd
early pc.>Ft of the 20th COl"ltury.

~'his

'dlBcovery

~1as

made

.Leverku!iHm, G'!!t>rm;;uzy, shortly &lfter ene end of \•Jorlrl i4ar II.

Th'l.a company

W<'i\S

one of the orli!;inal Big Six chemical

compiAnies . which bad IDerged into
me.t;,su~·e

in 1916,

!;,

<h Parben <Hl a wartime

The Gernwms refusecl to 1:1ivulge the

formula for Bayer 205 0 i!lstel!ld they sought to exploit
gl"e.t:•t value of· this >1i!!oovet>y by

offel•in~

thc"l

to exchange th>.:J

iileoret process in re tttl•n fo:r- the l"®S tor<~ cion of Ger·many 1 s
lost ooloni<:H> in Afx•ioa.

J:hey were· t;hw<:u•ted ln their

efforts by the AlLI.ed power•,;;

•~hioh

r<';lfused to con:;ider

the exoh<mge.15
'l'he. Alien Property Custodili!,l1S Office, 111 191', nuctionr'ld

off one of th'il most import:c!n·t; pt•ewe.r• I. G. F'a1•her1 subsidie.r·ie:s

-------------
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1n lilli'11X'ioa, i:.h'*-' E<li,Y1U' Colllpllllft of
Thl~ H~<ywr

h1:.'\der.

t,l<!i!~>t.

prO!ilpU;~ ~~Old

~c,::tu1s;it:il)!:l.

1'hA:1Ugb they had

to lllnother

~oqu.i.r~(l

K~S tO

StiiJ:rlings 1

~~r!ltas

of the wor'ld • lline!l>!

Aw.erio~I~,

l'igtltt>

to

U$<!1

aml in

'ii..'n~~J;l&><ltl.

fir£~.

r.

'!.'hll\1

a.

!>t>rb~n ln

'I'hs mo!llt

i:bl$

l!iHMl! som~

tli'!MiS!lliU'.K

1n othfJHI:'

did t:.ot oonfet· clear

in South

fSii!.ther tban e:nga,ge 1n lon;,:G l1t:t-

Ne1t York on

Ot~l't<)l agr,•em.a~nt

cox~cluded

Oc'tob,~·

an Sii.J::I'&tll..

:.'!fJ 1 1920. 16

provided tk><"i.t ooropetit1on

betwe>Stn th&; twQ fia•ms 1n :•;;out;h Ar>\f<lt<1o•l wl:'ls co
th~ aoropw;l:l:Y

queat1on

t'lli<f!3l:'t$ pNJp'i.'lrtUlt!

gat1on with th® Oex'illi!!U l'lay.,r, St•n•ltng;

llllllnt wlth

\<Was in

the d:fliHl.tufrs

th~~ O'IU¥'Oh~u•e

title>s to lllOOG! Of

1nt!\lr~~~¥t

th0 f'ii,tlt to use this

t:nademat•k 1n th!ll United Statii<S; thcH'iil

~nr.i

b:l.;j:hest

int;\\jro.s.tf; in ,\\metiCI'lt inclut'U.n,g ll!eized

phnrroac,l\1!tiO~ll p~•oouot'~•

:rigj'Jts

th~

Xt;;rlt• to

'l'nis QO'!!iJ?I.\\111 wboel(l) sol.$

Virgln:\.fJl,

branch of 1tn

t{~w

b~'

ll!Umi.n?.>t\!>d.J

with the oheap®st oo!it WM$ to 13\!pply tne Jll..'l.t•ket.

--- ------ - - -
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'l'ne agr.:;,ement gave the Gennan firm the whole South Amer·ican
l!l:'l.dtett ·save for msp:l.t•in, wh:l.ch Sterling was to prov:l.de.l7

'I'he

pol:l.t:l.o~\.1

implications of ·this c?:trtel agreet1lent

were brought to light t•f'ter G:"!l'lnany' s em trance into Vorld
War II 1 when Sterling agreed. to mnre 1ts <lu.bsidiary company,

affix,~d

. agents in turn

I.

r. o.

ther<~by preserviru~

n.

labels on th••HJe pr•od.uots 1

customer good-will <>Ylld serv:l.ng

as a good. reminder of th'!l fact ttJc?.t

G<l:r;Wl'~t.Y

ttl~

bei:ug clock,aded; but FJllill could SUw':IPlY
As le,te as

Novemb~u·

(lUstomers.

191H) 1 <lOCOrdi!l,!:!; to tesUmony given to

a Congressional Committee, the p1•esl.ds:nt of

I.

waB ostat-.sibly

~ite:rling

assured

a. of the corttinunrice of his effort to protect I. G.

interests in South Aillerioa.18
'rh.is agreement nurtured otber politioal ef'f'eots
~rbich pl'OVCd

inimical to the interests
~t'he

in \>Jorld t<lar II.
exclusive

m£~rkets

or

the United Natio.as

provision that e:rltitled I.

1 in tbe great me.Jority

or

a.

to have

co!il~lodities

in

r.atin Amerioa 1 was an important mea.ns of "ext<JJnd ing Axis
i.nfltv,moe th,O'Ire•''l9 In addition the sale of' products by

17nork1n and il/elsh • .212• cit. 1 !h ll>O.
18
Ibi<J.,

t

.lH llf2 •

•cart,~ls and Pr:i.vate Gove~·nment," :;t'ne CowmAAweal
Vol.. XXXIX (FebrlliU:'y 2 5, 19L;I<·) p. 1~60 •
19

AmericH-n conclir'ns

ua:l.n,~

deceptive labels such as Sterling,

provided ti'le S<Juroe of dollar balances for the German

government. 20

VI!,

I, G., ALCOA AHD

DO~J

CH!l:NXCAL

Havlng exam:l.J:J.ed. I, G, Farbe:.n 1 s pharrnta(;eu';ical cartel
opeX'atL,ns. we :noi'J tum to I, G, 1 s

rol<~

in the magnesiun1

oartel, and examine its rela.tirn'lsh:l.ps w:l. th its American
pa1•tners.

The magnes.i.um cartel serve 61-s another example

of the effect the Gernl'cl'll

ca.1~tel

system h£>.d upon the national

defense :pot<mtial of foreign nati:.)ns.

As

!i?- eonsequ•'l>noe

of

both domes t 1c monoptJJ.y and interne tional om· tal at•rangemants 1n this lnd.ustl:'Y, N'Lioh 1ndu:ced Germany 1 s potential
oompetitol"l!l to curb production• Germany secured an init.1al

lead in the production of' magnesium.

th!il-t I,

a.

remained substantially

The l•&ad was so great.

unchall~1!lged

until 19Lfl.

:Production estimates conducted hy the U. S, J:lureau of l'l1nes
revealed that G<iirmany produced 61 percent of the world* l:l

total outpt.tt of magr1esium in l9J?, and the Unit•sd States
2 0 11 l?atents

Weapon of Monopoly,ft
(February 14, 1944) p. 7.
--------------

prodt.taed only 10 percent.
th,~

prorlu.o1ng one-half of
Stated

\1RS

producing

By 1940 Germany was still
world's output,

IDJ:;!out

~Jhich

the Un1t;ed

llt.%.21

l'lagneS1um is one of the most

importm~t

metals used

in 1ndustriul -production both in tlma of -oeace and war..
lfhen this metal is p1•operly alloyed, it oan fulfill m%Uly
'

'"i th

of the :!\motions of AluminW'!l

grea.ter efficiency, since

it is lighter, has g;pos;tor ras1l1emcy and has gr-eater

strength.

Among its military

incendiary bombs and flares,

usr:!cS bU'e airor~1ft

construction,

'rhe two principal producers

of magnesium 1n the United States during the years 1919-1927 1

Company, a subsidiary of the Aluminum

Collll:<~"·!lY

of America,

In 1927 the two oompani<'lls entered into a, cross lioensing

agreement, under which the Ametr'ioan Magnesium company stopped
1 ts production of crude mag;nesiuro, arranging to buy what
1t needed. from Dow.22
In 19:)1 1 !. G,. Fl!'.rben, the p:rinctpal p:ro:J.ucer of
magnesium in Germany entered ir;to an agreement

Aluminum cernpany of America

knOWl'l

w1 th

the

as the Alig agreement.

"./

--------

.21Berge 1 .2l2.t., .!U.t...1 p. 22C,
22

w~xner 1 .2l2.t.. 5!J.L.. P• 2)1

----------

7r'5'
'l'his agreement called :f'ot• a pooling of p<J.teuts

~md

technical

addition, the o.mtrrtct called :t'o1• ·the establishnlent of .._
Joint corporation. the

!~agnes:l.um

ownership equally divided

.Developn;.ent Corn:,lany,

bet~"i'een

Alcoa and

:r. o.

~tith

'l'he ·

Magnesium Development Corporation was primarly a patent
holding corporation t;o wh1oli I .• 0, transfii>rred s.ome

fabrioatior. patents and Alcoa cc.,ntributed process patents.

I. G. and. Alcoa were to share equl!!lllY in the b.onefits
from this agreement, but in r•eal1ty I.

beme'fio1ary.

By the control

c.

was the primary

ot pel.ten&a and. technoloa,<;y turned

over to the Hagneaium Development Co••poraM.on,

:r. o.

limit!ild

the use of these p1•ocesses 111 the Un1 ted States, and excluded
Alcoa and other pote:ut.it{l American licenoees from foreign

mal:'kets..

'I'he

con~raet

also limited. magnesiulli prod!,ict1on

in the United States to 4000 tons a year if
the produot;ion patents • 2 3

US\il

was made of

compmay in tbe Un.l.ted States entered into "' p8.tent holding
agr$ement tdth Nagnesium Development Oorporll,t1on in

January 1934.24

i-

Th1s was followed by a sales contract

'

23Berg$, ~ ~. p. 222.

I

24aork1n

and Welsh, oo. e1t. 1 P• 229,

-----------
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contract a m<;<X.l.!l1Um capaci i;y of 6000 tons 111 ye1u• was put;
o.n

Do~; 1 s

otttput, :::nd. t;h1s restriction wa.s still in effect

in 19/.fO • 111hen Gc,rman pro<iuction of mag;nesium vtas estimated
at 60,000 to 75,000 tons, or ovar ten M.mes
of Anwrican indus try. 2 5

~he

C<>pacity

77
to

I, G;.

l:iCWl 1 8

more> than

J 1Doo,ooo pounds of m21gnes1um

ot~b of
'

<?{!.

t.otal p~'Oi.luo~ion of slightly !llOr''i' th'''.n I.;,GOO,O\JO,'"

'.Phe Pe sul t of

imports from GermMy;

•~hil<'l inrpor'~lng

only 186 tons from

the United Statli:la, 27

effort;. BlllC6 it

l'i~I.S

abX'lAptl,'f CQi:; Offo

·2'OFJerge, .2.!2• Qij;,, p. 22J,

2

fsot?Hn ,:;ul.O Welab, Q!..?.. clt.

28Berge, !m• .QJJ;.., p. 22tf,

1

'

it tllSO h::mdloa_pped

7,8;
' '

magnesium pl'Oiiuce.c1 in i\rncrice., ths gres;ter

"' o,~ q,,;e
st:reng t·,"

to cases

<~uch

'l''
' r·.
d
~n ...

th~

military

... i 0<1•
'' n ..9 9
lie

as this which led 1'hur!Jt1im Arnold to eomment 1

·~Jh,~n Hitler canH~ to power, he fOii,lld the oo;,r·telized
·society of' the democracies a ready inetrument :f'or
'~conomlc aggresBion.
He assist:1d En¥1 encouragad the
mc:mopoh :~t"' in demo<:H'G.t:l.c (H)Untri•'.HJ to r~>etrict their
O<>~n production in Gr~rmany, he played on th®lr fear of
surplus produol;;1on 1 their desi:r'~ to hold up !:heir
prices and st;abl.lize1 their corrtrol, • • • Hitler ctoubled

___

,,.._

..,...,~-·

.Q!l.• c:l,t., JJ, 217 •

?9
~) ~.H:ld, t;.r'l g>l !:'!.1 tb-':.: orcxiuo t1 on of r;~lu_m1num Sl.n.d wr&gl19S1um
t~b 11~ thl!l dli!lllOOl"'~O lG S S toodl S l.iillt f<U<i h~ OP''U'£'! C<l!\1.
;?:Llffi ilt:Yr·'ly th:rcn. tth a 1 Ct.Uf~; llt1 t o.f b~i;a 1-o ma t-:i1t' liitlS. u JO

-------------

30·rnurm&n Arnold• ~Row C~u··t~b Aft•11ot You. • !}l!i&#'~Siltl
i:li!fSUrY't Vol •.!.Vl (l'l!'d:•oh 1943) P• )29,

out of the oil busin<!?ss, while StandA.rd

1~as

to :r·efrmin

from chemical undertakillgS not rri!lated directly to petroleum,

g:his idea

~>me

ngre·o;ment between the

embodied in the Division of' Fields
t;~o

firms,

A 'second part of the

compact provided !'or thrs transfel' to a jointly o1med
compRny, Stf!.ndard - I • G,, rights h1 the hydrogenation
pl:'oGess i.n all countries. with thrs exception of Germany.
h. third document of the ag!:'eement prov:!.ded for ooorrUnation

in

r<~spec.t

to perlpher•al oa1.1es betl'Jeen the oil e:u:trl cherfilcal

fields, when<llver trle t;1o overlappe•:l.
th<9 a.g:rsement, cal1'3d.

th'~

The fouJ•th pa1•t of

German sales a.greement, prQvided

for 1;he fixing of !!!hares of the respectiv'" Jlarties in the
G"!<l'!llan m!>.rke t for pe trol,'lttm produo ts. :31

In 1930 1 tr,e two companies !.'loncluded an agreement,
r·ri th the intent of implementing the aforementioned Division

of' F'ields Agrr,•sments, !mown as the J·asco Agreement (Joint
Allli~rican

Study Company), r,;tipulaLing tli<•t

developed s.n;r 11ew

ch~mleE~l

~1hr:m

process 1t should of'i"."'r the

ot:h·?r an option to have r•:tghts in the process
&,

ei th•sr pa.1·ty

jointly owned companyt J<"'sco, Inc.

aJH~igned

t;o

,Jasco was 'to ms.l!;e

experimentations on mm processes t:tnd to f.'unction as a
----------
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liac:ma i:ng <J.grilnoy for the, explol t~ttion of p<Ol tents on

p<:·o:nisiug new oheruioul pr'ocesses. 32

Under the Division of Fields agreement

r. a. •

StfJ.nila.rd and

betwe~n

th<l developrnent of :>yelthetio ru.bb0r

was assigned to 1. G., sinca

~lle

processes used ·in

its composition lver<l in the oh31mical rathGr than the

Hesea:roh on 1 ts development was carr•ied

petroleum 0.•<>10..

out by both, however, sino<> Stc;.ndar.d ·regH1•ded synthetic
rklbber d•"velopmr<lnt as coming within
Jas(>O AgreerMmt,

th;~

purvi1'iilW

of'

tho

o.<;ali:!'l!:\ '":l.'<;ll joint dev.;;lopm<Snt of border-

I. G. as early o.Hs 19}2 had developed a

line cases.

tiyut.hetic rubber, oJSlslgmil.ted as Buna hubber· 1 but did not

give its formula to Jasco till ••fter tho start of the
ll!iH'.lond

world

W<U'

in l9J9 1 d.espite the fact it had Oeen in

t\tll scale P>'oduotion in Germany 11ince 1934.3:3
I. 0:. 'ivl!U> able to prevenc Starldctrd Oil from com-

mUting; itself to a polliit.ive program of synt.!1e tic Pubb'Jlr
d~evelopmenc

d.uring th>:se five years by wl.thhold.in£:, the

t0obnology i l

posrs,~sBJed

)2.~ •• p.

9.5·

JJ !big, •• p. 97.

on the process.

As early as 19).5,

-- -- ---------------
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c-.

E3tandard realized t'hat I-.

was not com:)lyi:ng Nith its

In tht:J words of' an official of StandHrd 011:

"TIH;) Hitl<H' gov•ernnHant docs not look v>.l. th r."',vor upon turn•

m!'leerial and d.oc:llt1.er1 to civc permission to I, a. to

S tand!trd 011

synth·et.l.c

r-0c~ 1ved

:rubbe.1~

lit tl<:, if ar,y, inf orlll'J. Uon on

f1•om I.

o,

'rhis tact is made clear in

nou:r pfE!Opl&~ have .u,:;ver macTe r~:!.una • • • !. G. has
not furnished anyone tEIOhnleal information."

·"The only information our people have is derived
from publ iBhod patents •"
"Inform.·~ tion

• , • about the:o tecl:mioal i!tSp8cts

of' this development has .not been forthcoming as

a reHul·t of
of mili tH:t'"~

lnform;::~ft1on

t.hc~

G~::rmmn ¢;v·vet~n.lm~n't

'"""''~dier.toy
y

ts

to pel'!!l1t I.

r·,~~f;Ar:~nl

a.

to D.:nyon3 outside Germany_. tr

btS<'C~-:;use

to reveal su.oh
J~
::;

J/j,"'"'"'I'
.V~0"''"'•1t'""'"
,•.• t'• i· i·•·>t''.J. n'"1 ... ,,, '•la•·l.,1,n,
~··1••1
u '-"' _.,. -t•l"'''
-f:/*' J .::-~·~nJ."l
u,
t..v·.... I'·,,
"' •...
v ·_.-u
Def;anse Program," U. 8. Senate, 77th Con;,;ren~· 1 2nd Se!imlon,
19142 • quoted in 1Jorl!in and. \ielsh, .QU. £J,.;t., p, 193.
~

>.J~l~"y

-~

35uergG, .QU. oi!.;., p, 21J

~ ~·,

f;:~'l}

~,

VI-~...,

J.·"'" t,.~ .

-- ----------------

took this eventual:!. ty into account 1
"BotJ::, parties !'>ftY.'''e that in event of

811

attack

by a third party 'prought against eithe.r of them

directly or 1ndir·eotly, in attempt<.ld dercgation
of' the title to patent rights transf,&t'r(l(i, hl!lre~
under, they w11:,1 coop•;rate loy1i\lly in defense Of
such attcHll< • .,:;;~

T'\10 American companies attacked thlll I>tatomt r•i,'!:hts on Bul.'WI;

the Goodrich and Goodyee.r Rubber Oomp•lnies attempted

'l:~he

production of Bumi, but the former was sued. for

patE~mt

infringement and the lattea' fo:r·mally

with su:i,t

thra~C~·t.ened

by the Standard. Oil Company under the I.

These events took pla.oa just
in October 19111. 37

t~;o

a.

patilnts.

m<)nths before Pear·l Harbor

X. STANDARD GIVES BU'l'YL HUB.B'i:R INFOaMA'l:'ION TO I • G •

Despite I.
prooess~s

a. 1 s

refusal to divulge the \2u:rJa

to Jasco, Stal'ld;cn•d 011 deoided to give its own

knoY.rledge of butyl r·ubber, a :Standard 011 :sy<ttl!letio rubber
disoov,~ry 1

to I,

a.

This type of synthetic rubbel:' could

be me.d.e more easily and cheaply, but

WliJS

uot a a good for

to I. G. full iufonllat.l.ort on its 0.1soov,n·y.

36tiei!lk"lnn, im•

w.,

9•

54.

J7t:;e:rge. ~· cit., p. 212.
.. -

--·-~-.-

i

84,

o<::mii!:1dorat1ons
,$ tand~li'd

pror11pt~d

mov~.

this

In th•:> words of a

of r ie ial,

"• , • , ()ll'll~'ta1n •:U.ffloulti<lli$ st1.ll l!ll'l.:i,st whloh
prevliiltit our• I. t:?, ft•i,"'ndr~ :rrom ~&1vinz, UfJ fu:U t:;$Obn1o~J.l
1nfm•mt1tion , • • • In vi,J:tw or thi.~ vc,rr·y i::!"'•tu1m~ spirit

o.)

of' coopii!'i'\i>tl<.~l:'l. wbiell (I.

~,t1Ja:playe<1,

I !l\111 cot1vitlO\lld

that it 11'1 not only <;ho l'ight thit~jjt to de!, out tkl~ nry
best thinl)!: from »Vlilry !rt<>mpo1nt to pg$ll O<'l to theill

full infOl'!Jlll\ t:l.O!l O:Q. thl.ll C~1po!yrna:t' { 2X<t;j{ 1) l~,t tb 1$ tillite •
l do not b<r~:Ueve w<:~ htlvo anythb'll}; to l0$\1! l:ly this which
ls oompm-nbl® with tht' pO!HollOl~ ben:" fl. t to <•ll o.f OW"
lnter~;sts. • )8

>Hth thf;J ootorl/llali:: of

Wf.U'

in !~urop·!l, I. a·., realizing

1-h!i'\t 1t c:::>uld no lo11ger P:t'IIIV>:l:l:lt thiil Ql>"' of l.

::iitaoo~Ar>d w<Hl

;?at!:l'Utl\1

oolll.~m1'"s ~Xnd&r thv~

t'J?ee to llc'iiinae

to IThtl.Ate EIUU!.'\ in tb:C1 Unit®d

t'i$1lt to tiT(;)

p:roel!!l~>i>li'!li!J

in the

In exoi:!anj\\ilil foi' th11i1, I .•

o.

a.

iit:~,lMH.,

l''-'ittll~~indet'

w1.1.s to

or

:reoe.tv"~

in tWil fo:l:'m of a hio/;h N:>y:;1lty t"$.te fNY.ll

'i:i.ll

ptittel'.lt

!,

o.

tlve Clrltl!llh

th•~>

world.

OOllSidsvation
11o>:Jn<Je..i

f1ll'!ll~

X!, ¥/OHLD WAH I! AND '.rHE:

HUBBl~H

SHORTA.ClE

•3'l'ANDAHJ) STANDS ACC!JS!IlD

\41th tbe entrance of the United States into Horld
il'ar II, and the na tul'(i~l rubber supply out off by .Japanese
couquesta in Asia, the probbm of

producin;~

suff'icient

synthetic rubber c''H:ne to the fore and became the source of
con.siderable controversy.

Standard OU and its cartel

agreement found itself blamec1 for the U. S. rubber short•
age.
~he

The position Standard found

ln arose from

fact that it never considered the political impli-

cations of i·ts c;;-u•tel agreement.

now

it~;elf

lmt~w 1

The Nazis, the public

\{ere using synthetic for at

the 1r rubber needs.

hJH!lSt

<:me-third of

Much of th,3 might of the h'e.rmacht

was at.tr1butable to synthetic rubber,

It was, • on !:.luna

tires that pa.n21er . dl.Vi$1~(:1
rolled through Northern France
' ..
•

and the lOl1fl&ndlil, ~4o

With the disclosure of these facts,

Stands.rd stood accused of being a 1!1\;\lPable party to the
rubber

short~1ge

among the United Nations,

Sanf..tor Harry

s.

Trtiman, the head of a Senate

Committee investigating th<> Th!'ltional

defenl1!<~

proe:;l:'o.m in

1SIIt<? 1 had even l1lhouted •treason" when the !!'elationships
-- ----------------

1

+0Fleming MacLaesch and Cushm<m Reynolds, Strategy
of th§! Am.:or1cas, p, 20.

86
between Standard and l. G, were being 1nvest1gnted, 41
Before this same Senate Committee, Assistant Attorney
General Arnold hurled numerous charges against the conduct of' Standard and its rele.t1ons
William S,

l~ariah

~~i

th :t.

o.

President

of Ste.ndard Oil gave a11swer to the

_accusations; a brief resume' of the charges and

r'~buttals

wakes 1nter•llstiw.J: r'lla<Ung:
"ihK!ex• the oart~!l bet>1€l<'l\ll Ste.nda:rd and r.a.,
Gertl1111.ny got tha benef'lts ot the u. :3, tl01clmoloic:l.cal
'•"' developments; 1:h?J u. ~). did 11ot get. Clerm~J;nys."

Arnold.:

Farish:

"'fhe

o~u·tel

gave the United States :l.ts BtmEI

Jmov;ledg;e among other thluge,"
Arnold:

"Stat:ldard. delay·~d the use of auna rubb•!lr :tn
this country beoaus<ll the Hitl,~:r gov,'!lrrun<mt did not

Nish to hf<Ve this rubber· exploited here for military
reasons •. •

"Nobody from Standard 011 to Jessie Jones wanted
to exploit; synthetic rubber at 20 to 40 cents a pound,
E:'lltcept for m:tnox· specialty p1•od.uct;s, as long as natur•al
rubber was available at 15 cents <~ pound,"

f!'arish:

•t~hen Standard 911 developed a new synthetic
rubbet· called butyl• it turned its process over to
:t. a. Farben, a1ld refused to g:l.ve :l.t to the U. s,

lirnold;

Navy."

:il'l>rish: "Butyl was no good to Germany because it ls
made of oil and oil is H:l. tler 1 s great laolt, !n 1939
the company gave samples to the l'iunitlons Boord which
turned them over to several companies for exper:l.ments.
Though che&.per th].l;n Bun.a, they decided thst butyl
was not as good.n+2

41 "D1mter lJ'WJ,e T:re{lsQn,"
(April 6 1 1942) p,

L>2rb1g_.

15.

~~

Vol. XXXIX
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Upon the conclusion of. the aoousa:cions ::J.nd artswers, up
spoke Senator 'l'ruman, the head of the Committee, stat>1ng
th""' t "even after we were in che war· Sta11dard 011 of
}lew Jersey was putting forth every effort to

control of tno

Gh~rJrJan

.

goverl'l!llant, over a vital war

To eompanias such
~rho ~<er0

p!~oteot;

'llil

the

nu:~terial .•

43

Standard 011 of Ne1.,- Jersey,

squirming under the goverx.unents inference that

they had 'been dupes of the Nazis, Attorney General Arnold
offered consent; decrees.

Standard of' N, J, accepted ttw

decree in 191+2, and was fl.ned

:~50,000~

As a result it

formally terminated its r<,;la tions vii th I.. G, Farberl <iurins;

the war.

Synthetic rubber patents held jointly with

I. G, Farben 1•1ere, by t;erms of' the d®oree, made available
in the United States on a royal ty-f'ree

biM~is.

IJ,4

l1'ollow1.ng the filing of' consent decrees by Standard
Oil, and subm1tt1ng to the provisions of' the decree,
Standar•d Oil of N. J, bought full-page advertisements in

newspapers all over the country in an attempt to explain
its relationships with I, G•.Farbeu,

In these advertise-

ments Standard publicized its claim that the. United. States
l~Jibid.

lf4"P•.:mding on Patents," Bus+nes§ ~. Vol. DCLX,
(April 22, 1942) p. 20

-- -------------

had benef'1 ted from the Farben arrangem<<'lnt because Standard
bad received much more technical

~.nformation

from I. G.

than they h.9.d given I. G. in x-eturn,

Eh:lO£tuse under the

agreements much of tlle basic reusectrch

•~<as

to be conduoted
/;,«

in G\?rlila..'l.;{, this claim was true to some extent. -'

When copies of tho :>tandard ':lll :;;,dve:rtlsements came
to the attention of tb'..;, German Economic l'linistry, the
Nin1stry denimlded a full report from I. G. F'arben on the
chs;rge trJat Standard had the better of' the exchange.

Fol1o111ing the· t<iar, from the files of I. G. Farben, the

amma:r to the Economic
'rhe

con\:,~ntion

~11nistry

on this matter was found.

of the ll'arben report was that the

G(~rman

firm had received from Standard Oil several important
new.links in ths!r own chain of technology, whereas the
os tansibly gre>7\C quantities of inforw.lt:l.c:>l'l. they had
revealed to the American firm had left extensive gaps to

be t'11led by

research and
11.6
could be ut:l.lized.
n;.3w

developm~mt

be.fore they

89

I. G. l'larben and its cartel agre.eme:nts were as

su0cessful in pene·t:vating oth<:r areas o.t' Am•JH"ioan tn<lustry
as it did the petroleum field..

One of its !!lain interests

l..n the United States was the General Aniline Works.

l'hls

company was part of Amerl.O(ll.n I. G. • !>lhioh had been organized
by I. G. Farben in Switzerland in 1928, aud later had its

holdings transferred to the United States.

Works and its parent company, American !.

General i!niline

a.,

Nare engaged

in the dyestuffs and pharmaceutical business in the Unlt·,,d
.States.

In December 19)9, American I.

o.

~m.s

reorgm<ized

to some degree, .and its name was ehanged to Genl.'lral An1li11e

and F'llm Company. h?
To every charge that it was a German-owned company,
General Anlline and Film Company officials replied tha:t it

was Swiss ONned., · ~lhen other I. G. Farben agencies

~1ere

unable to g;et supplies in the Elri tish Empire and in

thl)

blockade of the South American market, General Aniline
and Film p:rov ided the necessary !!ll>t.er1als.

General lmiline

20
and Film

l'las

I. G. l'i'arben 1 <~ biggest enterprise in the

of Germany 1 s i.mptorial pow.er in North a.nd South American
pharmaceuticals, chemicals ;>.nd other mat,srials, • 4 8
The

combin·<~d

inv0stlge.tive

po~1ers

of the United States

government W3.S unable, even as late as 191+9, to p1·ove the
4

Germll\n ovmership of General Aniline and l!'llrn Corporation. 9

I. G. F'ar•ben had other cartel connections in the

United States.

Among the more important ones, was its

aggr(~em<mt ~11. t;h

tl'!Eil Du Pont Chelllical Compa.ny 1

~~>nd

one of

Du Ponti s subs1d1ar1as, t.ha il,;mington A1·m~ Cotnp,~n~·.
late as
car•tc~l

th~'

As

winter of l9i>l, Du Pont was prevented by its

agree:nent with I. G. to sell certain types of

mati!>rial to Great Bz•itain,
defense of that country.

rr~a·cer1al

When

vitally needed in the

GreH:~·t;

Britain in 1941

attiJmpted to place an order for tetrazen.e-primed amm1mitlon,
the CP,rtel agreement bet11een Du Pout and I. G. prevented
the sale.

In this :particulat' case, tl'le pat®.ut attorney

for the flemington Arms Company wrote a memorandum stating
that, "The fu.rther sale of tetraz;ene-prl.med ammunition to

48r, !<'• Stone. "The Cartels' l•laahlngton Friends,"

'rhe Natigu, Vol. CLVIII {February 19, 1944) p, 210,
1"9r•1artin, .saB· cit., p. 67.

•~alii

!ilbrond •

thf> ae;r<Hillllf.iint

Dilll'llond i1acoh Company of

b$tw~aan tr.\ttt
th~

firm euil t.ne

United Stat.a"'.

'l'he <!affect

of oerta1n type<r of' ammunition, dur1.1lJ tile two d$Oadeg
prreoe,.ding \·h:>rld >J<u• II.
w~re ;a

'.t'blii: result<> of

th~;~

a.groHitm,;.mt

grlW<l shortage ot' ohlorat<J of potash for military

Jillll');lOSOI'I fll'J.G. r.;:;, toh pl"Od.UC t1on dur•ing Wot•ld 'liar Il. :_)l

CO<•>P!lnier. sou,sht th®
IDf'il'kO.t~t.

e~llllf w&y

out in Ul'* 'b$lttl'" f<>r world

ry,'hasa l.J. S~ ,!"trlll!B 1 it W!iHI

)013et•ge, .rul.• cit., p •.217

.5libid • • P• 186.

$f;lili,

h1Ml "l:la.~·t,!et~.:l.~~

92.

or

'rn.,y

the arteries."

were no longer aggressive alJd

would rather enter an agreement providing for a protect1!!d
marlwt tharl fight for an ever inere'·'aing share of it.

Anti-trust officials of the Department; of Justice cited
cases where powerful American chemical companies had. been
to enter Latin Ameriot:tn

reluct;an·~

cartels in

pre~>~a.r

l!!(;,l."J(E~ts

pt•otected by

days in the fear that aft;:ot• the

~>~Eir

I. G, JJ'erben might retall.ate,52
XUI ,

I. G. F '>HBfN B.OLE

was the Imperial Chemical Industries, LM.
dealin~s

with Amr:n•ioan

f'irm~1.

Unlike I,

those conducted

~<ith

c:~.

's

British

ent<ll:rprir>es were all aboveboard• since there were no an.titrust laws to hinder their cartel agreement,

I. G. and

Imperial Chemical Industries eltminated what m,.,rket rivalry
remained in the dyestuffs trade in 1938 by the establishment
of a jointly owned corporation. Trafford Che!llicals 1 Ltd.,
to manufacture certain dyestuff's in ·a:ngland.

:!'his cooper-

ation by O/llrtel agreem<mt was being negotla.ted at a time

93

from ec;.r·U.et' denl1n.e;s in nltt•ogell ana
llz<>rs,

nlk<~Uea~t

&ud e"plcm1ves.

I. G.

~qas

ar:;•:::;n,;;cm.¢lltS

Through tik'1 usi\1

ai?le to exe••cis<> oonr. idel';'!bl·"

·me pw•pos.a

bG~hind

this

fert.i-

Like t;he l!llajC>r1ty <:Jf

Of :':!\\Stern B;Ul'Opill thr'OLJ{j;b the O!lll'!.Hlll

poss<;sed in th 'c I'4ak;;ion.

n.itr·o~enou<>

p~~tl'lation

or

the

lai'lu<~noi\!1

of !J,alJ(G,n

1t

cartel
Oc'llllr

isl!~uztri~s

was to impl&ment a oontin(!)l:lt!al eoonoo1y pl<\lln, {Cf'Q•1jm·aumivert~
sohi!ift) ~;hleh requil'>ii!!d th® flall!:a.n rlfl.tiona to f\1mieh

rnineral.s 111 return for which they were to receive from

c<elldtic£->ls, and cosmetics, :ll1 i>.Jil.ltion to machinery and
technological t~.nd 0ngineerit1g services • .54

I. G. Parben 11ent beyond th<:J more prosaic functions

organization of
Bulgar•ia.

r. a.

oil~seed

prodUction in Humania .and

,offered soed.n to tlle farmers of Bulgaria,

to buy the entire crop at pre:3.rrangod prices. voM.ch were
at times above !#he woJ:>ld mc;rkmt prices.

l'brough furl1ishl.ng

technical advice\!' se.ed.s,

f•c~rti.lizero

inst~ctic1des 1

.I. G. was able to expand

itt~

marl>tet, and by setting; up a

oil-seed prod.uc ti.o:n exclusively to
typ:l.c.~<l CE\Se

am:

Grorm~?.ny.

'rhia

t>li\S

a

of I. G. 1 s economic p•ene tr:rttion l.n tlhcw

intel'nal economy of foreign ootmtrl.ea, somewhat similar

.54Karl Fall(, "German Industrial Octopus,"
Cy,:rrent llistory, III 1 (Nov. l9L>2) p. 215.
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to t;h<} prc,s(;mt ?oint
Vll!H'e

leas

li'OW'

i'rQgl'O.tu 1 c.xcept the objectives

lllF.Ignl'.nlimou&. 55

In t.lle :l.nduatl.':iJil,l field,
~~·

aumanir:m lt•w of l9J6 wh1Qh
p~:r1oo

for n limited
not

priljviou~;ly

I. G. Pal'ben

(!,lba}
•\nd

~~.~~s

gr'«Hlt<ld ~:,

tool(

foun;i.i in

tb'~

<:~s

c;:omttry.

<llntar*'~'iiM>s

ln August, 1937,

a t•esult of' the l;<m 1

111 Buohtar•c:st to

56rt1d. p, ~:2o.

th;i~

lllll>YlUfactuJ."~~ ~:milin

'
cii;:;le to ex:olud+l <all oOtll)!hli'ti tox·m in tn.illl

55I.
'""'11rrll•
.
""l
~q. P• c;.~ •

of

fldVIi'I:Ut&.(iil<li!

procect.\.ve monopolY

of tlme to 1ndul'Jtr1sll

aoqulr,>d~

f~wtory

r. o.

:r. ,:;.
dyas

>.u·r~''•

·"<::1)·

A.

of

~~x·l.t(:tr'il

l'i\E~

en

in. thiir I!!!Rtter. I.

"''~oopol :1. t

:l.oa.l"

o.

Parl::J,'l>:!l

ot•~,;e,n1;::161 t1o!a,

B!'\(J<Jld

t'S~.tf~·nt•

be deelgn'i<ti'ld

tll!'.m sol~olY a a

97
It was stated before the TemporJ<:·u·y Nat:l.ont>l Economic
Committee in 191.>2 1 that the "oolos:sal rc>mificationsn of

type of study.

Joseph IJ.orkin and Charles A, \ielsh had tbe

following statement to make about the extent ana ramificationu of I, G, 1 s operat:l.ons in their book dealing with

"It is probable thet t even aftiJl' th«l prot•raoted. 1nvest:l.ga.t:l.ons by studentel. and by goven"'l!ment which have been
tal~en :l.n t'E~cent years not all of l. G, 1 s linl<s to
American industry or to South Amex•io.\lln markets have
been brought to light, It is even more certain th>lt all
its l"<olat:i·?nsbipol outslrle this h>1Hll1sphere hav111 not bt1e:n
disclosed. • , • 'I'h.~> t>lirm!i "monopoly ,\f\l1d (%U'tel" are
1mtdequate when applied. to I.· Cl. It is an agglr.)meration of roono\)olles and an aggregr.ticm of cax·tels< • • ,
Perhaps by compounding the idetct of un:tversc,ll ty and
a.bsolute cotttrqS a tertn such as "panopoly" ~1ottld b.e
!l)Q.l1<9, f'Jt,tiJ:tt);, II 5 J
~ltnlator

Ha.rle;y K:l.lgore, who was the Chairman of the Senate

NUitary Affai1•a Committee,

>~hich

dealt \»>ith tM technical

problems involved in th•9 war mobili:<:l!itt1on of the United

/il.rll'l of thf' ea:rbels.

Both

WOl'k<ld

toga ~her in easy !1;!).rmony

for the domina cion o:f the 1cyorld iliconomicH>lly and· polHically, 5'?

58sork1n and l~elsh,

.Qll,.

ill• • p. 33.

5S\iarley Kilgore, "'l'he Me:naoe of the Blook Ince~~:l.onal," Natio
s;~ont:l.ol;} Asaooiati,on JotarMl, Vol. XXXIII,
(April 191-> } P• 9.

---------

Though the majority of evid.enee condemns I. G.,

SIS

the economic arm of the Nazi gov()rnment • some reports
indicate that th•D obeisance of
of the state was not achieved
part•

The

"For(~lgn

r.

G. off:\.oiall;; to the plans

~~ithout

some protest on their

Policy ttel'ol"ts" fol:' October 1944• stated:

"It ms,y be noted. that in the o<<Se of I • G. J:7aroen. i110..ustrie th~r<e was reluctance on the part of th 1;; fox·mer
(iireotors to adhere to the requi!'·ements imposed by the
!Utler re;;;;im<JJ• ,'lad t;hey are kno~m to have appealed to
their forei-gn partners ill an att<~mpt to halt the process,
necoJ.•ds indiO!!'ite that thoy !'•SHl;\.,;te\9. for a time at least.
the increased davelopluent of some synthetic industr•i'l!s
w1 thin Gs:<•man;v - development:~ 111hich !lppeared uneconomic
to ·the original m,<J\nagement. • oO

Eoonomic objectives may have been the intel'lt of' the ellirly
directors, but these obj&otivr:ls were perempto!'ily mod•ified

Despite this nugatory reslsta110e orrered by some
dil•ectors of I. G., th<l firm hand of ·the state was disC•i>l'r.tible in tho structure or the organization.

This plan was init;h<ted 'by I. G. in

19!~2:

An example of

,d.th the

esta.bllshment of the Fluszpatwerke G. m. b,

B.,

with

capital totalling 800 1 000 :reiahmarlt!!, t;o mine end manufacture fluorspor end otbex· fil:~Ol:lt8.es used in m<tking such

99
items as optical

~>lass,.

steel and alUlllinum.

This new

company had as its obJactive the dav'i!!lopment of :f'luorspor
deposits in ae:vmruzy 1 and 1n other Eu1•opean cOUlitr:l.es as
well as •oversl\l'as ter:rlcori<Hl belon,;ing to continental

states."6l
The political and economic effects of. ·chc intrilr-

national o;;u•tal oper·ations of I. G. r'arban induwtries upon
v~u·ious

nations have been briefly

ci>~scribed.

The writer

will return to the dest;inies of I. G. Farban in the. post*
war period in a 1-"Lter chapter.

CHAP'l'EH VIII
GERl~MiY 13

CliHT!liL SYST'i:M A.."'D ITS POLITICAL AND BCONOl'iiC

BFF'i:':CT UPOl\T INDUS'EE.l!ilS AND

G01lEHNi'lE~~TS

ABHOJW

Cartels have acqu.lred their nefarious reputation,
p:ilrti.cularly in the United States • bE!leause they are assoo1a ted with the economic aggression of German totc1li t~trii!Ul•
ism.,

Chsrmany 1 s r'aaor<l of mil:l. tar.•isin and stggression has

not helped the reput;atio:n of cartel.s,

~lhic'h

mind invariably associates with Garlll~tllY.

ttHl popular

:rnvest1gat16ns

relating to the effects of cartel agreements between
Qerm!ID. and ilmerioan firms upon ·the Nationill.l Defense pre ..
paratio:ns of the United States have further ser•vad. to
denigrate inti~l"¥J&t1onal cartels in the l!merioa:n mind• ·
Inability to.disassoeiate cartel policies from
German aggression 11!3 not only i>t'ue of the average person,

bu.t also of the studellts of cartels,

A survey of the

writings of the cartel system reveals that most writers

oC'!\Id.emn the system for its $usoeptab1Uty to misuse by
th'"' totalitarian govemiment"•

'l'he 1ntsm!il.tiot!al

syst<em is not a har•mfUl system

~ .!ll.§.,

structu.rra and

proced~.<res

lies t;he

o~'ll:"tel

but in its

nuol,~us

1'1h1ch Cl'\rt

~~ive

lOl
fruition to totalitarianism and militarism.
ship between total:l.t<.u•ian:l.sm and cartels

~mn

by Hendell Berge 1:n hi.s t4r•it:l.ngs on cal't>els,

This relationaptly st1:1.ted
He said:

"'rot ali t<lrianilsm repr<Hients simply thEil ul timal;e
commmma tion of cart(;;l:l.sm - the fil>f"l.l, full exprelilsion
of th•3 re2ot1ont~.ry forces stemming from s:peoi.al privilege. !n tcrcal:l.tarian st<tl>es all indur;trinl <:Jntm·pris.;~
is subservient to the predatory intere,sts and fear
dom:l.natod '11111 ot' a govel'l'llllent which op•i!nly flouts the
demool'atic principle of tll(> aons<mt of the gov el'ned. 11l

century

lt~d

another writer· to 0omment thftt "it is history

that the. cartel

syat<~m

is always ripe, with the passivity

of a trollop, for the >1ot•st uses of nationn.listio P<'.ss1on." 2
'l'he political 1mpliae1tions

inherr~nt

in thl'll stl"ucture of

cartelism as practicad by GermHny w:l.ll be the subject of
discussion in this chapter.

The opinions of munerous writers will be anmly;:ed
and appraised in an t:tttli!Illpt to gain an insight into the

motives of th0 O•:lr·man oartel agreements.

i.Jere Germany's

llvendell B·n·ge, £\l!I'tr~l!;!, p, 11,
2

"No Peaoe ~~1th I. a. !lt'!rben.• F,ortuni\l\, Vol. XXVI,
S·s];:rtembtn• 1942• P• 107
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dasign~;~d.

maoblmtionil

ti.ebilit;,~te

t;O

tha eoonom1ea iiU'Id
:~l:u;~:;~a

d;;d'er:u.Jlve >l:lffort!s of rm.tious sfbt•ood'l

of $tat'''''•
It

,,~.~;

hl?.!ll

tho;

pret~!lmt

t:tme and in the future.

be,.,n. claimefl

by

some thtd;,

of tbq Naei :t'lil!llinl$ 1

th~~ O>&tm~lll oax•tt!~l

tbroue;h ::an ul t11ll<;<IHll

£~ubtla

Cl'i l;ica tmy t

"t!HJ

'!:H110£~lll¢:

und<:~r

th<!! <:i-G.!;is

syste11> paeMd

evolution.

ll.il:'>il~Ot

tat

l\'\Clll.t Of. tbe l'llll.:i!i j;')I\U•ty

aNI thr'

'l'he a;,rat>lllll, tkll;;!>e

pvli tiao-.1)0 OllOII!IiO illi:!tl"U..

l'IO!lllll liUld &O.I:'OI~clf ;~i!lllded 11ith

th<!> ai>l.f;;le aim ot rea~·n11ng Cl~l'tm:U:W for

tmr. '' 3 Otbt~l' ob~

fl d.~:t<li:~illl'<'A.<<J m~;1faHtat;1zy,n of na.t10Tllli.l i1l·tn whili.tl :!. tal ooeur•

re:nc& takes

pl!lXH!

in

Gi.J::;l''i1l,1<1Y• u4

Opinions as to the
1nt•'llrnrilt10u.t\l l:'<)le<tion:s

pEtl't

lll~Y

pl<tyed l:ly

G<H~JJI:i\ll Oi!U"'t•~la

pol:l.tio&l

as,t,$otm~

3

&~j'f;;;G;~t

of 1.nterxlational o:.rgan1zat1on. be

thtiy G'n'rl>•l'll or othcu:;><,d.lll'l!•

liUld their d0o1a1onr1

~t<i>l'e)

T.be

:PO<~er

of t!:w lii:l'i;i::!Sl" c<>rtelst

oft!illl "mOl''l :l.mptll't!lJ:lt th01n t;b0€10

:tJ;J1d.

14.

in

diff<llr, but on·o oonclue:l.on

S@«rm:> j.ustif'ied1 rul!naly, that or•:n•t•.rl ftot:l.vltii<HI do
c~10

,·

kouill ? • Looi:;n,)r, 1:¥o.gonm ~awl ·~'::u:rzo.tllh p.

;1,;.
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of a sovereign political entity such as Holliimd, Denmark
or Portu~:,"Ual, u5

Hot1

tbis power rep<•<i.lsented by cartels

'rha t the cal·tel system in Gel?lllany

an instru-

of nm tional policy Nhich led to milita:l:'ism r:md war

lllli>llt

1.r111.s

~m1s

a discernible fact

power.

Some s·tudents

lo~;;

·or

before t}le rise of HH:ler to

Clel'ln?.n cartels in the prew>vorld

v-i&.r I period cite the gr•eett gro~>rth of cart\~ls in the fir•st

decade of the twant1.eth century as being " contr>ibutory

factor in the stflrting of that; war.
at; thb oonolusion is 2>.s f'oll<Y.<iS:

oartel system, G;u"maxzy 1 s industrial

'l'he l'e:ason they arrive
Piit;h the grot1th of thG
mi~"ht

?;:rew to be the

most powerful in JJ.urope and as a result thJ1l compet:l.t:.ion

1'his great competition offered by German industry wss made
possible by the utili<?.atto:n of oax•tel!l as OPganisn1s of

state policy under

ment.

th~l

direction of ·the n&tional govern•

The tligh tariff policy which hl;\d been enacted by

5payson S, · Wild, • Sano'tions of' International
iourual S!f. Jntc'ilrnatigun;t.
Law, Vol. ~XX (Ootob<H' l936j p. 65.
Commod :1. t;y.· Agreements •" .(ilueriomt

10~

ayut,jm to flQur1uh.
Ilm.pid. incl'6·'.lSe tn

otbii:r tl!'.lt:l.ons.
r~

'I'his

px'ocuo't:l.v•::~ o~~:paolt:;y

9.U!:H1t

E>Conomio to po11t1onl

for JlU:\.t•keta

l'l.bl'O.ll<d

W£1rfar,~, ~lnd.

in <l<H'tn.<»l'.l.Y

oftllll:l turnad.

SiOi!i'llld hhe

G'iliX'IlMl!.n ;n111t<;u:-1sm ~~b1oll bu:rg.;;onecl lnto World Har

t'ruH& of 1ts r,n•od\wtivity withou.t
w1 tb oth0z· indu!l t;rl.<~l POW•l!1'S

~" p:~.•imiJJ!

rae tor :bl

o«~ul.'l in$~

poUtiCHl 1n,id('lJ:lt$

()A•

J.

ooml.~

aea~l1!

:t.

<'Zlf

'l"ne

in·t:o ocml'Uot

~1\::l.road. 6
~leu~

tJorld

b~ir14,;; ,j1.u:~

a

:r

f'acr:~d.e

HOiili'l1'l.t4tti>iUt u:Hmif Car·tfllt1

l1()pt;fb:Uc,~ ~J:.!n?\!1'illl''2t!Mllt Vol.

t;O

xxnt.

t;iill;;lll allF.~oa,

the

fo:r· th<.• «oonomie

13:rolre tll:t~' G<n'mli.ln
(!1i•n.,on l9LJIJ) p. 279.

--===
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..,
world powers be :tug unavoidabls; und•er the C$.rt,':l BYcltem. r
Close cooper.at:!.on between c«rteh>. and tho national

to aohieva tJS.tionr;\list:l.c ends.

In contrast to the pe;.'iod

a.llbx<ce call for the clevelopment of

!'\

upon th,c;, suprmn:"!.cy of the s tg te • w1 th
the cartels• to be
end.

us~'d

In this period.

solely as a

~~hen Ill.

dua.l ity of into;.'ests

itt~

meHUS

economic ally 1
to achievn this

Germ1ut corporation s:I.<S'!led a

no German company was pern11 tted to gain a comm,ert.nal ben<:llfit at the expense of the inter<est of the state. 8

7Ip1~.
A
~ouenLe:r

Heimann. gatents t:pr H%t:}.er, p. 6.

===--

greB,t era of cartels • not only in

ot the world liiS well.

o,~rmany •

It t11as an era rnade to ol:'der for

the German oa;:<tel experts l

th<~

Old

:l.nt~n·na tional

lllUioidy me11ded af't;Gr the war, l:m:l.l·t upon,
'£h1s period of

its most

extr,;~me

oomplet1~

fonn in

GcH'llli'l.l'lY

1noi;ivati1~g:

rationalizaticm. was

th~

ties were

~nd extended~

vationalization of industry acr.11eved

;~a.s follcr<Hlld. by the x·ise of the
The thoory

'but :tu the rest

d.Ul'ing: the twenties and

!H. tl0r regime. 9

this great period of

self-suff1o1ency of Gel'many • and

ive enemy in peacetime in order to achi®Ytl a ligl'itanlng
vlotory in mu·.

This theory Qalled for· the coordination

of two main polio1eoq one
military

p<»I<::U'

~<Ail

£m i:nct'e8se of eQon.omio and

at home, with a simultan<Jous rE<dtwtion of

lO'i'

m;;;;r::;x>tiiiJdl;;.cM•snt.

~~~1'>o·

f.·,,:r'tJI.Ulr!h•.e.d so

.:~s

'to

c;l.it!>il"11'1.11~

1:uzy .

1oophol<i.\s. 10

th<; Of•r>tll:lt vll:liCh al~, >'11th 1)111ti<8llt <1omlt1oJ.tion Hex><~ t~

llll&ll!le.nta ••bioh

"'''~'!llc~d th~;

vital

'l'hill) cancet:rtrat1on of econom1o

o~'['!l.'m'l ,)(

p0'11'll'

in

ivn•

•.;hiJt

l\Lttl'

muclli.ne.

hl:.n·:l$ o;,\" '"

f<;!,;

10$·

in a great cartelization drive,

Fear and desire t1ere the

emotions employed by Gel:'many through tl'.«ll oartt,>l mechanism
to :pr'ilcipl.tate this oarl;elization of U:urop<3an industry*
which !OOshed s;rJClo1;hly t'<ith the political pl:?.ns of the

companhls to lllli!.ke nu:uerous alliances with German ind.ustl•y.
The terms cUotated by Germexzy for industrial peace weakened
tb.e non-Gel"man industcy 1 whlle str0ngthening the indus triml

;~<•r machine of the lieioh.ll

in the oartiel arrangemertlllil were

oont:l.nu~.~lly

l"i!lvealed.

Germ:suly •s productiv-;, Ollrpacity continued to grcm, 1'1h:Ue

non-Germatl companies, oom.placent in tho evanescent security
these agreements of'f'er®dt continued to restrict th•&ir own
ct~pacity

a2ld output, to limit their teohJlice,l research•

and to be genl!lrally inditfel"ent to the development of new
prooesseth
strategic

'fhb

nel:n~l<:ms

commoditht~

seour :l.ty was evlC1er1t in many

oontrolli3d by cartels a11d Cl.iscusscd

compi'mies entertained as to the seou1•ity of thesa agreements

~teN

allayed by the prof:l.ta they reaped !:tS a 1•esult

11 r•':ranois E1ddle, 11 Cartals An Approaeh to th!l! Prob1
lem, l[!ti* Sptili@Qh'iHh Vol. X (l'!a.reh 15, l9L~4) p,. 339.
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:rearmrunetlt in the 1930 1s, since this increased their
produotion and raised th\l' prices of their prOduots,

O<!!!rll!f1n rear•mament;
12
fits
,

.

Germ~:my,

begHtlt

so as to

p~crti(~:lp,<?. te

As

1n tbe pro-

through the use of the intermtt:l.onal cartel

syst<::un, was able to achieve a victory in the esopolitical

ar1ma even before the f:l.rst shot 1'1'!'\S fired in world \far

:u.

:l.ng disasters which beset the Allied Armies and Navies.
\1/hel'; the Allied 1mtions l\lOU!!;ht an answer to th<l then
enis1ll&.t1c Pl'obhm of why German war production had been
allO'..:ed to get so far :l.n advance of Allied production, the
there.tofore obscure word, cartel. oa.me into popular usage
:l.n the All:l.<iJd >mt:l.ons.
'l'he Kilgore Committee, which :l.n 19411, conduoted an
1nv!i}st1gatton of the economic 13nd poll tim'l.l asr,ullot;s or

12Henr:l.oh Kronste:tn, ngurop,>an Cart>:J>ls,

II

'Jih! CgMonwea;t., Vol. I!Xl, (June If, 191n) p, 172.
--------------

J.J_O

in·ternational cartels, elaborated upon the role played by
G~n·man

cartels in harnper1ng Allied military preparedness,
'l'he f oll ow-i:t'.lg

is an excerpt fvom its repo1•t:
n.A def~3ated Oermatzy em~:n•ged from tl'l\' first ~.~or·ld
war Nith h$1" lmper1!ilistic .. minded itKTustl•ial hierarchy in tEet • • • • German.y 1 s Lndust.rlc'tl management secured loans from abroad ;~b.ich enabled them
to consolidate into gigantic domc">sti<~ and interue.tional monopolies , , .. • 'l'hey were bent upon
recapturing their. wca·ld position in dyestuffs,
phar·ma.oeut1cals, military optiollll goods <md other
commodities •• , • Ger·man i:ru;\ustrialista, ba.oked
by the gove.rnme:nt they bad forced to do the:h· bidding,
thJ.•r:>a tened to il~nuie th•; foJ?eign mark·~ t13, threatened
to sell gooo.s at lo1qe:r prices., thr'.l&lt,}tied to tmleash
new teoimo1cg;iers 1 threatened to ditlrupt th·~ controlled
markets of otheJ? countries. 'i'hey bl1ackmailed their way
into world markf)ts • • • • 1:J'sing oo~~m"'rolal relations,
in particular the Oo!i~'tel, as a N<~apon, they rearmed
th.eir own oourltry and. dirsar·med. thei.t' prospective
victims • • •. 'l'he alli61nae between iHtler ·lllfld the
German cRrtelists acoeler;<;ted this qw.'!nt for dom1..:
nation. 'l'he economies of' otht;r countri~~s t~ere
penetrated by agreemente m1wng German, Bri tish•
American, l<'r•;nch t"-00 other concerns through 111hich
Germany. built up a netvwrk which imp~'<ir<>d the pro~
duction of oche1• nations, obtained sources of i'm•eign
exoha:t'.lg(il • • • ga.tih>3red ~conotlllo intelligence and.
sp:r.1lad Nazi pl'Opaganda. 1 ..1

Earlier

investit~at:l.ons

by

oth·~r.

Congressional bodies

aTha the Temporary National Economic Committee had

rea~~ed

th,;r same oo:nclusio:na r®lative to the intent and effects of

l:Jquoted 1n Colston E. l.Jarue ;, !ntex'ttational C~u>tels,
A f4enaca to P<!l:aoe," Currenl;i Higtor;y 1 Vol. VIII,

1945) P• 112 ..

(lr,sbruary

liJ..l.

final

~·epo:rt

among

otlh~:r

o.f !> '1', N. 11. c .• hear1n15 1:rl 19110 stated

facts.* the followillg ¢

"1, 'l'hat foreign oompani<vs had taken out patents
and. •E>nte:red. mto cartel agr&(1raents in tl1<ll United States
on essential war materials f"or the purpose of~ and "'1 th
l:he ·effect of, blocking Am~Jr>ioan d.ev·alopme:nt and CX'<i:1at1ng serious llhortr,>.ges • • •
2. 'rhere had been a division of NOrld markets by .
pa.t•"r1t agt•e·smeuts between dom•:~st:l.c and f'oreign companies
W'hieh gave foreign interests th·~ right to d.etc:rm 1ne
\~?he:re and ho~r the fimerice,\1:1 companies may iS~ll O•ll'tai:n
. m11ita:r.l' supplies , • •
}. It seem.s probable ths:tt' vital m:UHary .1n:fOX'!:llat1on
ie;; l.leen diselosed to f'or•a1g-n oomptmies thx'ough tho

re•juiremen:t of itemized. dRH!041ptiv"' royalty pz;,yments in
patient liokmae agr•H~ments.al

'£h'il ov;mall fact,s discovered by tr•ia wx•iter in the
course of research upon. tb<J intent and •lffeots of G·,l·maey's
cart,&l policy • saer.ns to indio"lte th•lt the
delili£.'!led

speciflo~•lly

pro~tram

was oue

to achieve the ends of the atc',tce• witil

economic GOl1Siiier<'rt1ons being incidental factors.

Though

some may ola1m 1 with nominf.tl jus Hf'ica;ticm, that any

14!~uoted in O'lor;cr<~ E. Falk, l'§;tencs ~•nd. Iaduat;ti§l
frogr,ilss t p. 103.
------ -

-----

discussion

~<hich

involves Ger•many and itCJ policies is

subject, to J:ll'ejudioes, due to that countx•y's militant
histo1•y in the twentieth
great; llk"'jori ty of

cen~ury,

obs<3rvsr~>

the opinions of

t;lr:><:~

seem to intllct Chn•ruany 1 s

intern..,tional cartel agreements as conspil'<tcies ·to UJ:lO.ermine the ecOllomic and political

po~•r:u'

of potential adver-

o:r•lginal intent of the cartels may have been solely eoo:uom:\.c
in character• 'bwc t;hay state this intent was ephemeral,
the ainH!l of the stNJ.t(3 soon b<<c8.me ·t;he

by Congressional groups

wer<~

ral~gn

~\nd

11 *.9·t;re of the

outspoken in tb.eir

COlldem~

nation of the pernicious influences of cm:·tel agreements
betwllien

Amerio~;'m

a:nd German firma.

SimHarly the majority

of American writers sm students of cartels are :l.:n almost

complete unanilllity in their opinion tiJJilt

G'~rnu;m~inspired

agreements were a carefully calculated instrument of
Oerm1;tny 1s W!'n' lords• existing 1nainly to enhsiXAOe the power

of the s ta t;e.

In England, with a fairly long .history in cartel
d.eal1ntliS and' no antitrust legislation, opinion was divided
on the question of the effects of Germe.tty 1 a cartels upon
that country's war effort.

In fact, the govel'%lment has
--- -- -----

tended to cUseount the charges Hs unsubstantj.al.
Oliver Lytthto:u, B1•U;ish Production Nini<ste1•, stated
before the British l?ar·liament in 194.5, that, "the fi'ee
flow of soim1tj.f'ic information in an lna.ustry is abso-

to Germany, and ! mt'l.Y. sHy tha:t; thort'l is no evidence
whatsoev<f!r tlw.t any British f'i:rm has e:nt•3Jl'Od int;o, an
;u•r"·tngement ll'th.1oh ):'estrioted prod.uct.ion of strategic
materials. ol5
.pespite .statements such as this, the overwhelming
weight of opinion on the sub,ject,
able to discover, saw in Gel:"many •s

~1hich

the writer was

ov~:n•sea:;

cartel

arrangements atl underlying purpose wh1oh waa designed to
weaken

th·~

industric"'l a:od m:ilits:.ry strel'lgth of nationt'h

'rbe ind.ict;rnent of the aims of Germ1u1 cax•tels we.s made in
the main by Ankll'ia&>..n w:rite1•s, who supplied t.he main sources
of this wrlt•>r's informatiol't.
have

What prejudices they may

add but little to the severity of the chargee which

15A. <iyn ','-IUliE:mst "Why Europe PNf\:-;x•s Ca1•tels to
Competition," J;T§.tis;m,§ Byg;ipe!ffis, XXXIII, (3eptemb~lr 191«5)
p • .3 5.

CHAl?TER IX

AND POST-\IAH D!':V'ZWPHENTS UNDEU ALLISD OCCUPATION

l}arma:uy 1 a cartel mechanism which was geared to ooordi!Ja te th<:J
h1dustr1es of the t;,r.:.'lexed. t;err:l. tor:l.es to those of the Ee:l.oh.
Th<l! a:l.m of this cartelization policy was to create a strict

relation of depe11d•"rwy of these n;ast 1#1xrop0a.n :l.nd.ustri.:>s to
those of

G6l"f\1UXlY.

The conolud1:n.g step in this compulsory

oa.l'tt1liz.at1on plr.m ws.s t"chievecl on October 1, 191}0 1 by
. incorporating the pl'Otectorate of Gze.;hoslovr!ll<la. into the
customs territory of

G~;rmany.

This customs territory had

been created *"t an eax•lier date in Germany to consumm::<.te
a plan for a complete ratlonmlizat.l.on of industry in order
to fa.cillt;s.te pl'oduction nE><'l(i.ed for a 1tlartirae economy.

The

lllethod used to bl'ing Czechoslov&J<.ia into this customs un.:l.on
lr?&s an extcmsion of Germany 1 s Compuhlory

Gm.l~tel

La;" of

July 19J8, to :trwlud.e thie area or c0<11.Ipied t·~rdtory ,1

This enforced cartelization which was in Germsmy 's
plan for a new organization of continental economy• was
applied to \lfeste>rn guropean nations once they were under
th.e suze!'ainty of Germany,

The ir,dus ·tries of these

occupied countries were compelled. to join l!ln international
oartel of the:l.l•

p~•rtioular

trade,

Because of the pre-

dominance of Garman members in these cartels, all the
deoisiOllS of the
German majority.

cuavt.:~l

were • in prao t ice, ma.de by the

Technically speaking,

leadership of Q,Sirmmn interests in

that~e

this

ho~•eve.>r,

_t>;uropean c:;wtels

was achieved by the greater production quotas of German
industries, rath0l' than by votes of cartel n~<Mlbers. 2

ot the WEI.!' wel'<s af:f'11l.ated in a

prhab•~

tlle Intl!!>rnat1onal Steel Cartel, were nor!/

or!,\<mization,
t'<~<tu,tred

Join a German .sponsored iron and steel cru•tel.
compulsory

car·~eUzation

to

'1'h1s

took place on June JO, 1941,

or c.ontinentell 1£urop!> was controlled from offices in
$erlin.J

2 ona. lUngwood and 'Sr>nest ;>, Hediger, "G~~rman Cartels
Invade Jl:urope, » Pgreifi ~p;+.icy B:!Ports • Vol. XVIII
(August 15. 1942) p. 1+8

3~.

,_
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This control by German or Gel'man dominctted. oart<:.ls

replace the e<'trlier international tHlroent cartel whlc.h had
been formecl in Germany, but had colla)'J<'Hld due to
oipation of the.:J Britlsh and the i3'1edes,

th(~

parti-

Under the new

oartel, division of the Europea.n mar·ke t among the various

The same ;procedure '"H:ts followed. in respect to the woodpulp

woodpul:p Ci:<rtel at th;:, start of the t'lat•, a new Europee.n
cartel under the hege1nony of' Gennany wa.s formed/'
In addition to tho ab.ove

control extended to

othc~:r

oommodit:l.,~s,

Germ,an cartel

impo:rtaw:tt pl•oduets; these

:\.:U(Jluded synthetic textiles, fats and IIJOaps, radio equip-

ce.1•tel

agre<~ments

in these goods wer<? intended to dovetail

with Nazi economic plans to brin,'i: ch'e direction of all
E:ur•ope.S\n inc1ust:rial acti'I"Hies und.er the authority of its

German Cartels Undex• the

of E:cgno.IDies.j Vol. LXII,

trol,

<~·11d

the right to dissolve or combine existing organi-

zations and to regula.t(~ proeed1.U'(;s,5

DUHING

e:dgm1oies.

't~OHLD

14AU II

As a reen.1lt of th.;>se

fa.r-si[tbt•~

provisions

ln cartel contracts, mt:my ee.l'tBl agreements between Get•raan
and t'Ol'iilign industries

~Jere

mer'lly suspeactect for the

.;turat.ton of hostl.lities, and wer<a to be :re:,;umed following
the war•,

'l'h1s modus vivendi haci the effect of giving·

German firms the right to resume their positlon of primacy
1n many world mstrkats folloH:I.ng the war.
The !1.g1•eement between Ste.ndard Oil of New Jer•sey
and I. G. Farben iS e. case in.

was

taket~

~•hich

into account long' before

the porHiilbility of 111ar
hostilit.;1<~:•S

his testimony before the Truman Committee in

beg(;t11..

19·!~2 •

In

commented upon this provision, thus:
0ul' contracts wlth I. a. F'arben of 1929 were
run until 1947. As you gent>lemen doubtless l~now,
contracts such as these are noj;, in law abr.ogat<:ld 1
but merely suspended ~~han th<ll parties• nations are
at \~tar. 'l'he parties to such a contract must ther,~
fore find some way of getting along with their gwn
business while the e;:mtr"i1ct;s are eo suHpe.nded."
11

In eff<llct this agreement said that :l.f tl';ere ls any hinder-

anoe resulting fvom governmental action, in the; United States,
then at the conclusion of su.oh interruptive notion, the

parties would oonclude a

ne~;

agreement in the spiJ:'it of

the old.
The practical ef:t\11ct of this

transfer of
~rhis

:.woo

I. G, pat•ents to

magnanimity on the part

esp<lloially

note'.~orthy,

of its patent

S~andard

or. r, a.

providon

Oil in 19J9,

Farbeu was

since prior to thiil date, I. G.

knOI<~ledge,

tr.,.n.sfer•;lnce of pate.;;rts

contin.;;l_~enoy

'l'h'il lllOt1ve which prompced this
~m.s

the perspicao:l.ty of I. G.

lll1ght aeon be at wal:' with the United St.ates.

If this
~-~==
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t~tould

happ;;med they lmmv th'" patents

Alien Property Custodl!'J,n,
larg~sse

h'~nce

be

by the

the reason for ·th·3l.r

in respect to the patents.,

collectable following the

s;e;iz,~cl

In f'!ddlt.l.on 1

''~ith

t.he

l'lflilt'•

The a1•raugement s made for the pa t<3nt tr:c.nsfer wer<>

concluded in the Hagu.e, Nethel"lrmds, in 1939, be:f'or•J that
co1mtry was

inv~<ded

by Garmany:

The trcmsaotlon thftt took

place there was not; made public, ho,.'revt:H't until le.te 1941

<1he:n the Department of' Jus tioe condL\Oted an. imr:•cs tigntion

actioll by St?tting that the Compcmy was pr•otect1ng its own
t'lh!>.re in the ps tent rights Nhloh >night bs in j eopPtrt'iy i f

the Alien Prop,'lrty Custodiall

seiz<~d

th<l!Jl and classed them

111 their emtl.rety as enemy property, 7

following the war these countries v.<ould Nant to ooop•i'll'ate

these !1I1;f,Ot1at1ons.

'l'his

~;as

indicated at; the time of

the transfer when a Stmnd<?crd Oil off!cia.l wrote to his home

-

7Ibid.
- ---- ------

some 2000 foreign patents and we did our b®st to work out
complete plans for a modus vivemdi l•Jhich would operata

bhrough tlv'J

tm~m

of the war, whetl'ler

Ol'

not the United
---

5ta tes came in, n8

'

", • • if, by r•eason of unforseen political events,
the execution of this contract shs1ll br;, made iur osa~
ible, tempora.rily m• perm<WH?ntly, or t.he firm of
Carl ZeiiHJ liml ted in tiHJ enjoyment of .1 ta full Ucense
claim, this agreement shall be susperided J'or that t1roe 1
and upon an appeal, the bo<J.rd of arb1 tors· shall make
such dispositions alii seem n(~oeas'''~'Y !n order to carry
out the w111 of the part1es to tilis agreerne:rlt under
the changed oondit.l.Ol1s,. if pos1'31bl·s. "'51

The intent of such pr•ovisio:ns as this was tl'H! .retOlltion of'
a f'oothold :l.n tiv?. industries of r'oreign countries, regard-

less of political actions or tlil"il event of bost:!.l1ties,

The Kilgore Commit tee reJ.'lebed this eonclusion wl'lcm it

"'fbe Germsm iXkh<strie~l growth (J<M; been tb"J m&l.instay
o!' the in terl'l.rc. t.i omal Olur>tel system. In their agr•!lemen ts

;;'!

quoted in H·endell Serge, Qartels., p. 27

u ..

9 u ,_§......va, i:IB!,iSCh .& r,.omb O:otioal Comtl!i!.niT I £!.&•
Complaint ::md oons,>nt decree, July 8-9, 191i01 quoted in
J oaepll Borkin and. Charles .i!. Welsh, f:ie:rmr.rny 1 a !ileu;j;er ~.
p .• 312.

--- - - ------- - ----------

121
"with Eil·.l.tish and AnHH'ioa:u com;:>anies 'the Giiil:'Ina:u
specifically provided that in the event
of war Cftrtel arrm::~gements would be resumed whlllcn
hostilities were terminated. Any effort to Pett1in
the internl\tional cartel system will thf3Nifore help
to ke;;rp in po!ltex· the 0fJtrmem mHi tarl.~t-tndustr:I.Blist
clique which has planned and launch®d two world wars." 10
cart<~lists

DUl1INO \vOHLD \<iAli II

An anomalous sHuation which exil';ted 0.\.tri.ng

~Jorld

\>Jar II w1.1s the oo11tinuation of limited oooper"tion among
ce1•tain cartel members looated both within the United Nations
and Axis

countrl~s.

maintained between

An exa.mple or this waa the liai!!on
cartr~l

lamps ':1Ud equipment,

e.nd

Ge.nr~ral

members dealing in

This cartel,

Elect.ric in. the United

~lhich

electr·h~~:11

included Philips

St;~atea;

among others,

communicated with and aided each other dur.ing the eax•l;y
years of World
W!J.S

ltJ~ar

II.

The principal office of this oartal

located in Holland, which was

~-~lso

the home of J?hilips

of' Hollandt one of the most powerful members of this com,.
bine.

In 1942, on

~l?ders

from the N!izi-co:ntrolled main

off1ae in Holland. the Amcrioa.n trustees of thol Philips

lOquot;ed 111 n'l'ho s~~me 010. Gang,"

· (Nov~,~mb<;;r 25, 191;1<) p. 632.

Maq,on,

Vol, CL!X,

122

oowb:l.ne ,,•;ided £l

O®l'r~~m

Cf.u•tel

f.\uU in the SW<i!di:lib Courts.
Amt:u•iot.•n

tru!ilt'~~l$

befln dl.ll!ll:ll'i.b•:;d.

werci

~cr t~

ptC~rtner

in f:I.E,iltl . ng

:.)ut•ing thh

l:'t~pot•ted

"our·iously

t.o luwe

~J<I.!ll:?O

pat>.mt

pEilr•:l.od t.l'll1lliHl

e~tohtUlged

over;~t·1•> ffad

c~

'c-.9ormioal

AX'I:);IllUt :l.ne

l'H"H.£l0h • n ll

o<etrtllla

m~n

ll1lld do ooopl1lr'N.te

dut•:tnr:~

peviods of hoatilitl.ea.

'l'hot.t&;h such ooopel"at:Lon 1;~ th,;; exoillption t'Glther thb\n a

r·ult'll• alll:a.mpl.!is suoh

!UI

thw !'t'bove seom U) v1nd:to<•te th<i.l

ll:r, F. s·;.;one, nQ~tr.i;,S~l c"'noer," ·~
Vol, CLVIII, (B'ebl'U!U'Y l:f. • .._Jili.ll) p. 179,

N!\!UQu.,

Deoarte11zat:l.on Branch was formed :l.n

De~tember

19'·'5' under

the command of Brigader General \lfilliam Draper, 1·t was
entrusted with the investignt:l.ou, coo:rdi.:nation, .<md r<.lform

\~·,.r

Crimes Commission hes;:cings.

heElrings

nuu~;n•ous

In

th~

course of these

executives conm:cted lftrit.h such indus-

put on t;•ial I' or complto 1 ty in the s cart in;; of
second Horld \v;.'lr.

tl:H;

'I'he courts trnt tried these men

acquitted th·em of th<l Ct'imes brought in th·'1 i:orJ1otment,

since the prollJecution failed to prov•e th.ct these industri-

a11st>J plot;ted tbf:l war·, or' had. a1v advn.noe l{nO\'iledge of
Hitler" FJ S1Yt>Clfic pl<:.ns for military <,ggresslon.

to Nar, but under the concept of law, as

These

int;.~rpreted

by

Amer1Cfl11 judges, only those r..:,t;pons ible for th•c last event

could be held guilty of a crime.

12

zones of occupation were attempting to reach a11. accord

011

1?4
a uniform C'cu'tel law for German indus try.
were concessions 011. the part of

O<trrying Oltt such

CE~.rtel

th'~

Though

th<;~l'e

!'our respective

l'iiws all enacteld, whether• tho law

should be mandatory oro volu:nmry, and similar po:l.ntos of

d'!l.sagreement.
V•

'l'Hll: CAE'£.iU, LA\4 OF 194'?

!6greement. was finally reached.

the law \llhl.ch was to deal with

bct;~een.

c~u··cel

the United

operations in the

sector of G;:.rmany occupied by th·'H;e nations,

This 112m

was promulgated on I<eb~ ;.<,;ry 12, 1947, 1'J.S f'lilitary Govern-

ment Law No. 56 for the United
text

>~l'Hl

3tat~~s

:zone, rmd. a similar

lssu•!!d as Ordinance No. 78 for the British Zone.

Included in the provisions of this law

~~ere

i1

those pro•

scribing fJpec1f:l.e practices v1hioh were in restr.oint of
tNlde in th<o; mHnufacturing and consumer fields,

Another

aeotio:'> vf the law provided for the 1ny7'stlgf:,tion of all

German. firms l'lhioh employed over 10 • 000

~;orkers,

If .such

I
I

\

I'

'

12.5

economic pov1er, tt.ey were to be reorganized and separated
into functionable but autonomous economic unita. 1 3
'l'his law and similar laws dealing v.ri t:h decartelization were to be the subjects of much disputation am
oratory among those interested in the cartel issue in postwar Germany •

Some held that; th,ll law was not v lgorously

e11foroed 1 some said the law was too ambiguous for

~~ffeot-

ive enforcement, while others held that the power granted
to the administrat.l.ng authorities was too arbitrary.

In

addition to these diff'ioulchs, the advent of the cold war
in Europe furti:H'Il:' obfuscated the

ce?,rt~ll

is suo.

One of the groups which had r,"'oomt!Nllld;,tio:ns to make
pertinent to Cartel Law No. 56 was th*1t 'Nhich was composed
of' fourteen top

u. s.

business elteoutivea who made a trip

to Germc·HlY in May 1 191+7, on the invitation of the Secretary
of \Jar to study Germ!Ul industry and the United States 1

military &;overnment industrial program.

'I'he report of

chis group submitted to the \4ar Department and released by
that agency inclUded numerous suge;.estions, among

t~hioh

was

the following relating to deoartelb>at1on:
"Decartelization: Law No. 56 and Hegulation 1
embody a l1ter1es of controls and regula tiona 1 man,y of
which r;;rpresent economic principals tlUit.e ne1~ to the

lJMartin, gn. o~t., p, 228

"German milld '4nd to the pnflt industric1l development
of the country. Since we are now conf:ronCed with
the urgent neoeasi ty of bringing about as r<1.pidly as
possible reoov~~ry o:l' tbe economic life of a starving
people - it is our belief that too strict adherence
to the Law in its administration will seriously retard
· this primary obj,~otive•
"\•Ji th no desire to or1 tioize the principle of ·c.hat
law as it has been written - we do however, recommend,
H' at c«ll possiblei that the enforcement of these
regulations b'~ postponed, o:r at l.:Z!>.st 1mbstanti~'llly
mO'Jified, until tb·:• indus tri3.l eoollomy is in a reasonnbl~) st '.te of oper!l.L:l.on. "14

Otll,lr groups ;,1.nd individuals had d.l.ssenting opinions

as to the worthiness of Law No, 56• anct thoe disagreements
wl!lre

~~

source of oonsternstion to both civilian <md mill-

tary off 1oi4>ls concerned with cartel (lo

As Time magazine

so aptly put it, "Since the war's end many an important

squaoll: has been sounded against the

u.

:~.

!•lil1tary Govern-

ment for failing; to do something about Germany's cartels
- though hardly anyono

k~lows

what tllat somethilli'". should

be. ul5

A o:l.vilian committ;ee headed by F®deral 'I'rade Com-

min1o:ne:r. Garland Ferguson went to Germany 1n Deaeu;ber .of

lh',;'iuoted 1n ll:I!B.• 1 p, 2:32.

l5nc!'!l'1i~la on th1:J Block," 'l'lme, Vol,

(June 2 7, l ;H9 J P,

1.)) ,

HII,

\
\

1948 and held hearings relative to the decartelization
laws as well as investig,·bing the effects of General
Lucius Cl,'J.y 1 s order''" of Ne.rch 1948 which had the effect
of rejeotin&;: sev,':lral test cases which had been ad,jucUcated
under Law No • .)6,

General Clay was at this time the

IIJ:Llitacy Gov•.?:rnor of the United States Zone in Gorm•:·ny,l6

I

In .1\p:rH 1949, the Fert;uson Committee l'eleased its

l

pol1ey of' eliminBting the. OEtrtels was

t~ound,

and went on

to say that the. policy shol.!.ld have been, am should be
enargetice.lly enforced •. ·£he report prs.ised Cli'\rtel Law
No, 56 as a f'a:l.r and indispensable

regnlt~Liont

and found

no validity in the claim tl'.tat thlll elimination of excessive

oonoentr.Ation of economic

reeov®ry,

po•.~er

would inhibit German

In its suggestions, itrecomrnended the

deooncentration of the plants of' !, G, Ji'arben, which it
said had been a mainstay of the Nazi war maohine,l?
'l'his committee also reported that t;he reason d.eoarl;eH-

to build up

German production machinery

16Mart1n, ,r;m.. cit., p, 276

17ro1d
..___._,,

~ts

fm asset 1n the

cold war, had obstructed the progr;11m,
cited by the committee for the

A seoond reason

bogged.-do~m

decarteli-

zation d1•ive was that the British, in whose zone tha iron
and steel combines of the Bhur were located, were neV(n''
enthusiastic about; decar•t,;;l1zat1on. 18
General Clay was prompt in 1•eplying to the
committee's charges the1t the Army had obstructed d·:aoarr,0;ll.zation; contradicting the assertion, he continued to say
tlrL:tl;

any further brealmp of Ge>rman enter•p:rises nwould be

a political and not a secut•U;y measure, •19

'I'he resu1t;r;

of this greP>t varl.:cmce of opinion as to Cartel L&.w No. 56
-.1as to stultify its use as a

decartc~lization

weapon from

its outset.

The military gove.rnment in Oermf'\ny in iaddi tion to
the promulg,•tion of' LaN No. 56, also put into effect; in
th~

Am'ilrioran and British Zonatll, Ll>!w No. 7.5 >rhich provided

for the reorg<cmization of
industries.

Germ~.ny 1 s

00.."-1, iron, and steel

l'he intent of th1s law, promulgated on

18Bruce Ce.tton, "Deoartelizatlon - Our Last Cr.anoe,"
Nfit19Jl,, Vol. Ot.XX, (F'ebrmwy 11, 1950) p, 122,
19~,

loc, cit.

~--·--
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November 10, 191->8,. was similar to Law No. ;;;6,

which is

the slimin£:.tion of excessive concentration of economic
power, and the inhibition of the war potentlal of' Oel'!llan
')0

indus try.'·

been deemed excessive ooncen-cration of economic power' in

ated were to be dissolved.
were to be liquidated.

Num€:rous holding compauies

Among them were twelve steel com-

bines which incl11ded such titans of the Oe1'mf>rl steel

industry as Krupp, l•lannesmal"..n 1 'I'hyssen aud Hoesoh.
addition to these steel combines, thirteen oth'or
coal combines t<tere to be

of the lGM,

disb<l,nd<~d

In

opr~ratlng

under the provisions

Law No. ?5 also provided for thee formulation

or a steal trustee aasoo .!.at ion which was to consist of

zation &.nd reorganiz.tittion of the iron a.nd steel industry.
'l'l?,e memb<3rr:> of this ste,31 association t<ere to be appointed
by or under ·th·!l a.J.tthoril<!:ation of mil itat'Y govermnent offlcials

aftsr consultation v1ith appropriate o,,rwan groups.

2

0:~ar·t1u, .2.!1• ,m., p. 272.
21 Ibid,, p. 27).

2l

By June,

1951-~,

Hasid.ngton, D. c. 22

st;ock boom in 1954 1

belief.

~1plittin[;;

up these great

\.Zhether complete decentralization

e.s a partial substantiation of

th~ir

Leading this. rise in vaJ,ueru were the stocks of

the thirty-eight

so-oS~lled

the end of Hov,"'mber.

~·JOuld

the job of'

"deoart;elized" iron, steel and

'l'he expectations causine; this

soon be tc'l>rrnina ted, and that "teel and coal

compal:lies would once again combine fen· yet mox•e profitable

One of the first

ta~:ks

to

f~toe

t;h., 11ilittwy Govern-

ment in Garmi·:my in the postN8.r period WHB the dissolution

22 11 German Car.•t.els Try m Comeback," Business \vQek.,
(~iarch lJ, 1954) p. 148,

2J"Beh:l.nd the; Headlines " ,Xhe New HeQUbl1c 1

Vol, CXXXII, (February 7 1 1955J p, J,
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of the I, G. Farben combine,

'l'he dismemberment of this

colos6US of German industry, lr·Ihich had plant a in all four

:!Iones under occupation, was put in

th·~

hand!''> of a com-

mit tee which was .to stu&y the organization of !,
s.nd.

xnak<~

gpp1•op:rlate

;:··~commendations

o. 1 s

plants

for dis solution.

planLG or groups of pLln·i;m could. be opel't'cted economically

as scp·:1rt1te units,

In adcLl.tion to t.his, other studies con-

patent<; and trademttrks 1 its interrmtional and domestic
ceu•tel agreements, and its selling and accounting arrange-

An ag;reement was then renehed on an American pro-

po>Jal th1:1t 1n each zone,

pend1n,.~ H.

final decision on

costabl1sh1ng tha new cwnel'Ship of the separate units, the

control off:l.oer in the cUffer<m·t

zon~ls

would. desigr1ate a

trustee for each uni-t a:ru:l. transfer> the legal ownership of
the properti•Els from thG Allied Control Counell to this
trusteJe.

I. G. properties had up to this time been UJ:lder

t;he control of t:tm Allied Control Cotmcll, ;-Jh:l.ch through a
Control Council Law had formulated the law requiring the
dissolution of I. G•. Fo:J.rben. 24

24Martin• op. cit. • p. 215.

~J2.

Follm~ing

t;he approval of this plan, and. the trimS-

fer of prope1•ty to the trttstee ctesignated by th•a control

officers in each zone, Cfen,Jral Clay was able to announce

This pronouncement ty General Clay was questl.oned by some

crltics

Nho

claimed that the breakup of

only on paper,

:r.

0,

W&tr~

true

They held that though Parbtm had been

split into a number of 1ndepend.ent compani·f0s, each under
a German trustee who was respollsiblc to A. !•1,

one of these trustees were old

Farb,~u

o.,

officials,

all but
Hence,

these critics claimed, the e,otual structure of ownership
?-

was unaltered.<;;~

Various plans

~t;cr,e

eonsidered a a to the final

disposition of I, G, l?al:'ben 1 s hold1ncc:.

Oue plan pro-

posed would 11ave fragmented I. G, 1 s holdings il:rt;o eighty
separate units, but this, along with other plans, was
abandoned as unfunctionable
were completed under w!1ioh

01'

r.

too extreme.

In 1954, plnns

G. would. emi.H'ge as six .sepa-

rate chemical companies; some of these companies already
formed were already l.n competition w1 th each other. <:6

25.rug_:

26Ml~.rul.!!

Week, 1oc. cit,

i-

O<llrmmny 1 s path of' leadAn•!$hip in tl:le O('l.rtel fi•i:ild,
am how the exat•citJe of thfl.t le6u:l.ership hi!ld repe.rouasions

upon t:r.e economic r:md polHio.al

been traoed. 1n prev1oui>
~rhen

1.n1~t1tutionll

(I!Utpt·:ill:':S.

H.b:road has

l'iO'a W.e tiro® h!ils arr1v1!!d

we must evaluate this n;ovement 1n order to guide or to

dill'a.l i.Wfi'ecuv'"ly wi tf! any new
field. in tl'l>e t'utur'iil.

That

th<Hil® 1nt;WI:l!.~.uonal

i!igree:<1ill!nts st:l.ll OJ)•:'!l'i'lte over
r.odiil~· 1s ti'l Cillll't'''1nty.

in t!:w oartol

d~velopment~J

<!1.

widlll

1/j,l'c~~t

of

bu;;d.naas

th'~

wm·ld

Thi!! United Stl!lt>3s State t<~i~p£il:'Cmiillnt,

for example, I:HuJJ evidc>.ntMll that over•

tw~nty

major ioJ;li!r,-

natiollllll. Qswt~l.s l!>l"$ flou.rianini; tQdl:l,y wt..liJide th@ United

have

seo~.<!"ed

t.n,,~

Eu!:'opll!nn marll:e t for a

~'I ide

r.fJ.lld'.l) of

);)!"OO!!Ots. l

------·-·
lnu. N. Strikes tat C.a.l:'t~h,"
(N~y

16, 1953) p. 158.

t!l!!i!1Utt~@§ !~'IS.kt

blll~io

13.4
Though. at the present time, there has been no
evidence of German regnancy ovex· these cartels, will
l1ist;ory repeat itsellf, gnd see the
lllany 1s

reot•udesc(~l1Ce

leadership in future cartels?

of Gi:n;•-

ltiill this leader-

ship once again ally itself with the n;;,tionalistic elements

in Ge1•many and pos'e a threat to Norld peace and economic
stability in the future?

'rhese are the ques tl.ons which

must be studied and carefully snalyzed so as to prevent
a repet.:tcion of events that; followed the first, l!lorld
It is true 1

11e

~Jar,

are p1•esently living in a different mUieu

in which the threat of Communism is the rnain concern of

the

~festern

rmnce .of a
th'> future.

world 1 but this does not prevent the

ne~;

menace which

·~he

Nma1s-

wo1•ld may have to face in

Since th!3 aupremaoy of ce:rtels may netm"ll at

any time in th'i'i future, an 'uooerstat1ding of the cartel

organizatio,tt and it$ pra,c ticea is SS13<111tial, as is the

methods to regulate th<' actions of th0se intern&tional

given an insight into oa1•tel oper,etiouts.

What is left to

do nov; is to examine 1nterll't1onal cartels, !!Is they exist
today, and then att<Jmpt; to vl.Sllalize Gt:mr.any's x•ole in the
cartels in tho futur-e.

------

II.

'UlTERNATlO.NAL CARTELS, A

lU~T!WSf'EGT

OF 'rf!OUGiiT

The problem of curbing cartels is on<'!> of the greatest
international problems ~~ll.ioh must be f<wed in the near future. 2
'!his statement !lWJ.d.e by t;he late Pr•esident Boosevslt ln 1944

may appear a bit t''o stringent t;o apply to cartel!.;;, but some

tion of. cartel regulation has been a vehememtly debated
issue among eeonomists, businessmen, and government leaders
fo:r th<J last gen,<errt'tlon,

into

tt.;¢1

Opinion on th" subject is u.ivided

main divergent schools of thought,

These m.."l.y be

called the Europerin school and tl;re Amerioen school.
r~uropean

school

iW•zS

The

in cartels, per .ll.!:!. 1 a.n efficient and

sensible method of o1•gen1zat:l.on, while the

Americ:~:u

school,

imbued with over two generations of anti trust legislation
and investigert:to:n, sees C$rtels as a pernicious influence

economic totalttarilmism,

What is the reason for this wide

variance of opinion between 'i:uropean f:l.nd Amel'ican students
of cartel practices?

An examinat1o.n of background and

tilougl:lt w:ill make the point olea:r.

:p. 56.

2"Nonoply," 'l'ime, Vol. XLIV (Sept<'>mber 25 1 19'-fl<)

.

1.36·

III.

EUl'lOP.EAN VIEW ON CAHT!ilLS

The majority of .European students of cartels desired
the continuance of int•ar11ational cartels in the post;war
per1qd 1 though they ma,y grudgingly concede that some super-

visim1 or regulation would be in order to prevent the repe- ·
ti tion of the abuges of the past.

•rhe thoughi; of eliminating

oe.rtels in their entlr•ety ie one l•lhich never enters the minds

ot European bu;,;iness and goventment · leaders;

To the 8uropean

mind, cartels r•epresent a form of liltab111ty 1 and the thought

or going baclc to a state of unfetterod oompeti tion is abl:lOrrent to the European ind.ustrh\lists.

Cartels

ha\'·~

so perme-

is difficult to see how they can be ellmim;ted without
economic ohaos.J
Cartels and other forms of monopoly organization
have been seen as a stabilizing factor in the economy of

the

prcii-~lorld ~;,Jar

I period, th3 stability of Gorman economic

life was said to be due to
·toward a stable

p:f'i~e

th(~

cartels which were•· >110rk1ng

situation.

'I'ha t they created problems

3A. ltlyn IH111ams, "1-lhy ;:<;ur•ope Pl•efi.'lJ~s (l,rtels to
Cmnl:(etltion," Natiop.'s By,s1ness, Vol, XXXIII (§~ptember 191+5)
P• .::>5•
'

which were to contribute to thcl starti.ng of that wsr was
overlooked.

That oartel.s are conducive to price stability

measure of th,.,'iir success in this importomt nspect, aoeordiJ:li.l, to one wri tor·, should be the gauge of their

cation.

4

It is this effort of cartels to

in order to eliminate

ruinou<~

jus·~ifi-

scablliz~

px•i.oes,

competition and provicte for

orderly marketing, thst is usually c:;nsidered the most
f<WOx'able influence that the cartel
genero.l economic scene.

h;~s

exerted on the

Cr•itios of this position are quick

to point out, howevec.r, tha·b aoonomlc stability must be

ty achlevecl in one h1dus try will inev i tabl.t

be~

t<;ained at

the expense of anothc~r.5

or

the outstaud.in.f; mcclm:nisms in the <wonot!tl.c r·shabilitation

of tba old world,

tb

~

'l'he gl;c~s,t t;.cachnolo,,io.fl.l advrmcements in

t••:entieth century, th1.1y believe, are to a great extent

4 n. C, Trench, uThe Case fo:r Cartels," l,grtnip:htl;v
H(i!View, Vol. CX:XVII, (i'1aroh 1930) p, 361.

5"Hole C?f' Cartels in lf)oder11 Jioonowy, • Fgr<!li>rn Po;l.icy
Ec,mortfit Vol. XX 1 (October 1.5, 19hl+) p. 181.;.
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ph1lospphy in European trade relations, when overproduction
threat;3ns, no at·tempt is made t;o lower

p~·lce,

no effort is

mnda to push sales j instead prices ar•e stabilized and the

market allocated by cartel

a.r:~:n1gements.

a ce,rtelia not a"trust".

'r'o European eyes,

They think of a. "trust" as an

agency which tries to supc•ress competition, wlhile a cartel
l.s only a device to regulat'il o.:>mpetitl.on.
to liquidate rivalfJ; the cartel

pr<i:Hlerv'"'~

~,'he

"trust" trl.es

them by promo'tl.ng

greater stability so as to assure re!i!sonable profits and
protect t;l:lC! capital investments in both large and llll1lall
onLerpr1ses.

Thilil feeling of st.!>.bility through cartel arrangemzmts has been the 'thought of

Europe;~n

in th'" past, as it is today.

'This is th<< reason Hhy th-a

strongest advocates of postv1ar

o~l.rtels

blM;iness loaders

during \vorld Nar II.

nmoivea. the support of Sweden, Cz.echosloVIil>l<ia, Holland and
6

NorvJ.sty.

IV,

The United. States wa:s the only importl9.nt nation that

-·-------

1)9

of economic and political vicissitudes in the postwcn• period,
it might relent somewhat in its resolves.

An economic and

political background. which was quite dUvergent from th.at
of Europe ht!iil ahaped American opinion on the question of
o:arte.ls, or any similar form of monopoly Ol'gantzation.
Unlike Etu:•ope, the Ul:llted States was less dependent and
not as

sensi·~lv<~

to extraterr1toriilitl economic considerations.

('

cooperati•'l€1: in <aoonomio intercourse in trw form of oar~els
to overcome the lethargy of their indus tx•ie~J, while
American businessmen t•ema ined largely aloof from this
1Ut€H'l'l£,tiOnfi\l COOperation, ooncentrati.l:l£1 their attention
on domest;ic cooperation, wher•e possible to c1rculllV\$nt the
anti-t1•us·t laws•
\4h1le European industril·ll lerad.ers jusuty the controlling of prices. allooat;:ton of terx•itories, and other
cartel tactics as indispensable to economic stability and
heal ,:h, the great major! ty of their American
see these practices as

inimlc<.~l

1nstHut1ons of ttrc nation.
ations during '>'iorld

~Jar'

count.erp~u··ts

1nflueno\9s upon the economic

In addition to ·this, revel-

II relating to th.s influence of

cartels UpOn the war effort Rnd . the pol1t1oal powers they

llrO

exerted, have further served to denie,ratco cartels i11 the
eyes of American obsel'Vers.
This in esslilnce e;<plains the rmtsons for the basic
points of conflict. of thought be·tween European and American
thinkers on the cartel issue.

To th"1 European ml.nd, cartels

have no direct political effea.ts.

'J:hose

~lhioh

have arisen

in th'<' past have been lnc 1dent<tl to them. not inh0rcnt in
their makeup.

'I'he American thinker· sees in them a nucleus

whioh provides not only fox· a method of harmful concentration of economic power, but also a cudgel for political
:poNer ani militaristic aspira\tlOns.

Cartels have divided. Latin America and oth,)l' areas
of the l'ITOrld among themselves.

These 1nternii\\ tlonal pane•

trations tend. to cause governments to consider certain aref.tS

of' the world. as "flel<is of interest" and certain oth,c'r parts
as t;erritories outside their sphere of

1ntetn:~~;ts.

Ce..rtela

mal{e use of govermnents to further their tnt,9!'0Sts, or as
in the case of <l13rmany • cartels can be used as an instru-

:oent of Ukttlonal policy.
one.

vlhem~ver

The

x•el~ltionship

is a

onlll of the cartels broke down. a

V\~1'Y

close

w.arlll.u~

situt)tt.ion arose between the privF.;.te monopoly groups involved
with the rel!lult thrc.'t governments found. themselves involved
in the diepute.7

7

nenr1oh Kronstein, "European C'n•tels," 'I'he Qogo:gWJl:fi.\\1, Vol. XXXVIII, (June 1;, 1943) p, 172.

-----

-

llH

That <Hn"tel relationships tend ·co tr"Zmscend the
economic and baoome political is p9l"haps the greatest

arm of the priVli\te industries to !lerv;; th0 n<,.;3dS and arn-

bitions of the

stat,~.

in derP.()Cx•atio st,,,t,J<;, corpor-

!1V{H1

.;;d.ms of a st,?.te is a possibility "hicl< few would q1..wst1on.
V.

OU'rLOOK OF

cart«Jls 11hat does ths

f<ltUl'"il

bu!ilins!'ls org2mizll\l;ion7
t<~ thil~

01~FiMAN

Cl\hl'ELS TODAY

hold for this method of

No definitive

a:nse~er

cem be given

'luestion, but a fait• predicl;ion 11:::mld bd for their

decart,~ll-Zii\tion

tmposed by the hll1ed Pm1ers follm'li:ng

the H·ar, carl>;e_ls

Gtl."'O

still ~· J}:Cl:;t of the indugtrifl.l

stru.ctt<Nl of Germany ·cMay.

territori;';S and m.cu•kets :l.s

!.ihethsr t:l.m('; will see e.n

.?.

qu.est:lo:n. v:h:lch cannot be

a:nsw<n'sd, but that within the cartel structure there is

the fertility for the growth of such

<Ul assoei~;tion

has

been tragically demonstrated in. the past C!:U'tel history

of Germany,
As ear+y as 194?, an Economist, ,John K. Ga1lbr€ilath,
made the ominous statem1>nc ·coot "German cartels and com•

bines could again,

1~ith

a little rf>juwmation, assi.Ulle

their fol?mer position of' power."8

Though the power of

G;H'll'ltany 1 s C!U'tels today is not nearly lio1hat it> was under

the Nazi's, this does not detract from the Genuan tn.J.sinessman's .fondness for oart;els,

cartels in

~Jest Germ~ny

The greatest deterrent to

·today has been· the unprecedented

and steadily r1Hillg prosperity which has taken place in
Gitn:'lllmlY since the end of the· war.

Contrast this present

situation 1vl th the chaos which plagued the German economy
for many years following the first World

\J;.~r.

~'he

continual

presence of unemployment which hovered ov<:>x· the Germli'.n
economy, cmd later over all the capi t.~>1lis t world, proved.
highly conducive to cartel devalopm;mt.

times followin&; the :f'11•st hforld
t,o s<Hilk

wiU'

'I'h<H>e depr<Jssed

caused businessmen

stal)ility by agresm,ZJ:nts not to cut prices, but to

... PJor;n

!!. Oailb••eath, "Is There

a o,,~r.man Policy,"

f•"ortumt, Vol. XXXI, (January 1947) p. 195.

----

---

divide the availal;Jle marlrets on a profitable basis.

Bew

cause of' the prosperity in1tJest Gormm1y today, there is
little unused prod.uctive capac! ty
cart<o:l control of ind.ustry has

~11th

be(~i'l

the result thF;t

greatly diminished,

thou.;;,h not eliminated.

means for t'">Cartelization, calling again for such tactics

·rnlt>

group rdth

Unable to completely extirpate such an olt1 insti-

ErhaPd has bes11 unable to do th ls he bas been forced to

9iBehind the Headlines,"
(October 25, 1954) p. 5.

e

Rsmublio, Vol, CXXI,

----

compromise 1dth the cartel ad.here.nta,. rlinister Erhard,
a Classical ·eeonomht, has

st·~ted th<~t

in classic economics for eit-her a

th<H'e is no room

traq~
:;. ,,'}(\\')

as an :!.nstrument of. national policy,.··

m' shooting;. war

-~!arket

;

economici'l 1

he states, 1s by defin1tion true international eoonom1cs;
and l4est Germany is adopt1ng- mt'lrket economics as a
national philosophy ,10

>ll. th this adoption of markc;,t economics as a national

eartc?ls 1 thus patting: tho German economy on a purely compstitive baf>is 0 but -in this endeavor he has been forced to

compromise.

He has alreadY comp1•omised

>~ith

pro-cartel

bus 1.neasmen to the exi;ent of agreel:ag that c&rtels should
be allO'•<ed under the following three oondi tions:

(a) "Expm•t Cartels" would be permitted in or>der
to expand German salres abroad.
(b) Cartels would be perll!it.;ted at. home to make it
easier for certe.1n branches of htduotry to
modernize tJ-Je:l.r produc t:l.on f.aclli ties.
(o) "Crisis Ca1•tels" would be <:tllcwred. should
ind.usllries fimlfhemselves faced with a serious
slump in sales.

lOGilbert Burck, "The German Business
J<ot·tune, Vol. XLIX (May 1954) p, 111.

:iL:L''. G.:rman Cartels tl'y
(.March 13, 1954) P• .149.

~lind,

•

~-

Comprom1Sei\1 such as this mE<ke cleal" the fact that
O'ol.rtels vdll n"'ver be completely eliminated in Germany,

:unrlerlyin,'j;

implicr~t:l.ons

:l.r< such

cono:.,;,i;iun~>.

It is the

;;overmnent is uot prepared. to risk 01 re'.'tl shoTIId.oNn fi::;ht

12
'I'his 'briefly ls the sltuP:tion in Germcm.,y today in

respect to cartels.

-·

14Ibid

Some may 1ronder

wh~~ t

happened to those

146
his pro<§;rarn the maintainence of' peace through postwar

cont.1•ol over G"rman commercial I'Uld
Thl~

indu.stri~>l

'enterprise.

rise of a new threat, represented by doviet Russia,

following

th<~ r~ar,

was th'1 main factor in softe111ng these

voices in the >.Yilde:rness of present d:ow t;msions.
industry is no longer a polent.1al

en:t~;ny i

Glilrman

but is v iev;ed as

em r:tlly in any future co·aflict with the colossus of the

'rhe progra1n of' cartel-busting, onCIE! th·e avowed aim

of' many

Am,~riean

leaders, would probably have been just as

abject, even without the threat of Russia in the postwgr
period,

~lith

the coun·tena:uce of many i'Duropean nations,

who vi,ew cartel agreements with li.ttle disfavor, the pro-

grtnm

~<as 110

doubt d.oomed to

failur<~

from

thE~

outset.

l"oreign gove:t'nments just ;.;ould. not eooparate with the
Un1 ted :1 tta tes in any ooncert<~d progr;;un ag:ail1s t th<;~ cartels ,13
llven the once ad.m&nt1ne attitude of American public
opinion r1as shown a remarkable resiliency in respect to

had onc.e conjured up visions of clandestine Ger•man

lJnThe United St~tes and 1-lorld Ca~··t;els," Business
;,;eel£ 1 (Nay 29, 19'>8) p. 116.

lh7

the UEM prospect :l.ve by ldlioh AmEn·ioa:ns v:l.elif onrtels,

It

stated:
~~----

"'rhe rise of Soviet

po~•er

has for the ·cime being,

Ht least-, put asia® our synti1etie oonoern about

cartels in OrBrmany. To get the ro:),uirc>d Oe1•man
divisions W'fd\ were willing to forget the> liwhole thing
and admit th::t the d.r·.3am, by 1·1org<).ll.thau, out of
Harry Dexter ~ihite, Of' a Germany r•::Jltidered he l,pless
ae<1inst Soviet &g[;t"ession was strloUy for th·r, Red
birds. 'l'hex·e are evils 11~ cartels \\lh.l.ch T£oonomies
l'iinister ~;rhard has oourageo.t:~sly a.ttclil\pted to destroy,
Hitler w;:;s able to use (h~rman industJcy as formally
oJ:ganized to his ff.,dvantag<;. PosBibly a new h~ade:r of
el':pHllly l:'or·mid<>bl0 ohal:'~tCt<~r>.l.!i!·tios mig'ht produce a
new perll • • • • It· is praiseworthy orlly for the
:Ou E'onts 1 H<3m1l'lgton Avms, Sohnoider-Gr•usots 1 Vickers
c<nd l\l'l!istrongs and Imperiro~l Chemical Industries to
manufacture W<il!'cpons, chemicals l:iUd r.:>Xplos 1ves. '1'h<~~
Deir 11 1 s Chc;mi sts ar·:: at rt¥orl{ 1e1l1en G•n'mzcn savants
take to chemical so i·ance, «14

This v ie\.J represents a ohr:ang;e of opinion of '?artels
expr'~'Jsed.

by Amer•1can or'gBns of public opinion in the past.

'l'he hope is that this view is not apoortBte in respect t;o
Am.erici!ln thought on cartels, but me1•ely

to meet the
of a

ne~;

nh:ed, is

llt!led~~

of the present time.

ll\

ti:Jlll)?ONu•y expedient

'rhat the possihility

IU tler aris 1:ne; anrJ prod.uc 1ng; a new peril is recogencour~,~s:.ing

to those, such a.s the

wrH,~r.

who see

in ciiu•t;.'il arrmlgement§ an 1ntl~ins1c €U1d perpertw2tl pr&di""

lection tovrard abuse !Hl.d. misuse.
11

~"'.{eaning the Chrm~:ms fr·om •cm'tels'' has been an
UnpNt":tt.abl<e Project•, $e,ty..rday Even1'flp; Post, Vol. CCXXVII,
(November 20 1 195!~} p, 12.

'rhe p<•oolem of curbing os.rtels aoo. m\l.king them
innocuous in raspec t to their pote:ntifAl ;;a instruments of
natlonal policy, as well as impediments to economic
ex.pansion has not bee.n solved, and will not be solved
until then; is unanimity among th1c> ViU'ious nations as to
their injurious eff,,cts.

If complete elimination

o~mnot

of l'01i,'Ula t ion should be an ind.is pensabh• aim of gov(l>rnment.
1'h1s regulation could pos:sibly

reghtx•ation liU'Ill

r'~vie~<

pr·ovi~le

for a

of oa:rtel policies as suggested by

one writor on the subject,

Under i;his p.roposed plan, a

law would be put into effect Nhich would

national registrs•tion of C<l!'tel

req~;d.re

agrc'h~l!lc~nts.

the

In addition

to this a p•sriodio review of the. agl•eements; in

~1hioh

the

goverrament would consider the effect of !l;j1f<H'Y agreement
upon the military securl.ty •.foreign policy, and upon the
v·olume of into:n•national trade.
oart,,ls

1~111

Since it appears that

be with us for quice some time in th,e future,

regulation such as this is U(]jeded at the present tame.15

15Mno .Perkins, "C6>rtels, >¥hat Shall \~e do about
Them,"

Earper!J. Vol, CXIC •

(Novenfb,~l'

l94ll) P• 5?6.

-- ..

No doubt incentives t;owa1•d. c'''rtels vJ01.tld diminish
wc~re

110rld co:nmerce to proceed in full volume and :h1 proper

balance.

lJnfortune,tely,

loug-r•t.m

<:~xpootatiOll

al;.ton of

th":l

see in the

hOWi~V

of this, so

system no matter

sys·~,~m

era th<llli'e is no iunnc,;dicite or
thc~re

ho>~

must be some toler-

dlstast•aful to ·those vJho

l'·estriction of trade, r•.'lduotion of pro•

duct:ton ana e<nployment, hie;hc?r prioEHl, lo:,;er. standards· of
11vlng; and a threat to democra.tio iutJti·cutions.

ruusi~

It

be remembevecl. tl:F:<.t ther<; tH''" m£my ·v1ho just; as sincerely

believe t;bat the f:Nle snt;ox•prise and profit syatem can only
be saved. by collective economic
of cart0ls,

A compromise of

s<~ClUl'H;i

th,~se

under a system

viev<:points by

thr~

acceptcmce of' some sort of l."egulation seel!t$ to offep the
best solution to the probl(•m.

Cartels
in. the

futl.lr'''~•

coolt~

conceiVIl.bly play a COllstrucCiV0 role

It would be necessslry for them to follow

an expansionist philosophy rather than one b&\sed on

r•'lstriotion, i f they v1ere ·co have a truly
affect upon

~he

am~1lio:rating

·economic well-being of the tqorlct,

a oe:rtal.nty that we have not

f'ou~

lt ia

a system to eliminate

them, let u.s hope we can find a system to 1Inp:rove and

regulate them,

CHAP:I'EH XI
St!Mf'iABY AND CONCLUSIONS

'l'he cartel organization we speak of tod;:w

of the mercantile protEoctionism of
tury.

th1~

gra1~

out

16th 1md 17th cen-

Various forms of CIH't<>ls had thE)ir antecedents many

hundreds o:t' yer;trs prior to this clat'"• bu;t tbe modern c0rtel
orgt•,nization took form during this period, as did th•!l

modern n"tion etate.
'J.'he development :and growth of cgrt<lls in Gex•many
cmne shortly !tlfter thrc; t nnt:l.on 1s uni fica t.l.O!'< in 1870. An

to ooopiH''ction t;o achieve a mef!sure of s tabU:!. ty in their

achieved through the use of cartel agreements.

~l:he

a ttl tude of

O'H'lll!:l.n

The g1•owth

courts toN•9>rd cal:' tel agree-

mants aided thelr gro>1th during their early development by

economic instability and as org.anlzatlons neoeseetry to the
~~ell-l:v;;ing 0''

the whole eoclal community,

Cliven

S1lOh
------

encouragement t;his method of husinesli! oooper,.tl.on became

1.51

an

integr~~l

par>t of German basiness philosophy 1 which has

per•sisted to the present day.

of

At the beginning the interests

government in these

cartel organizations were mot:l.vated by economic considerations,
but gr.adually the government began to V'iew them as pot;ential

tools to further the politieal ambitions of the state.
reevaluation of cartels by the state

cam~

This

with the extension

of certain domestic cartels into 1nterna!l;ion!'l.l cartels,

The

combined economic ·- political ohare.eter of c&.rtals was
solidified with the adve11t of the Nazi governmen·t which

exploits{\ cartel agreements tQ a<arve the ambition of the

The results of this fusion of aims was manifested
during the first few years of the second World \iar when

a shortage ot strategic n1aterials faced the Un1tecl Nations
who were aligned against Gex'lllm1y, t;he gr0at p1•omoter of
Many oommod:l.ties vital to the

international c!U:>tels.

arsem•ls of the United N:1t1ons were 1n
the p1•odu.ction of

~l1ese

short~supply,

and

commodities, the Ul'lited Nations

discovered had been affected by cartel agreemGnts in which
Germany had been a OOlll!lpiouous !ll<7mbe:r.

Qommod1t;ies suoh

as alU!l'linum, maE,""Ues1um, tungsten cw.rbide, and synthetic

rubber, among others, were in
The leading German
oartel

~1tgreements W&S

worlds largest

short~supply.

Comn~•ny

in these international

I. G. Farben1ndustr1e 1 one

ohr~micol

·Of

the

oc1noe:rna 1 whose cartel agreements

,--
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reaohlilld the industries of evliflry roaJor nation in the world.
The Hat of aO!lllllOO:ities atfeo·ted by tbi!l oornp.m:r'y •s

oartel

ag:reellHmts l.naluded wmzy oona1d!:llrli1ld vitStl to a nation 1a
wall-being. both 1nd.ustr1.tl 'md soo1Hlo

phiU'm,aoeutloals,

ml\l~:;nesium,

.Prt.)cluots suoh as

aynthet1o rubb®r, a.lwnlnwn <md

(tr;t'l.sollne vr•;re m.ll included., d.irtllotly o:r 1nd1reotly, und•:n·
cartel

ae;reeme~lta

in

•~M.,;h

not the doml.n<l)!'lt: roembOl'•

I.

o.

Ft~rben ~'ll1t'lia

'l'he relat1V<il> tmltterlal u.ntJ<'GP<>red-

ness or tba 1JnHed NaUO!HI 111 the

:agra.:tment~>

a leading, 1:!'

f:\.r·s~

w1th foreihU aom''"'n1es.

few

Y'~ars

of World

'l'he l:)V<.mtuality of

w<as was ta!um into otmsl.derat1on and px<o'l11s1ona for the

oont1nuo.noe O'f' roylillty payments on

p~;,t~nt\11

and proteot1on

for I. <l. 1 111 forel.jZ!l 1:at<l!rests dur1¥lg i:>er·i.l.'lds of hoatU1 ties
we1•e 1nolw1ed in oart<llll

both

dollar~~wise

the e!lrly y\la:rs

~;iif;re~ents.

:rhese

p~'Cfll'iOll.OnOt

aided

and propagiMlda-whe 1n S ;Uth Amerloa during

or

tile second \•iorld l>ar.

In ada.J. t1on to I, Ci,

Ft<l:'b~n.

nuulel'I::IU.ilJ oth<ilt' Garman

o0ll!rw111es part;ioi;:ni'lted in O!llrteJ. ag:reall\lllntu wl,1on flf'feoted

the production of

wholila oat•te:t

e·cr~«teglo

&1;\l."OI!I!liH!lnts

goods.

The Krupp Compcmy of'

witl:t Am.i!lrl.ol,\:er fir.ms retarded, tbis

ooutlt-ry 1s war.. tim~> 1ncluatrin.l

oxpi\tllilion~

1\rupps agreettent
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with General Electric affected the production and utilization
of tungsten carbide, needed for the making of .t'ine cutting
edg<11s for machine tools, and delayed the retooling of

Amari<H~n

plants at the start of the secon,d World War.
'l'he fourth most serious shortage facing the United

States in \l/orld ·war II Has the shortage of' military optical
equipment.

This sbol'tage of optical g1;all!s fox• use in

binoculars,

r~.tmgef:l.nd.ers,

and bomb8ights was attributed in

ltlrge part to the cartel agreement betweep Zeiss and the
Bausch and Lomb
of

t~he

CO~\pany

:ln the United States,

The nature

agreement between the two firms made this oountry 's

supply of opti.oal glass almost entirely dependent upon
Ge:rrnany,

An exchange of information provisions of the

agreement, relative to the development of military optical
equipment in the United. States. was valuable

t:'i

Germany,

since she was kept 1nformeK1 of any new developments by
the United States involving the use of milit;ary optical

glass.
\~1 tll

Germany 1 s defeat and subsequent Allied occupation,

a dee&rteli>r.ettion movement was started in Germ:tmy.
Allied powers promulgated

sev\~ral

'L'he

anti-cartel laws, and

disbanded the great industrial combi.l1es of' I. G, J:>'arben and
Krupp.

'!he effectiveness of this dec,.rtellzation program

has been questioned by some observers, and. mony claim the
program is a tanure.

It is the opinion of some, including

----

15/f

th-e writer, that oar·tela in Oel"m<tJ.'lY are there tc1 stay, at
ll<liMilt 1n the f orl!lseeable future.

'I'lle differences of opinion

oeta1een; Euro.c"eana ~:uld Amer1oZtt:H!I on the merits of cartels,
and the threat t>f CommuniSm killed r•ny ehanees of' extirpating
tll>e

ol~rte 1

ay stem in Germany •

Since

cart•:~ls

are here to stay let us hope they will

be regula ted a.n;l clo<lely observed by the :na tio11s of the
world,

Open cov•2:nants in futu!'<l oart0l lilgreem,;mts are

neo,JSSt"iry to prev.s:nt mlsusG

t~nd

abuse of tlv

ca.t·~·el

system,

Continual vlglhmce is incumbent upon us lest our oh1ldNn

suffer from our present and past compromis<:Jill with the
system.

It is tile writer's opl11ion that the disclosure of

the past fifte12·n yam's h0:s focused a ns1,1 light and interest

on cartel opcrgt1ons, let; us m£<1ntain this in:.:er,>st. in the

futUJ."e• since apathy today may VfH"Y well r·eSL\lt in world
tragedy

tQlllcrro'~.
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APPENDIX.

The compo "''nts of I. a. "P&.rbenincl.ustrie A. G.
and 1 ts subsidia·des are included in the following
list;ingro, 'l'he list is not complete, since some
corporate identit:l.el:! have been ma1nt8.ined, out the
list we.s the most sHtisfactory compilation available in l9Lfl.

l,

Bodische Alt1lin und Sodafabril!

J.

I>'&.rbefabriken vor.m.

4·,

.Farbwerke vorrn,

5.

Leopold Casseyla U!l(l Co.

6,

Chemische Fabrik Grleshelm-Elektron

7.

Akt. ;,. Gas. fuer Anil1n - fabrikaten

8,

Chemische Fabriken vorm,

9,

Kalla Und Co.
Rott1>~e1l

Fr.iedr, Bayer und Co,

~leist<~r

Lucius und

Brt~en1ng

Weiler-ter-meer

10.

Koehn -

11.

['ynamit A.-G. vorm.

14.

Karl Jaeger,

15.

Hbemiaohe Stahlwerl!e

16,

Ampere, G. m. b, H.

18.

Phi.lona A. - G.

19.

Jacob 1 s Mine at Preusslsoh Eloernec.ke

20,

Hermine

21,

Dehler

a,

A.-G.

Nobel

m, b, H.

------~line

.l(i)

.Stickstaff-Kredlt G, rn, b. H.
2).

Koliner.Kunstduenger

und

Che!!!ische Fabrik

A. G, fuer Landes\{Ul ter

Chemlkallen-Werke Grieshelm G, m, b, H.

26,

Zuckerfabrik Koerbisdorf

27,

A, G, fuer Stickstaffduenger Knapsack

28,

Elekto-Ni trum A, ·-.G.

Soc, l:!:lectroquimco de Flix
30.

'l:eer~f'arben-Industrie

J2.

.numlnum - Werke G. m, b. H.

)),

Blektrochemische - Werke A. - G.

Jl•,

Slektrochemische J.ferke .. G. m. b, H.

J,S,

Chemil'lche \1erke

)6,

Auguste Viktoria !'line

37,

Chemlsche 'tferke Durand und Huguenin H. - G,

)8,

Delvendl:~hl

ItO,

Chemische ?lerke Schuster und Wilhelmy A, - G,

tn.

Erdoel und Kohlevert'iertungs A, - G.

42.

Diusberger Kupfepbuette A.• - G.

Llj.

Duetsohe

1+4.

Bergen Kohle A• - G.

45.

Deutsche ll:<:l.elstGingesel.lschaft vorm.

A, - G.

Loth~·uger

und l:fuentzel G. m, b. H.

Nolybdoenvterke

Herrn, \Hld A. - G,

72.•

H.

'H)

1 )'.

85•

Ch •. ;.;, Huls, G, m, b, H.

---- ------

----

1\)6

97,

A. G, fmr Chemische Indu:ortrie, G•)henkirchen-Sehalke

98~

i•zlend.e Calori Nazionali 'Aff:tni (A. C, N, A.), S, A,

99.•

Societe. Chemica Lombardo A. E. Bie,nohi
\Jith sirnHtu· l:'es•:rvat:tons as to completeness, the
following list of' fields of products of I. G. Farben
is given:

Coal tar dyestLlffs
Innumerable organic and inorganic chemicals

Solvents, such as those for pa.ints, lacqu,n·s, varnishes,
accelerators an.d ant1-oxydents
Preservatives
Tann1ng: agents

N:l,neral colors
Synthetic bulldh1£C mat.·:'Jrials

Light and heavy metals• including aluminum, magnesium
and the rare ana prev lous raetals

Synthetic gems
Synthetic perfumes

Insecticides and fungicides
Photographic production and equipment

Cell wood
l1a.yon

Celluloid

Plaatlcs

167
!•.

I

Synthetic rubber

Exr)losives
'1l'i'~r<\tes

Vi.~tra

atld .rert1l1zer-s

(r?ynthotl.c textUeB)

1

lHeproducsd from Jos<&ph i30r'J:\:1n and Charles A. Halsh • s
O()Ok, Q"'H'iaan:y 's !'las tli:ll' jJlan.
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